in due gradation, from that to the President's; he himself, on the contrary, giving his own opinion, as against attacking, first, or in order to indicate what he wished the votes of others to be, and then descending to the opinion of the lowest, according to succession of rank. Of the Council, as might be expected, a majority, or 9, inclusive of, and headed by, himself, decided against proceeding to engage. But the 7 others, inclusive of, and headed by, Major Coote, were of an opposite opinion; the Major, as spokesman of the glorious minority, arguing-that such a delay, to act in presence of the enemy, would abate the existing ardour and confidence of success in the soldiery, which it would be difficult to restore-that, through such a delay, the enemy might be both physically and morally strengthened, by a French reinforcement-that the English force could likewise be surrounded, its communication with Calcutta cut off, and thus as effectually ruined by delay, as by the loss of a battleand, therefore, that an immediate advance, to decide the contest, should be resolved on, or an immediate return to Calcutta. The consequence was, that, though Clive was necessarily successful in the Council of War, as seconded by the majority of votes, he, after the assembly broke up, reconsidered the matter, and became so convinced of the erroneous course he had advocated, and had led others to advocate-or to remain where they were, instead of pushing forward to fight-that his better sense came round to, and acted upon, the opinion of Coote, in issuing orders to pass the river next morning; by which movement, and its result, in the overthrow of the enemy, he reaped the fruits of superior advice to his own. The conduct of Coote in the council was duly supported by him in the field, or in the part he took at the ensuing discomfiture of the Nabob, which laid the foundation of the British Empire in India. To the comparative merits of Coote and of Clive on this important occasion, the remark of the Roman General in Livy would consequently apply, "that he is the first man, in point of abilities, who of himself forms good counsels; that the next is he, who submits to good advice." And the application of the remark is the more requisite as regards Clive, since he showed himself so unfair, in his subsequent parliamentary evidence on this subject, that he endeavoured to shift from himself to others every connexion with the very decision, which he had done his utmost to procure from them. "This," he said, was the only Council of War that ever I held; and, if I had abided by that Council, it would have been the ruin of the East India Company!" But was it not he who had influenced the majority of the Council to come to the decision they did ?—

66

"In all you speak, let truth and candour shine."-POPE.

Such, in the person of Coote, was the able adversary whom Lally had now to meet, under most unequal circumstances; or with every advantage on the side of that adversary, in the way of honest political support, and superior military and naval resources, for the campaign upon which he was to enter.

The English Governor and Council at Madras, to profit by the weakness of the French in the north, and thereby prevent them making any further use of their strength in the south, assembled, by November 25th, at Conjeveram, a superior force, of 1700 Europeans, including cavalry, 3000 Blacks, and 15 pieces of artillery, with which Coote, that day, took the field. Having led the French to think he designed attacking Arcot

first, although his real object was to reduce Wandewash, he appeared before, and raised his batteries against, the latter, on the 27th, and effected a breach by the 30th; when the native Kellidar, or Governor of the Fort, who had 500 men, being desirous of submitting on terms advantageous to himself, and the French contingent there consisting of but 68 Europeans and 100 Sepoys, a surrender took place. The principal French force at Chittapet being too small to intercept Coote, he next, or on December 3rd, invested Carangoly; by the 6th and 7th, opened fire from 2 batteries, likewise carrying on his approaches; and, on the 10th, being near the crest of the glacis, and having dismounted all the guns of the garrison but 4, the place was given up by the Irish officer in command there, named O'Kennelly,* of the Regiment of Lally; to whom, owing to his gallant defence, as well as a wish to gain time, and the fear of incurring the disgrace of a repulse, almost all that was asked, or favourable terms, were granted. The loss of Arcot, and of such an important territory as would accompany it, being now but too obviously at hand, if Coote's career could not be checked, Lally recalled in due haste the larger portion of his troops from about Seringham in the south; to which, as already observed, he would not have detached them from the rest, could he have maintained the whole together in the north; or if his only hope of any relief from his great distress for money had not arisen from the prospect of such an amount of revenue as might be drawn (free of official peculation) from the south. The troops this recalled, others to arrive under Bussy, at Arcot, and those hitherto obliged to keep on the defensive about Chittapet, would form as many as could be assembled, under the General himself, to deal with Coote; and that officer's further advance was, from the 16th, most effectively diverted, through a cloud of predatory horse, principally Mahrattas engaged by the French to harass him. Of those mounted ravagers, "which," writes Coote himself, "put me to the greatest distress for want of provisions, as they plundered all the country," another British authority more fully informs us, how every sort of pillage and devastation was extended, even on the north, or British side of the Paliar, to within 20 miles of Madras itself; and how thousands of cattle were swept away, which the enemy "sold to the 1st purchaser at 7 or 8 for a rupee, and then made them the booty of the next excursion. With this experience, the inhabitants would no longer redeem them; after which no submissions exempted themselves from the sword; and all abandoned the villages and open country, to seek shelter in the woods, forts, and hills, nearest their reach. Not a man ventured himself, or his bullock, with a bag of rice, to the camp, which, for 3 days, were totally deprived of this staple food." That destructive diversion by the hostile cavalry, the falling of such heavy rains, for a couple of days, as no tents couli resist, and a consequent necessity of affording his men some shelter and repose, compelled Coote, on the 19th, to canton his army in the Fort of Covrepauk, and the adjoining villages; and, having also to consult with the Presidency at Madras, he was not able to take the field again before the 26th, when he removed 6 miles from Covrepauk to Chinasimundrum. as presenting the site for "a very advantageous encampment." By tha:

The O'Kennellys were of the best old Ulster, or Irian, origin. The Lart tenant-Colonel became a Brigadier in 1769, and died previous to 1773. His wi a Mademoiselle Susan Darcy, is mentioned, as, in consideration of his services, pensioned, in 1789.

time, the increased French force, intended to act under Lally, with Bussy as next in command, was collected about Arcot, where Lally himself arrived on the following day. In this condition, or encamped but 5 miles from each other, though neither, for sufficient reasons, as yet ready to push matters to a decision, the 2 armies remained to the end of the month, and of the year 1759.

On consulting with Bussy respecting the best plan of action to be adopted against Coote, the leading measure advocated by Lally was the recapture of Wandewash. "Bussy, on the other hand, was of opinion, as the French were superior in cavalry, which would render it dangerous for the English to hazard a battle, except in circumstances of advantage, that they should avail themselves of this superiority, by acting upon the communications of the English, which would soon compel them either to fight at a disadvantage, or retire for subsistence to Madras: whereas, if they besieged Wandewash, the English would have 2 important advantages: one, that of fighting with only a part of the French army, while another part was engaged in the siege; the other, that of choosing the advantage of the ground, from the obligation of the French to cover the besiegers. At the same time, the motives of Lally were far from groundless. The mental state of the soldiers required some brilliant exploit, to raise them to the temper of animated action. He was deprived of all means of keeping the army for any considerable time in the field. By seizing the English magazines, he counted upon retarding, for several days, their march to the relief of Wandewash; and, as the English had breached the Fort, and taken it in 48 hours, he counted, and not unreasonably, upon rendering himself master of the place, before the English could arrive." Accordingly, from January 9th, artfully manœuvring in such a manner as drew Coote from Chinasimundrum, and caused him to resort to other precautions as in apprehension for the immediate safety of Wandewash, Lally, by the 12th, overreached him in arriving at Conjeveram, where, though disappointed in the expectation of finding magazines of rice for the English, the French met with, and carried off, 2000 bullocks, and other booty, on their march for Trivatore; and, the 14th, with a select division of European and Asiatic troops, and 4 field-guns, the General proceeded thence for Wandewash; leaving Bussy with the main body at Trivatore, as the best, or most central point, from which the division to attack Wandewash might be joined, if the English should march after it; or might be opposed and interrupted, should they menace Arcot, as a set-off against, or diversion from, the siege of Wandewash. After reaching that place, the same day, Lally lost no time in his arrangements to carry the pettah, or town, previous to assailing the Fort. The southern quarter, garrisoned with 330 men, (or 30 Europeans and 300 Sepoys,) by the Governor, Captain Sherlock, was to be assaulted, at 3 in the morning, by all the General's infantry, in 2 divisions. Of these, the inferior, or that whose Europeans consisted of the Marines, already mentioned as designated by Lally "the scum of the sea," was to act against the western rampart, merely as a diversion to the real attack in the opposite direction, "where the Europeans were of Lally's regiment," and to be "led by himself." Both divisions, being perceived by the garrison ere they could reach the foot of the wall, were suitably opposed, when the Marines verified the bad opinion which had been expressed of them, in breaking, and running round to the General's division; by which, being mistaken, in the dark

ness and confusion, for enemies, they were not undeservedly treated as such, until the error was detected. This disaster, through the misconduct of the Marines, caused nothing more to be attempted till 8 next morning. The whole of the infantry having then to advance, with 2 field-pieces at their head, against the south side, in 1 column, were exposed to such a fire, that the front of the column halted, without orders. Upon which, Lally rode up, got off his horse, called for volunteers, rushed to the ditch, was himself the 1st man to mount the wall, sword in hand, after 3 of the 7 volunteers who followed him had fallen about him; and his entire column, pouring into the town, obliged the garrison to escape through the streets into the Fort.

Had sufficient expedition been used in forwarding the heavy guns requisite for battering the Fort, and, could the engineers have afterwards been gotten to dispense with professional technicality, or pedantry, by hastening to direct a proper fire against the place, Lally's design of reduc ing it would seemingly have been accomplished, in ample time to antici pate Coote's arrival, for Sherlock's relief. Unfortunately, the siege artillery, from Valdore took several days to come up, or until the 20th when the General ordered the engineers, says Mill, "to batter in breach. with 3 cannon, upon 1 of the towers of the Fort, which was only protected by the fire of a single piece, and which, 5 weeks before, the English, with inferior means, had breached in 48 hours. But the engineers insisted upon erecting a battery, in exact conformity with the rules of the schools;" so that even "the soldiers, in derision, asked, F they were going to attack the fortifications of Luxemburgh?" Ani well might the soldiers have thus expressed themselves, since, ada Orme of Lally," he had reason to expect greater industry and spirit à the artillery, officers, and engineers, who might have breached the plac in half the time." These circumstances enabled Sherlock to hold t Fort, until Coote could arrive to raise the siege; for which purpose, appeared, with his army, on the morning of the 22nd, in view of the French camp. His approaches were so skilfully directed, that, afte proceeding along the foot of a mountain, until opposite the Fort a Wandewash, and then making a conversion of his lines to the right, be army "would immediately be formed in the strongest of situations their right protected by the fire of the Fort; their left by the impassabr ground under the mountain, and with the certainty of throwing a number of troops, without opposition, into the Fort; who, sallying the garrison to the other side, might easily drive the French from ther batteries in the town; from whence, the whole of the English ar might likewise advance against the French camp, with the choice attacking it either on the flank, or in the rear; where the main defence which had been prepared in the front of their encampment, or ar from the usual dispositions on this side, would become entirely useless." Lally no sooner saw this march commenced along the bottom of mountain, than equally detecting the drift of Coote's operation, resolved upon interrupting it, he left 150 of his Europeans and 300 s his Sepoys to man the siege-batteries, and attend to Captain Sherlock the Fort; drawing off the rest of his troops, disposable for action, to ground in front of his lines, or the direction in which he designedi engage the enemy.

* In this quotation from Orme, the 2 italicized words are adaptive substitu for "enemy" and "pettah," in the original.

The comparative strength of the French and English, for the ensuing battle of Wandewash, has been computed as follows:

"The

From about 7 to between 11 and 12 o'clock, there was much preliminary manoeuvring and skirmishing. The cannonade then became smarter, as both sides advanced to the more serious business of the day. When the English, towards 12 o'clock, were coming forward, Lally, from his right, thought he could perceive such an unsteadiness upon the hostile left, which he attributed to the effect of his artillery, that he proposed, by a wide and dashing sweep over the plain, to get round to, and fall upon, the horse of the English, in the rear, or 3rd line. He accordingly proceeded to his European cavalry, to turn, at their head, the apparently-favourable moment to account. The misconduct, however, which so far justified his subsequent complaint, "that his troops did their duty ill in this action," commenced here. cavalry refused to march. The General suspended the commanding officer, and ordered the 2nd Captain to take the command. He, also, disobeyed. Lally addressed himself to the men; and a Cornet crying out, that it was a shame to desert their General in the day of battle, the officer, who commanded upon the left, offered to put the troop in motion." Lally was quite correct, as to the wavering which existed in the quarter he hastened to assail; 9-10ths of Coote's cavalry there, or the Black horse, retiring in confusion, on witnessing the French advance; a body of Sepoys, who were to check that advance by a flanking musketry, displaying but too little resolution to do so; and only the 80 European horse of the English, and 2 guns, under Captain Barker,

I give the French, according to Lally's own enumeration of them, as cited by Mill, with the exception of their artillery in the action, which, in default of any statement on that head by Lally, (as so cited,) I enumerate from Orme. I give the English according to Cocte's total of their men and guns; merely adopting the proportions of their European and Black horse from Orme. It was only the Europeans, who were of consequence, on either side, as soldiers, in this action; and, without dwelling upon the various causes which existed for Coote's Europeans having been much superior in morale, discipline, and condition to Lally's, Coote, as having 1700, had a considerable advantage over Lally, with 1350 Europeans nominally, though, in effect, only his 900 regular infantry, and 150 cavalry, or merely 1050; the 300 Marines having shown themselves not to be relied on as soldiers. The comparative numbers of the 3 regular battalions or regiments of infantry in each army, between whom this engagement was fought and decided, would, on an average, be thus:-FRENCH: Lorrain's, Company's, Lally's, each 300, or total 900. ENGLISH: Coote's, Company's, Draper's, each 540, or total 1620. Even should we admit the 300 Marines to have been "all right," Lally would still have only 1200 infantry to Coote's 1620, and the latter still be, by upwards of a 4th, the more numerous. Neither Orme, nor Mill, would appear to have consulted the despatch of Coote, to whose alleged totals of his own men and guns, should we not adhere, “coute qui coute ?”