His Majesty sending out a general pardon and amnesty to all Buccaneer-pyrates, would soon bring in a great number of them, of all nations. They agree well together against the Spaniards, would be fit for any service, and soon be at Jamaica.

The French may have in America, by what I could observe myself, and learn of others, men fit for service.

Men.

The Spaniards have not, in all America, by the best informations I could get, one hundred thousand men; and, perhaps, not near so many. They are dispersed into several places, very distant one from another. It is easily to be believed, if we rightly consider the disposition of the Spaniards în general, the barrenness of their women, and the nature of the country, where they are for the most part settled.

New England and Virginia can afford some thousands of men more than I mention; Virginia especially, which has no troublesome neighbours to fear. Two-thirds of the inhabitants of NewEngland, all the people of Pescatway, Acadie, and Newfoundland, live and depend upon the fishing-trade; the best half of their ships go for Spain, Portugal, and the Streights; the rest are employed in voyages to the Southern Colonies; so that most of those people, if we have a war, will be at leisure, and may be very serviceable. In what I propose about the islands, an objection may arise, that they must keep their people to guard and defend themselves. But this may be remedied, by transporting thither good numbers of Scotch servants, engaged to serve, as usually, for so many years. The planters like them very well, and will freely entertain them. They will soon learn the use of their arms, and help to guard and defend the place.

When I consider the great inconveniences which I have observed to attend giving of the plunder to soldiers, the difficulties, or rather, the impossibilities of dividing it to their content and satisfaction, I cannot but urge and insist again, on what I had but hinted at before, That his Majesty would be pleased to grant and send his commissions to all the officers to be raised, to encourage them the better; and to allow them all, officers and soldiers, such a pay as they may deserve, and esteem just; considering that they shall have, whilst upon service, all provisions and ammunitions found at the king's charge.

And the king may easily do it, providing in time good store of beef and pork from Ireland; of beef and pork, salt-fish, bisket and pease, from New-England; and a ship or two loaded with salt, if possible, from France, being the best to preserve flesh and fish.

There is, in most parts of America, a vast number of cattle, wild and tame, of sheep, goats, and hogs, finding victuals for every body. Killing and destroying of cattle and stock should be strictly forbidden; and you may procure people, as butchers, and such like, whose whole business would be to dress and salt such meats. There is also, in some places, a great quantity of manatees, or sea-cows, of turtles, and other sorts of fish. The islands, likewise, will furnish abundance of rum, lime-juice, and sugar, to make drink.

If the King would be pleased to send some few officers of the Mint in his fleet, with all things necessary for coining: They may coin the Spanish gold and silver that should fall into our hands, and the army might be paid with it. This way would make a large addition to the English coin, to the great and general benefit of the

nation.

The taking of Canada may be easy enough, if we attack it at once, both by sea and land; and not as it was done lately, by very unskilful people. The keeping of Canada, and settling and fortifying that large island of Newfoundland, will hinder the French from fishing upon the great bank, and consequently diminish greatly, if not totally ruin their maritime power.

Martinico is the only place of strength the French have in America; its Fort-Royal is impregnable any other way than by famine, but it may easily be bombarded, whereby you may ruin and burn the houses and buildings in it; and perhaps the very magazines and cisterns, after which they cannot subsist long, and will be forced to surrender.

Granada is of very little strength, having but few inhabitants: its fort is on the top of a hill, and was surprised and taken by one Erasmus, a single Dutch privateer. Its harbour is very large, and capable of holding many of the greatest ships. This island is not subject to hurricanes, its situation lying near Trinity island, and the Spanish coast; and those other places, by which most of the Spanish ships pass in going to the West-India plantations, make it very considerable.

It has many rivers of excellent water; the land is hilly about the harbour, and the north side; but, towards the south and west, very level; cocoa trees, and the vanilio, grow there naturally.

In lieu of sending two regiments (as it is discoursed of) to Jamaica, I would only draw detachments from all the regiments here in England, and Ireland, perhaps, also, from Scotland; model them all into independent companies, and give them commanders out of the reformed and half-pay officers.

The regiments, keeping all their officers, would soon recruit, and be filled again, with new soldiers, who would presently be disciplined; and these independent companies would be as serviceable as if they were regimented, and be of less charge to the nation.

I would also propose to send these companies, as soon as possible, to the north continent of America: for example, two to Newfoundland, six to New-England, four to New-York, ands of all the other companies; it would make no great noise, and alarm no body, not being likely to be thought, or presumed to intend, farther than the defence of all those places. The transport from that northern continent, to the southward, is very easy, and may be done at any time, together with the provisions, all the parts of New-England having a great number of ships of their own.

The sending of two regiments to the island of Jamaica will cause many inconveniences. Jamaica is unhealthy, and many will be sick and die, before you can bring them to action. The northern parts of America are as healthy as England. Jamaica lies to the leeward of all the French colonies, so that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible, always very tedious, and long, to turn up to the windward; the winds are contrary, and the current is against you, very often so strong, that a brisk, favourable, westerly wind cannot make you overcome it.

I would gather all the forces to the islands of Barbadoes and the Caribbees they lie to the westward of all the French and Spanish colonies; the wind is always favourable to go to them at pleasure.

I humbly propose the attacking of the French first. If a war breaks out towards the spring, most of the forces being ready in the continent of New England, I would begin, by attacking Canada by sea and land in the beginning of the summer; the conquest of it may be thoroughly perfected before the fit time of attempting any considerable action in the southern colonies.

The timing well your attempt is so very necessary, that, without it, you cannot, with any probability, succeed; yet it has been hitherto so little regarded, that all our fleets for the West Indies, in the late war, arrived always, and thought of some action, when the hurricanes began to be feared and expected.

It was very far in June, when we attacked St. Christophers; it was the beginning of it, also, when we landed at Martinico; and it was also in June, when Willmot and Lillingston attacked Port de Paix in Hispaniola.

Had Ruiter been at Martinico any other time but June, he would have certainly taken it The Dutch committed many errors in their attack; but the only thing, which forced them to withdraw, was, that, it being hurricane time, Ruiter, seeing great appearance of a storm, would not venture his fleet, and caused that sudden retreat.

The French, who were but few, had no other defence, but a very bad pallisado, and a narrow trench, almost filled up in many places, could not possibly have resisted a brisk attack with sword and pistol in hand. But the Dutch must needs land in order, though they saw nobody to oppose their landing, and would not advance upon the enemy, until they had formed their battalions, as if they had been in a pitched battle; they were all this while exposed, from head to foot, to the musquets of the enemy, and the great and small guns of a man of war, which lay in the then careening place, commanded by Monsieur d'Amblimont, who died lately General for the French King in America. The same night the Dutch retreated, the French left and abandoned their fort, judging it untenable, and expecting the Dutch would have stormed it the next morning.

All things should be so ordered, that the fleet and forces may arrive where you intend to make your attack. In the beginning of October, the hurricane time is just over, and you may venture your fleet any where, during nine months, and you have then three months that the heat is but moderate, and the weather, for the most part, very clear and dry; the best time for action.

I would put the forces upon action and attack, as soon as they arrive; and so make the best use of their strength and health, and not stay until the heat of the weather, or any other cause, should pull their courage down, or they should fall sick, and be out of order.

In the West Indies, I would begin with Martinico; take that

island from the French, and you will ruin them in all their colonies there they keep all their stores for ships and land forces. It is easy to block up Fort Royal by sea and land; by falling upon the island unexpectedly, and landing near the fort of a sudden, you may hinder the people from going and carrying any provisions and water into the fort; and dry weather may happen, so that there may be but little water in the cistern. One may encamp round about it very well, and commodiously, all along a river of good water: the country about it is also full of provisions.

The fort being besieged and blocked up, I would ply them night and day with bombs and carcases, in order to burn and destroy their houses, magazines, and cisterns. From some of the neighbouring hills, guns may shoot at random into the fort, and, raking along, may do much damage.

Having left people enough to maintain and continue the siege, some considerable body of forces may be sent all over the island to subdue it; which I am confident would be easy enough, especially, if his Majesty, intending the conquest of all the colonies, would give out and proclaim, that he intends to keep the island to himself, and would receive its inhabitants into his protection as subjects, and so forbid burning and destroying of plantations and houses. Very many, if not all, would submit; and it would be easy afterwards to banish and force away those, that should be deemed unfit to be kept there as inhabitants.

I would also take, keep, and fortify, the island of Granada; it has an excellent large harbour; it is never troubled with hurricanes. And the Spanish ships, going to their western plantations, pass near and often in sight of it. That island is better than any of the English Caribbees, Barbadoes excepted. It might soon be settled, and made a profitable colony.

All the rest of the French colonies would easily be subdued. I would ruin them, and transport what I would keep of them, to Martinico, or Granada. There are still, in the French islands, many Protestants, French and Dutch, who may be trusted and depended upon.

The taking of Martinico would discourage the French, and, I am confident, would hinder them from assisting the Spaniards in the West Indies. How could they with reason venture out thither a considerable fleet, after the loss of Martinico, the only strong hold they have, being sensible that the English can be always their superiors in those parts, whensoever they please?

All our Caribbee islands being secured by the taking and keeping Martinico, some few frigates might suffice to protect and defend them from any insult, and they may spare some of their people to help to attack the Spaniards.

The island of Cuba is that of the Spanish I would begin with. The Havannah, its chief town, is very strong on the harbour and sea-side; but would be easily enough taken, if besieged on the country and land-side; and, as we commonly say, in form, with those preparations that are requisite in sieges. You may land in many places, and the march is easy from thence to the town: the