ftill more wonderful formation of the powers and faculties of our minds, that one fhould imagine it could never be called in queftion. It is certain, however, that there have ⚫ been men, both in ancient and in modern times, who have exerted all their abilities to weaken this important truth. It is proper, therefore, to understand thoroughly the grounds -on which it is founded, and to be able to refute the atheistical reafonings of thofe who have oppofed it. It is extremely furprifing, that fome men have employed fo much ingenuity and difplayed fuch abilities in endeavouring to explode this truth, fince it is evident that the light of the fun is not more neceffary to chear and refresh our planetary fyftem, than the exiftence of a father of the univerfe to give comfort to every rational mind. As it is of the highest importance, both to the happiness of individuals and of human fociety in general, to have just and rational conceptions of the deity, of his perfections and providence, deeply impreffed on the mind, every attempt to promote fo defirable an end must meet with the approbation of all wife and good men; and this is due to the performance now under confideration. In the introduction we are prefented with a view of the arguments that have been used for proving the existence and attributes of God, and the reafons for propofing a new one. The author obferves, that there are two general ways of reafoning upon this fubject, a priori and a pofteriori; or, according to what is commonly called the fynthetic and analytic methods. We treat this fubje&t fynthetically when we lay down fome felf-evident truths or axioms, and deduce by a train of juft reafoning the confequences neceffarily refulting from them. We treat it analytically, when we begin with phænomena themselves, and trace them up to their original, and from the known properties of thefe phoenomena arrive at the nature of these methods of reasoning; how far each of them has been carried, and with what degree of evidence they have proved their conclufions. This our author has done by giving a fhort, comprehenfive, and elegant view of the principal arguments ufed by the following celebrated writers on the being and attributes of God: Mr. Locke, Dr. Samuel Clarke, Dr. Fiddes, and Mr. Wollafton. He likewife makes fome very juft reflections on the arguments ufed by these authors, and points out feveral mistakes into which they have fallen. He alfo enumerates the objections of fceptical writers, particularly thofe of Spinoza and Hume, against these modes of reafoning, and anfwers them in a fatisfactory manner. Our author next informs us, that many writers have thought it impoffible to treat this fubject in a demonftrative manner. He takes notice of the chief ob jections to this mode of reafoning, and endeavours to answer them. Having read fome treatifes which appeared to him plainly defigned to preclude every avenue that could lead to the proof of one all perfect author of the univerfe, he conceived an earneft defire to fee the important queftion concerning the being and perfections of God, treated in a concise, and if poffible, demonftrative manner. Accordingly, from one fimple principle or axiom, he fets himself to demonftrate nine propofitions, which prove the being and abfolute perfection of God. Most of thefe propofitions are demonftrated indiretly; that is, they are proved to be true, by fhewing that an abfurdity would follow the fuppofition that they are falfe. It is obvious to any one acquainted with the principles of mathematics, that an indirect demonftration, or a demonftration ducens ad abfurdum, is as juft and true as a direct demonftration. Accordingly it is often ufed by Euclid and other mathematicians. But though this be the cafe, it is not fo pleafing to the mind as a direct demonstration, where we not only fee ; he proof of the propofition, but every link of the chain of which the proof confifts, deduced by juft reafoning from certain axioms or firft principles, which are the foundation of all reafoning. We shall give our readers a fpecimen of the performance before us, and of our authors's manner of reafoning, by quoting his first axiom and his firft proposition. AN AXIOM. Whatever is contingent, or might poffibly have been otherwife than it is, had fome caufe which determined it to be what it is. Or, in other words: if two different or contrary things were each of them poffible, which ever of them took place, or came to pass, it must have done fo in confequence of fome caufe which determined that if, and not the other, fhould take place. PROPOSITION. THERE must be in the universe fome one Being, at least, whofe non-existence is impoffible, whofe exiftence had no caufe, no beginning, and can have no end. If there is no Being in the univerfe but fuch as might poffibly have not exifted, it would follow, that poffibly there might have been no existence at all. And then these two cafes, viz. that there might, and that there might not have been existence, being equally poffible, the former could not have taken place rather than the latter, but in confequence of its having been determined, by fome means or other, that it fhould take place. (Axiom.) But this determination could never have been made, unlefs fome Being could have determined its own existence, and have been the cause of itself; which it would be abfurd to fuppofe. Therefore, it is not poffible that there might E e 4 have have been no existence at all. Confequently an impoffibility of not exifting must be found fomewhere, that is, there must be fome one Being, at leaft, whofe non-existence is impoffible. And as this impoffibility of his not exifting is abfolute, or unconditional, and depends not on any fuppofition, it must be at all times the fame : fo that this Being never was nor can become non-existent, but has an existence without a beginning and without a poflibility of ending. 'As no caufe could have determined that this Being should exft, or have given to him that existence which it is impoffible but he must always have had; he must be unoriginated and have existence in himfelf independent on any caufe, or be felf-exiftent. Thus it is proved, that there must be, at least, fome one Being, whatever it is, who cannot but exist, whofe exiltençe had no caufe, no beginning, and can have no end. And fince this Being is fuch that his non-existence is impoffible, he does not exist contingently but neceffarily neceffity is the mode of his exittence. It need not now be confidered whether there is only one fuch Being, or whether there may be in the univerfe many Beings, each unoriginated and having existence in itself independent of any caufe. It is fufficient, at prefent, that we know there must be one fuch Being, whofe nature we may therefore make the subject of our further inquiries.' If we attend minutely to the nature of demonftration, as it is exemplified in the pure and abftracted reafonings of logicians, and particularly by Euclid and other mathematicians; and were we to confider farther the fpecific difference between demonftrative and probable evidence, we might juftly conclude, that Dr. Hamilton had not, in the proper and ftri&t fenfe of the word, demonftrated the existence and abfolute perfection of the fupreme unoriginated Being. Nor does this important truth, perhaps, admit of metaphyfical or mathematical demonftration, though it certainly does of the highest degree of moral evidence. Yet, abftracted fpeculation, however it may leave the mind in doubt and fufpenfe concerning those unfathomable objects of eternity, and neceffary existence, does certainly tend to thew, that the hypothefis of an eternal mind is not encumbered with fo many difficulties as the other alternative of eternal matter, or an infinite fucceffion of dependent Beings. It humbles the pride, if it does not wholly fatisfy the precifion of rea fon; and prepares the mind for the reception of truth, on fuch probable evidence as must ever-carry conviction where the heart is not pre-engaged, and has not taken part against it. Dr. Hamilton has perceived and offered, at least ingeniqus and plaufible remedies, for the defects of fome of the links in the chains of his predeceffors in the walk of the moft fublime of all fpeculations. He treats his great fubject with order, perfpicuity, and elegance. His book will be read with pleasure by eyery Theift, and indeed by all lovers of abftracted reafoning on objects which cannot but obtrude themselves on the moft fceptical minds. ART, 2 ART IX. A letter to the People of Scotland, on the alarming Attempt to infringe the Articles of the Union, and introduce a moft perniciqus Innovation, by diminishing the Number of the Lords of Sefion. By James Bofwell, Efq; 8vo. 2s. 6d. Dilly. TH HIS is in our opinion, the best performance which has proceeded from the pen of Mr. Bofwell; and it is with a fincere pleafure that we applaud his public virtue and patriotifm. The pernicious fcheme of invading the Union, appears to have originated in the crocked policy of Henry Dundas, fometimes termed Harry the Ninth, from the defpotical principles upon which he acts, and in that of his fubfervient friend Mr. Ilay Campbell, the prefent Lord Advocate for Scotland. " At a period, when the lofs of the American provinces is recent, and when the difturbances of Ireland are by no means fettled, it is to the highest degree furprising that a plan fhould be formed to excite diffentions in Scotland. It would feem that the prefent miniflry, by giving encouragement to Mr. Dundas and his affociate, were defirous of removing Scotland from all connection with England, and of advancing the calamities of this unfortunate country. For to what point but to open rebellion, muft it lead, to infult and to deftroy the most valuable and the most guarded rights of the Scottish nation? After an attempt fo nefarious, after a project fo traiterous, if the people of Scotland can confide in Mr. Dundas, and the Lord Advocate, they must be corrupted indeed! The inhabitants of England will carry, upon this occafion, a penetrating eye to their conduct; and if the Scots fhall difplay the fymptoms of abjectness and fervility, their reputation will be loft for ever. With refpect to argument, it is almoft unneceffary to obferve, that Mr. Bofwell is decidedly clear and convincing.For the encroachment fo profligately in agitation, is in the moft flagrant oppofition to the precife and definitive language of the treaty of union. It is alfo apparent, that by the diminution of the number of the Scots Judges, Mr. Dundas and Mr. Campbell had it in their view to fway and direct the more completely the Court of Seffion in Scotland.. For, of late years, that unhappy jurifdiction has been confidered as a political engine; and it is an obvious axiom of polity, that it is much easier to command a body which confists of a few members, than of many. Mr. Bofwell has touched upon the daring fpirit of Mr. Dundas, who affects not only to govern Scotland, but even the prefent administration. The ftroke however of his fatire is not fufficiently fharp. He indeed appeals to the power of this politician, but he does not apply himfelf to defcribe his principles. Do any of you want to be informed of Mr. Hen. Dundas's power? I dare fay not. Care is taken that its full extent shall be proclaimed as far as Orkney. Yet let us contemplate a striking instance ;` it would make a picture for the exhibition, or a fcene at Aftley's. Behold him in your metropolis, which the death of Sir Laurence Dundas left open to him. With his right hand he has moved the Lord Provost, Hunter Blair, (gold chain and all) from his political bafe. With his left he has thruft in as reprefentative of the citizens of Edinburgh-Whom?-a refpectable merchant? No-A profperous tradesman ? No.-A Coutts, the father of the great establifhment in the Strand, London? No.-Kerr, whom Pelham loved? No.-A citizen of any fort, good, bad, or indifferent? No, no. no. Whom then? Why, Sir Adam Ferguson, advocate, the late member for the county of Ayre! Sir Adam Ferguson wrote a circular letter against peers interfering in our county election, and feveral very worthy gentlemen joined the ftandard of independency, as then imagined, which he erected, Carrying them along with him, and yet haying his peers as well as we," he contrived to poffefs, for two parliaments, the reprefentation of Ayreshire, by means of thofe fuperiority votes, which that county has declared to be nominal and fictitious, while the real interest was unreprefented. Sir Adam Ferguson last year, as we are told, made overtures to the Earl of Eglintoune, and formed a coalition with his lordship. That he was not elected, we know; that he voted for his former appointment, we know; and it is faid he fupports the Earl's friend for one parliament, and the Earl is to make him member next parliamentif he can. As to all this power affumed by Mr. Dundas, I must fay miror! But I certainly do not blame him, as Cato fays, when his gallant fon Marcus is brought in dead, "Who would not be that youth?" -The proverb fays, "A living dog is better than a dead lion." What then must a living lion be? But under what genus, under what fpecies, are they to be ranked, whofe pufillanimity is the caufe that this lion alone domineers in the foreft? Our late and prefent fituation brings to my remembrance fome verfes in an old poem, which I have heard my father repeat: they are a kind of imprecation applicable to a coalition which in the lait age took place in Scot land: May eke thae men o' mony wimples, Rule aw our lords and lairds like affes !". Among the politicians who will befriend the Scots in protecting the Union, it appears to us very remarkable, that Mr. Bofwell fhould have included the prefent premier. And fhall we be fo unjuft to the Minifter of the Crown, to the fecond William Pitt, as to apprehend that he will not hear us ?— He who first took, he who still holds the reins of government, with the hearty concurrence, the generous applause of an admiring nation! He whofe nobleness of foul has fo remarkably fhewn how open he is to conviction ! I can have no doubt that, when he has made him |