with the approbation and mediation of her greatest counsellors, might prevail in a greater matter than this; and urged her, that though she could not signify her mind to others, I might have a secret promise, wherein I should receive great comfort, as in the contrary great unkindness. She said she was neither persuaded nor would hear of it till Easter, when she might advise with her council, who where now all absent; and therefore, in passion bid me go to bed, if I would talk of nothing else. Wherefore in passion I went away, saying, while I was with her, I could not but solicit for the cause and the man I so much affected; and therefore I would retire myself till I might be more graciously heard; and so we parted.. To morrow I will go hence of purpose, and on Thursday I will write an expostulating letter to her. That night or upon Friday morning I will be here again, and follow on the same course, stirring a discontentment in her, &c. And so wish you all happiness, and rest

Your most assured friend,

ESSEX.

NOTE (C.) P. 53.

'A TRUE remembrance,' says Bacon, of the abuse I received of Mr. Attorney-General, [sir Edward Coke] publicly in the Exchequer the first day of term; for the truth whereof I refer myself to all that were present. 'I moved to have a reseizure of the lands of George More, a relapsed recusant, a fugitive, and a practising traitor; and showed better matter for the Queen against the discharge by plea, which is ever with a "salvo jure." And this I did in as gentle and reasonable terms as might be.

'Mr. Attorney kindled at it, and said, "Mr. Bacon, if you have any tooth against me, pluck it out; for it will do you more hurt than all the teeth in your head will do you good." I answered coldly in these very words; "Mr. Attorney, I respect you; I fear you not; and the less you speak of your own greatness, the more I will think of it."

'He replied, "I think scorn to stand upon terms of greatness towards you, who are less than little; less than the least;" and other such strange light terms he gave me, with that insulting, which cannot be expressed.

'Herewith stirred, yet I said no more but this: "Mr.

Attorney, do not depress me so far; for I have been your better, and may be again, when it please the Queen."

"With this he spake, neither I nor himself could tell what; as if he had been born attorney-general; and in the end bade me not meddle with the Queen's business, but with mine own; and that I was unsworn, etc. I told him, sworn or unsworn was all one to an honest man; and that I ever set my service first, and myself second; and wished to God, that he would do the like.

Then he said, it were good to clap a "cap. utlegatum" on my back! to which I only said he could not, and that he was at fault; for he hunted upon an old

scent.

'He gave me a number of disgraceful words besides; which I answered with silence, and showing, that I was not moved with them.Bacon's Works, vol. 7, p. 338.

NOTE (D.) P. 150.

'THE term Induction (izaywyn) has been employed to denote three very different things:-1. The objective process of investigating particular facts as preparatory to illation;-2. A material illation of the universal

from the singular, warranted either by the general analogies of nature, or by special presumptions afforded by the object matter of any real science;-3. A formal illation of the universal from the individual, as legiti mated solely by the laws of thought, and abstracted from the conditions of any particular matter.

"That the first of these, an inventive process, is beyond the sphere of a critical science, is manifest; nor has Induction, in this abusive application of the term, been ever arrogated to Logic. By logicians, however, the second and third have been confounded into one, and, under every phasis of misconception, treated as a simple and purely logical operation. Yet nothing can be clearer than that these constitute two separate acts, and that the second is not properly a logical process at all. In logic, all inference is determined ratione formæ, the conclusion being necessarily implied in the very conception of the premises. In this second Induction, on the contrary, the illation is effected vi materia, on grounds not involved in the notion of its antecedent. To take, for example, Dr. Whately's instance: The naturalist who, from the proposition-ox, sheep, deer, goat, (i. e. some) horned animals, ruminate,' infers the conclusion-all horned animals ruminate,' may be warranted in this procedure by the material probabilities of his science; but his illation is logically vi

cious. Here the inference is not necessitated by the laws of thought; the some of the antecedent, as it is not thought either to contain or constitute, so it does not mentally determine, the all of the consequent; and the reasoner must transcend the sphere of logic if he would attempt to vindicate the truth of his conclusion. And yet, this has by logicians been almost universally done. Induction they have distinguished into perfect and imperfect, according as the whole concluded was inferred from all, or from some only of its constituent parts. They thus involved themselves in a twofold absurdity. For, on the one hand, they recognised the consequence of the imperfect Induction to be legitimate, though, admitting it to be not necessarily cogent; as if logic could infer with a degree of certainty inferior to the highest; and, on the other, they attempted to corroborate this imbecility, by calling in real presumptions-physical, psychological, metaphysical-which logic could neither, as a formal science, know, nor, as an apodictic science, take into account. This was a corollary of the fundamental error to which we have already alluded-the non-exclusion of all material modality from the domain of logic. Thus, it was maintained, that, in necessary matter, the imperfect Induction was necessarily conclusive; as if logic could be aware of what was necessary matter-as if, indeed, this were not itself the fre