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Aiyong substances some are called simple, some are commons, pound, whether the words be taken in a philosophical or a vulgar sense. . . * i ii'$ 10.1
Simple substances, in a philosophical sense, are either spirits, which have no manner of composition in them, and in this sense God is called a simple being; or they are the first principles of bodies, which are usually called elements, of which all other bodies are compounded : elements are such substa bces as cannot be resolved, or reduced, into two or more substances of different kinds.
The various sects of philosoplaurs have attributed the honour of this name to various things. The peripateticks or followers: of Aristotle made fire, air, earth and water, to be the four ele. ments of whiclı all earthly things were compounded, and they supposed the heavens to be a quintessence, or a fifth sort of body distinct from all these ; but since experimental pbilosophy and mathematics: bave been better understood, this doctrine has been abundantly refuted. The chemists make spirits, salls, sulphur, water, and earth to be their five elements, because they can reduce all terrestrial things to these five; this seems to como nearer the truth ; though they are not all agreed in this enumere ation of elements. In short, our modern philosophers generally, suppose matter or body to be one simple principle, or solid ex tension, which being diversified by its various shapes, quantities motions, and situations, makes all the varieties that are found in the universe ; and therefore they make little use of the word element.
Tit! Compound substances are made made up of two or more simple substances ; so every thing in this whole material creation, that can be reduced by the art of man into two or more difin ferent principles or substances, is a compound body in the philosophical sevse.
But if we take the words simple and compound in a vulgar sense, then all those are simple substances, which are generally esteemed uniform in their naturen. So every herb is called a simple; and every metal and mineral, though the chemist perhaps may find all his several elements in each of them. So a
Me. Locke in his. Essay of Hum. Und, Book II. Chap 22. 91% segtas 10 ridicule ibje common idea of substance, wbich meo bave generally supposed to be'a sort of substralum distinct from all properties whatsoever, and to be the supo port of all properties. Yet, in Book IV. Chap. 3. $ 6. be seems to suppose there may be some such upknowo substratow, which may be capable of receiving the properties both of maller aod miod, pamely, extension, salidity, a od cogitauiopia for he supposes it possible for God to add cogilation to that substance.which ! corporeal, and thus to cause matter to think. If this be true, then spirits for ought we kno) may be corporeal beings, or thinking bodies, which is a doc$7196 too favourable to the mortality of the soul. But I leave ithese debutes to the • philosophers of the age, aod will not be too positive in my opinion of abis abstroser subject..." is? Enfants*
: * : 134,90 biswil to See more of this argument ia Philosophical Essays, before cited, Essay .
peedle is a simple body, being only made of steel; but a sword or a knife is a compound, because its baft or handle is made of materials diferent from the blade. So the bark of Pery, or the juice of sorrel is a simple medicine : But when the apothecaries' art has mingled several simples together, it beconues a compound as diascordium or mithridate."?
"The terms of pure and misl, when applied to bodies, are much a-kin to simple and compound. So a guinea is pure gold, if it has nothing but gold in it, without any alloy, or baser metal; but if any other mineral or metal be mingled with it, it is called a mixt substance or body.
Substances are also divided into animate and inanimate.= Animate substances are either animal or vegetable.* 1,'%!
Sonie of the animated substances have various orgánical or instrumental 'parts fitted for a variety of motions from place to place, and a spring 'of life within themselves, as beasts, birds, fishes, and insects, these are called 'animals. Other animated substances are called vegetables, which have within themselves the principles of another sort of life and growth, and of various production of leaves, flowers, and fruit, such as we see in plants, herbs and trees. One
'And there are other substances, which are called inanimate" because they liave no sort of life in them, 'as earth, stone, air, water, &c.
There is also one sort of substance or being, wliich is como pounded of body and mind, or a rational spirit united to au ani" mal; such is mankind. “Angels, or any other beings of the spi ritual and invisible world, who have assumed visible shapes for a season, can hardly' be reckoned among this order of compound, ed beings, because they drop their bodies, and divest themselves of those visible shapes when their particular méssage is performed, and thereby shew that these bodies do not belong to their patures. Sect, dll. Of Modes in their various Kinds and first of esa
is pjesni sential and accidental Modes. isi indiau buste des
THE next sort of objects which are represented in our ideas are called modés or manners of being.f
• A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to, and subsisting by the help of
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* Note, végelables as well as animals, have gotten the name of animated substances, because some of the ancient's supposed herb's and plants, beagts, birds, &c. to have sort of souls distinct from matter or body.
W 101 *** Note, Tbe term mode, is by some authors, applied chirfly to the relationso or relative map ners of beingá Bút sau logical treatises it is ofven used in a largons senses and exiends to all attributes whatsoever, and includes the most essequind and inward properties, as well as outward respects and relations, and reaches Los esliong ibemselves as well as manners of action. I p. 1041916 and 10 plumb
some substance, which, for that reason, is called its subject. A mode inust depend on that substance for its very existence and being; and that not as a beiog depends on its cause, (for so substances themselves depend on God their Creator ;) but the very being of a mode depends on some substance for its subject, in which it is, or to which it belongs ; so motion, shape, quantily, weight, are modes of body; knowledge, wit, folly, love, doubting, judging, are modes of the mind; for the one cannot subsist without body, and the other cannot subsist without mind,
Modes have their several divisions, as well as substances...
An essential mode or attribute, is that which belongs to the very nature or essence of the subject wherein it is; and the sub. ject can never have the same pature without it; such is roundness in a bowl, hardness in a stone, softness in water, vital motion in an animal, solidity in matter, thinking in a spirit; for though that piece of wood which is now a bowl may be inade square, yet if the roundness be taken away, it is no longer a bowl; so that very flesh and bones, which is now an animal, may be without life or inward motion ; but if all motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an animal, but a carcass ; so if a body of matter be divested of solidity, it is a mere void space or nothing; and if spirit be entirely without thinking, I have no idea of any thing: that is left in it; therefore so far as I ain able to judge, consciousness must be its essential attribute ;* thus all the perfections of God are called his attributes, for he cannot be without them.
An essential mode is either primary or secondary.
A primary essential mode is the first, or chief thing that constitutes any being in its particular essence or nature, and inakes it to be that which it is, and distinguishes it froin all other beings : this is called the difference in the definition of things, of which hereafter; so roundness is the primary essential mode, or tbe difference of a bowl; the meeling of two lines is the primary essential mode, or the difference of an angle; the perpendicularity of these lines to each other is the difference, or a right angle; solid entension is the primary attribute, or difference of matter; consciousness, or at least a power of thinking, is the difference or primary attribute of a spirit,t and to fear and love God is the primary attribute of a pious man.
"A secondary essential mode is any other attribute of a thing,
* Note, When I call solid extension an essential mode or attribute of 'mat ter, and a power of thinking an essential mode or attribute of a spirit, I do it in compliance with common fornis of speech; but perbaps 'io reality (bese are the very essences of substances themselves, sod the inost substantial ideas that, we can frame of body and spist, and have vo need of any (we know oot what) shstrehim or unintelligible sabstance to support them in their existence or belag.
* See the note in the foregoing and tuje page.. : ' • 51.! All'epit
which is not of primary consideration ; this is called a property; sometimes indeed it goes toward inaking up the essence, espeo : cially of a complex being, so far as we were acquainted with it; sometimes it depends upon, and follows from the essence of it ;! 80 volubility, or aptness to roll, is the property of a bowl, and , is derived from its roundness. Mobility and figure or shape are properties of matter; and it is the property of a pious man to. love his neighbour. . An accidental mode or an accident, is such a mode as is not necessary to the being of a thing, for the subject may be without it, and yet remain of the same nature that it was before; or, it is that mode which may be separated or abolished from its subject; 80 smoothness, or roughness, blackness, or whiteness, motion or rest are the accidents of a bowl; for these may be all changed, and yet the body remain a bowl still ; leurning, justice, folly, sickness, health, are the accidents of a man; motion, squareness, or any particular shape or size, are the accidents of body ; yet shape and size in general are essential modes of it, for a body must have some size or shape, por can it be without them; so hope, fear, wishing, assenting, and doubting, are accidents of the mind though thinking in general seems to be essential to it.
Here observe, that the name of accident has been oftentimes given by the old peripatetick philosophers to all modes, wliether essential or accidental; but the moderns confine this word accident to the sense in which I have described it.
Here it should be noted also, that though the word property be limited sometimes in logical treatises to the secondary essential mode, yet it is used in common language to signify these four sorts of modes; of which some are essential, and some accidental.
. (1.) Such as belong to every subject of that kind, but not only to those subjects. So yellow colour and ductilily are pro. perties of gold, they belong to all gold, but not only to gold; for saffion is also yellow, and lead is ductile.
(2.) Such as belong only to one kind of subject, but not to every subject of that kind. So learning, reading, and writing are properties of human nature; they belong only to man, but not to all men.
(3.) Such as belong to every subject of one kind, and only to them, but not always. So speech or language is a property of man, for it belongs to all men, and to men only; but incn are not always speaking.
.. (4.) Such'as belong to every subject of one kind, and to themonly and always. So shape and divisibility are properties of hody; 80 omniscience and omnipotence are properties of the divine nature ; for in this sense properties and attributes are the same, and except iq logical treatises there is scarce any distinction made between them. These are called propria quarto mode in the schools, or properties of the fourth sort..
Note, Where there is any one property or essential attribute, so superior to the rest, that it appears plainly that all the rest are derived from it, and such as is sufficient to give a full distinction of that subject from all other subjects, this attribute or property is called the essential difference, as is before declared ; and we commonly say, the essence of the thing consists in it, so the essence of matter in general seems to consist in solidity or solid extension. But for the most part we are so much at a loss in finding out the intimate essence of particular natural bodies, that we are forced to distinguish the essential difference of most things by a cumbination of properties. So a sparrow is a bird which has such coloured feathers, and such a particular size, shape, and motion. So wormwood is an herb which has such a leaf of such' a colour, and shape, and taste, and such a root, and stalk. So beasts and fishes, minerals, metals, and works of art sometimes, as well as of nature, are distinguished by such a collection of properties.
Sect. IV.-The farther Divisions of Mode. :;: II. THE second division of modes is into absolute and relative. An absolute mode is that which belongs to its subject, without respect to any other beings whatsoever : but a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being has to others. So roundness and smoothness are the absolute modes of a bowl ; for if there were nothing else existing in the whole creation, a bowl might be round and smooth; but greatness and smallness are relative modes; for the very ideas of them are derived inerely from the comparison of one being with others; a bowl of four inches diameter is very great, compared with one of an inch avd au half; but it is very small in comparison of another bowl, whose diaweter is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the absolute mode of a body, but swifiness or slowness are relative ideas, for the inotion of a bowl on a bowling-green, is swift, when compared with a snail ; and it is slow, when compared with a cannon bullet. : These relative modes are largely treated of by some logical and metaphysical writers under the name of relation : and these relations themselves are fartber subdivided into such as arise from the nature of things, and such as arise merely from the operations of our minds ; one sort are called real relations, the other mental; so the likeness of one egg to another, is a real relation, because it arises from the real nature of things ; for whether there was any man or mind to conceive it or no, one egg - would be like another : but when we consider an egg is a noua substantive in grammar, or as signified by the letters e, g, g, these are mere mental relations, and derive their very nature