rior of Spain. According to Diodorus Siculus, they were a people composed of two nations, the Iberians and the Celtes.

117. 2. Delphinus, ut Arionem Methymnæum. A well known fable related by Herodotus, (I. 23. 24.) and Ovid. (Fast. II. 83.) 117. 4. Neptunii. The fable says that the horses which drew the chariot of Pelops had wings, and that they had been given by Neptune; the meaning of which is, if we may believe Pindar and Palæphatus, that Pelops made use of a ship with sails to carry off Hippodamia.

BOOK III.

118. 4. Deorum immortalium. Apollo and his son Esculapius, the latter having been deified on account of his skill in the healing art.

120. 9. Imago; "an echo."

(Carm. I. 12.)

So in Horace,

121. 22. Hortensio. One of the philosophical works of Cicero, often cited, and highly commended by Augustine. It was published in the way of dialogue, in honor of his deceased friend; where in a debate of learning, he undertook, as he had often done in contests at the bar, the defence of philosophy against Hortensius, to whom he assigned the part of arraigning it. See note 41. 4.

121. 22. De maximis rebus. Pertaining to philosophy, of which our author treats in his Acad. Quæst. and books De Finibus Bon. et Mal.

122. 5. In sapientem ægritudo. The Stoics advanced many extravagant opinions concerning their wise man. For example, that he feels neither pain nor pleasure; that he exercises no pity; that he is free from faults; that he is divine; that he can neither deceive nor be deceived; that he does all things well; that he alone is great, noble, ingenious; that he is the only friend; that he alone is free; that he is a prophet, a prince and a king, and the like. These paradoxical vauntings were humorously ridiculed by Horace, Serm. I. sat. 3. The Stoics, however, did not suppose their wise man actually existed; but they formed in their imagination an image of perfection towards which every man should constantly aspire.

123. 9. Igitur insaniunt. It was a paradox of the Stoics, that all fools were mad. Horace says, (Serm. II. 3. 43.)

Quem mala stultitia, et quemcumque inscitia veri

Cœcum agit, insanum Chrysippi porticus et grex
Autumat.

124. 26. Ajacem [Telamonium]. See note 65. 4. 125. 17. Crantor. A celebrated philosopher of the old Academy, who flourished 300 years B. C. He was highly esteemed for the purity of his moral doctrine, as we may infer from the praises bestowed upon him by the ancients.

125. 18. Minime... corpore. A quotation from Crantor's discourse on "Grief." Our author in his Quæst. Acad. IV. 44, says of this discourse, Est enim non magnus, verum aureolus, et, ut Tuberoni Panatius præcipit, ad verbum ediscendus libellus.

125. 21. Ne .... corpore; "I would choose never to be ill; but should I become so, let me have the power of sensation, whether an amputation or any other separation of my body is to be made; for that insensibility [which they praise] cannot be but at the expense of some unnatural wildness of mind, or stupor of body.”

127. 2. Cadit, ut serviat. Horace, (Epis. I. 16. 66,) says,

Qui metuens vivet, liber mihi non erit unquam.

The same epistle contains not a few of the opinions of the Stoics.

128. 14. Pisonis. A distinguished Roman of the Calpurnian gens. He obtained the epithet of Frugi on account of his frugality and other virtues. He left behind him various orations, and was the author of "Historical Annals," which, though written in the meagre simplicity of the times, were reckoned of good authority.

129. 12. Apud Homerum. (Iliad IX. 646,) where Achilles replies to Ulysses and Ajax, the ambassadors of Agamemnon.

130. 21. Callisthenis. A Greek philosopher and historian. He attended Alexander in his expedition to the East; but his free spirit and republi

can sentiments rendered him very unfit for the attentions and obsequiousness of a courtier. Having frequently offended Alexander by his unseasonable reflections and remonstrances, he rendered him altogether implacable by opposing his assumption of divine honors.

130. 21. Sodalis sui. They were both disciples of Aristotle.

132. 1. At non similis ægrotationis est libido. See our author's treatise De Finibus, III. 10.

133. 20. Ille videtur. Thyestes.

133. 22. Raptis nuptiis. Enomaus, the father of Hippodamia, refused to marry her to any one who could not overcome him in a chariot race. Pelops was successful in a contest with him by bribing his charioteer, and thus obtained the object of his affection.

134. 16. Dionysius. The son of Dionysius of Syracuse, to whose authority he succeeded. Under the influence of his uncle Dion, aided by the lessons of Plato, he seemed to imbibe the true principles of philosophy. Soon, however, the courtiers gained an ascendancy over the young king, and succeeded in driving these true friends from his presence. Dionysius was twice driven from Syracuse; once by Dion into Italy, and subsequently by Timolean into Corinth. In his fallen state he was exposed to the reproaches and sarcasms of the witty. To one who asked him what he had gained by the wisdom of Plato, he replied, "The ability to bear as I do, this change of fortune."

134. 19. Tarquinio. Called Superbus, the last of the Roman kings.

135. 14. Cyrenaïci. A sect of ancient philosophers, so called from the native city of their chief, Aristippus of Cyrene, a disciple of Socrates. One of their distinguishing tenets was, that "Pleasure is the ultimate object of human pursuit; it is only in subserviency to this that fame, friendship, and even virtue are to be desired."

135. 20. Ei rei sustuli; “raised or brought him up for that end." The verb tollo has this signification, perhaps from the practice of laying a new born infant at his father's feet that he might take it up, and thus own it as his child.

136. 25. Quamobrem .... lucro. A quotation from the Phormio of Terence, in which Demipho in conversation with his servant Geta, expresses his displeasure at the marriage of his son.

137. 13. Quem....risisse.

Pliny says that Crassus never laughed, and was on that account called Agelastus.

139. 17. Videt malum nullum esse, nisi culpam. Bentley substitutes culpâ. As the signification of the word is "moral evil" or "sin," there seems to be no good reason for the change. Cicero, (Famil. IX. 16.) says: Nihil esse sapientis præstare, nisi culpam.