but so scattered and uncombined as to have no aggregate weight; which when collected and united are seen to be founded upon, and to be illustrative of, acknowledged principles and current truths.

It is not to be expected that our author will always be happy in his suggestions, or that his plans are practicable; although he appears to us to have his mind imbued with sound principles in the science of political economy, and with an enlarged and generous conception of the great doctrines which should regulate the conduct of a sovereign power towards its dependencies. For example, he propounds this merely feasible and artificial scheme to the consideration of the English Government,-"whether it might try the system of granting the land, (in future colonizations), not in perpetuity, but only for a term of years; upon the understanding that, at the expiration of the term, the land would be granted again, for a similar term, at the market-price. The rents of the lands thus granted might in time afford a revenue which would enable the local government to defray its expenses without resorting to taxation direct or indirect; and as the experiment would be tried in a country in which the land had not been appropriated, it would not disturb existing rights and interests." Now, without here inquiring whether the results anticipated by Mr. Lewis, with regard to rent and revenue, would occur, upon the supposition that the colony would be adequately supplied with settlers, this preliminary requisite to a certainty would be wanting, there would be few or no settlers at all upon these terms. A freehold is the grand thing looked to, with all its anticipated and associated independence, eminence, and honours. But the scheme of our author would throw a complete damper upon all such fondly cherished hopes,-those truly British fancies which have hitherto been the incentives to unparalleled enterprize, patient endurance, and often large rewards to the offspring of the struggling emigrant. We agree also with a contemporary journal that our author's suggestions with regard to the mode and course of legislating for our colonies do not promise much improvement. The alteration, indeed, appears to lie more in the words that may be put upon paper, than in any essential or workable reality. We shall take for our first extract the passage in which the suggestion alluded to occurs, and then add a few other specimens that will recommend Mr. Lewis's volume even to the general reader.

"The rule which prevents the English Crown from legislating for a dependency in which the form of the local subordinate government is popular, does not lead to inconvenient consequences, provided that the dependency be allowed to manage its own internal affairs and to enjoy a virtual independence. But the application of this rule to dependencies to which England does not intend to allow a virtual independence is inconvenient, since it is impossible for Parliament to legislate frequently for a single dependency; and therefore, when a necessity arises for the legislative

interposition of the dominant country, it is likely that the interposition will come at too late a period, or will be made otherwise under unfavourable circumstances. Accordingly, in a dependency belonging to the latter class, it seems expedient that the House of Assembly should be considered mainly as a check upon the legislative powers of the Governor and his Council; and that the Crown should possess a power of legislating for such a dependency in the same manner as it legislates for a Crown colony.

"The following reasons may be alleged in support of this conclusion. If England is to legislate at all respecting the internal affairs of any of its dependencies, the possession of this power by the Crown would, in general, enable it to legislate under the most favourable circumstances. Since the Crown would act upon the advice of the department peculiarly charged with the affairs of the dependency to which the law would relate, its interposition would probably be made at a sufficiently early time to prevent the various evils arising from delay. The persons so advising the Crown would be exempt from local interests and passions, and would probably not be influenced materially by any political party in the dependency. They would, moreover, be directly responsible to Parliament for the advice so given by them, and their responsibility might be increased if every Order in Council, or other legislative act issued by the Crown to a dependency, were presented to Parliament, together with a written statement of the purpose and grounds of the measure.

"The concession of a power of this kind to the Crown would not diminish the legislative power of Parliament over the dependencies. The Crown would act by powers expressly delegated to it by Parliament. Now, when a supreme legislature delegates a power of subordinate legislation respecting a certain subject, it does not diminish its own power of legislating respecting that subject. An Order in Council affecting a dependency might be repealed or modified by Parliament as soon as it was issued, and no provision of an Order in Council would be valid which was inconsistent with an act of Parliament.

"It may be objected to legislation for a dependency by Orders in Council, that they are advised by persons who are not the chosen representatives of the people of the dependency, and over whom the latter exercise no direct influence. But this objection equally applies to legislation for a dependency by Parliament, since the people of a dependency are not directly represented in Parliament; and it, in fact, involves a claim inconsistent with a state of dependence.

"It may be remarked, that the Secretary of State for the Colonial Department and his official assistants know more about the condition and interests of the British dependencies than Parliament or the public, inasmuch as their attention is more exclusively directed to the subject. It is likewise probable that they will care more for the interests of the dependencies committed to their charge, on account of their being under a responsibility to public opinion, by which Parliament is not affected in an equal degree, and from which the public at large is nearly exempt."

Many of the remarks of Mr. Lewis embrace not merely some broad principle and generous sentiment worthy of the appreciation

of an entire people at any time, but which possess a peculiar weight and significancy at the present particular juncture in the history of colonization, on the part especially of Great Britain, and when so much speculation is floating in the public mind with regard to the best plans to be pursued both in respect of new and of old settlements. The following is a specimen of a general, but a fine view :

"A nation derives no true glory from any possession which produces no assignable advantage to itself or to other communities. If a country possesses a dependency from which it derives no public revenue, no military or naval strength, and no commercial advantages or facilities for emigration which it would not equally enjoy though the dependency were independent, and if, moreover, the dependency suffers the evils which are the almost inevitable consequences of its political condition, such a possession cannot justly be called glorious."

Here is a passage that contains still more pointed ideas to the times in which we live, and strikingly pertinent suggestions:

"The expectation that civilized nations may become, in no long time, sufficiently enlightened to understand the advantages of free trade is not visionary. Even at present a progress towards a less restrictive system of commerce is visible over the whole civilized world. Protecting duties between different parts of a country immediately subject to the same government are now generally abandoned. Yet Turgot's measure for permitting a free trade in grain between the different provinces of France caused an insurrection in 1775; the corn trade between Ireland and England was first opened by Lord Granville's administration in 1806; and the remaining protecting duties between the same two countries were not removed till 1823. The principle of a free commercial intercourse has been extended by the Prussian league to a certain number of neighbouring independent states. And although every nation still asserts the expediency of duties intended for the protection (as it is falsely styled) of native industry and commerce, and not for the levying of a revenue for the government, yet they all show a disposition to diminish the number and rigour of the prohibitions and restrictions by which this so-called protection is afforded. Thus slow and painful are the advances of human reason, made, as it were, by groping in the dark, and retarded at every step by the opposition of short-sighted interest, the listlessness of routine, and the want of confidence in theoretical truths. If, however, the governments of civilized nations could once acquire so much reliance on the moderation and enlightenment of the governments of other civilized nations as to expect that the latter would allow an unrestricted trade with their own subjects, the motive for the acquisition and possession of dependencies, which is founded on the assumed folly of all governments respecting commercial intercourse, would no longer exist."

According to this view even European governments and nations are so lamentably ignorant to this day of some of the most important principles of political economy, as to be blind to their own im

mediate and best interests. But may we not hope that the expectations cherished by our author, relative to the appreciation of the advantages of free trade, may be realized at an early date by England? Why should she not lead the way, and earn the first honours? Is she not in a condition to amend her commercial policy? Is she too much impoverished to undertake the task of remodelling her system? Are class interests still so strong as to resist the necessities of the many? We shall lean to the hope that there are retrievers in the state.

There is a chapter in the Essay on the means by which a dependency may cease to exist, an event which hitherto has unhappily been witnessed only in the case of successful revolt and violent insurrection; unless, indeed, there may be found instances of extermination or complete captivity by the dominant power. Mr. Lewis, however, philanthropically contemplates another alternative, and cases where governments will discover their true interests and the welfare of mankind to depend upon a voluntary separation and a peaceable surrender. He thus urges the propriety of preparation for independence, and speculates about the issue:

"It is conceivable that, in a given case, the dominant country might perceive that it derives no benefit from the possession of a dependency, and that the dependency is able and willing to form an independent state; and that, consequently, a dominant country might abandon its authority over a dependency for want of a sufficient inducement to retain it. A dominant country might, for example, see that the dependency contributes nothing to its military defence, or to the expenses of the supreme government; that it adds nothing, as a dependency, to the productive resources or commercial facilities of the dominant country; that it is a constant source of expense to the supreme government, is likely to engender many economical evils, and may even involve the dominant country in war on its account. It might, moreover, perceive that the dependency is sufficiently populous and wealthy to form an independent state, and that the people of the dependency desire independence.

"If a dominant country understood the true nature of the advantages arising from the relation of supremacy and dependence to the related communities, it would voluntarily recognise the legal independence of such of its own dependencies as were fit for independence; it would, by its political arrangements, study to prepare for independence those which were still unable to stand alone; and it would seek to promote colonization for the purpose of extending its trade rather than its empire, and without attempting to maintain the dependence of its colonies beyond the time when they need its protection.

"The practical difficulties and inconveniences inherent in the government of dependencies, which have been stated in preceding chapters, are necessary or natural consequences of the relation of supremacy and dependence, and of the imperfect though necessary expedient of a subordinate government. Now if a dependency is considered as in training for ultimate

independence, the difficulties naturally incident to its government, if they do not vanish, are nevertheless greatly reduced. If a dependency were so considered, the free and forcible action of its local institutions would be encouraged as an unmixed good-not discouraged as a source of strife with the dominant country, and of vain resistance to its power; and all precautions on the part of the supreme government for the purpose of preventing the people of the dependency from regarding their subordinate government as virtually supreme, would be needless. If a dependency be distant, if its territory be large and its population numerous, and if the powers of its local subordinate government reside to a considerable extent in a body chosen by the inhabitants, it is difficult for the dominant country to prevent it from forming habits and opinions which are scarcely consistent with its virtual dependence. But if such a dependency be regarded as in training for independence, the local popular institutions leading to and implying self-government may be allowed to have free play, and the interferences of the dominant country with the political affairs of the country may cease almost insensibly.

"Admitting the impossibility of the prevailing opinions concerning the advantages of extensive empire being so far modified as to permit a dominant country to take such a view of its political relations with its dependencies as that now indicated, it is proved by the example of England, that the dominant country may concede virtual independence to a dependency, by establishing in it a system of popular self-government, and by abstaining almost constantly from any interference with its internal affairs."

We shall take our last, longest, and at this moment, the most practically pressing extract to be found in the chapter on the means by which a dependency may cease to exist. Ireland is the theme, and the demand by the repealer that she should occupy the same relation to Great Britain as she did before the Union, the case supposed.

"Ireland was both legally and in fact a dependency of England or Great Britain until the year 1782. In that year the Parliament of Great Britain surrendered its supremacy over Ireland; but the King of Great Britain continued to be, as such, King of Ireland. The change which took place at this time in the political relation to Great Britain and Ireland was, therefore, of the following nature. Before the year 1782, the King of Great Britain was, as a constituent part of the Parliament of Great Britain, a member of the sovereign government of Ireland. Before the same year the King of Great Britain was, as such, likewise King of Ireland; and as King of Ireland, he was a constituent part, together with the Irish houses of parliament, of the subordinate government of Ireland. Before this year, therefore, the political relations between Great Britain and Ireland closely resembled those between Great Britain and a British dependency whose subordinate government consists of the Crown, with a legislative council appointed by the Crown, and a house of assembly elected by the inhabitants; with this difference, however, that a dependency of this sort is not