THAT there is a strict and widely comprehensive analogy between reason and revelation, we conceive has been repeatedly and successfully demonstrated. That reason, when unassisted by revelation, is unequal to the perfect discovery of moral or religious truth, we hesitate not to affirm, has been triumphantly proved; and that human reason ought not, like science, to become the tribunal before which revelation should be arraigned, has we think been incontestably developed by the examination of the nature of reason, its capabilities, and its defects. The superiority of common sense to reason has been accurately delineated and ably enforced. The very existence and identity of the human soul, have been shewn to be alone capable of direct proof by the evidence of consciousness or internal sensation. And as to reason in her natural state, it has also been proved, that she ever has been incapable of making any progress in religious knowledge; and even when supplied with materials by supernatural aid, if left to the guidance of wild imagination, she has fallen into the grossest errors. In fact, there is no absurdity, however extravagant, which she has not been ready to adopt: she has persuaded some that an effect can be produced without a cause; that there is no God; that there cannot be any future state of existence; that the soul is material; that there is no real distinction between vice and virtue; and that to mock or relieve the sufferings of a fellow-creature are actions equally meritorious. By analyzing all things, she has satisfied some persons that every thing is nothing, and that matter is non-existent. "By perpetual changing, she has reduced all existence to the invisible dust of scepticism; and by recurring to first principles has proved, to the satisfaction of her devotees, that there are no principles at all."

To such statements, the truth of which the records of history, and the evidence of facts, support, Deism has replied, that her disciples have counterfacts to oppose; and that without be

lieving in a written revelation, their ledge of natural religion;—of the nature and attributes of their Creator;and of their duties and obligations as rational beings to him, themselves, and their fellow creatures. The plausibility of this observation we however conceive is only equalled by its absurdity; for who are Deists? Have they ever been discovered to exist in any country where civilization has not planted her standard, and where barbarian ignorance of letters and science has enslaved the minds of its inhabitants? Is it not, on the contrary, we inquire, in those countries alone in which the Jewish or Christian religion has been prevalent, that Deism has been discovered to exist? Deism is at best but an excrescence. It cannot claim the merit of being a self-originated independent system. It erects its distorted superstructure, upon the foundation which revelation has laid, and Christianity pointed out. It has sifted the system it opposes, for the very materials with which its superstructure is erected. And although those materials are injured by an improper combination with erroneous substances, yet all which ensures to it any notice, it has derived from the Christian religion and its holy scriptures. The pride of man has however induced him to suffer the disruption of every truth, the infringement of every moral axiom,-and even the contradiction of natural sense and feeling, rather than permit reason to be displaced by faith, and the darkness of imperfect human knowledge to be supplanted by the light and splendour of heavenly communications.

reason has conducted them to a know

The term Revelation has roused into energy the most dangerous feelings of the human mind. It has been alternately asserted, that it is not credible that God should give to man any revelation of himself:-then any written revelation of himself:-and lastly, such a kind of writen revelation as that which Christianity communicates. Nor have such assertions been so limited; for there have been men who have maintained, that no revelation could be general; that nothing is a revelation to a man which is not directly and personally revealed to him: and thus, in the overwhelming requisitions of human folly and conceit, the capabilities of the Godhead have been controverted

may be depended on as written by the first preachers of Christianity; and which, we hesitate not to say, he supports by arguments which are irrefragable and conclusive. 2d. That allowing the New Testament to be genuine, it will follow that Christianity is a divine revelation. 3d. That God has recognized the New Testament as containing a divine revelation; first, by the surprising propagation of Christianity; secondly, by the miraculous powers with which Christ, the Apostles, and the first preachers of Christianity, were endowed; and thirdly, by the fulfilment of the prophecies pronounced by Christ; first, relating to his own death and resurrection; and secondly, relating to the destruction of Jerusalem.

This is the skeleton of the work before us. It is not novel, though in its adjustment it has claims for originality. The questions are sometimes too ethical, and the answers too long, but in subsequent editions we do not doubt that such imperfections will be attended to, and removed. The quotations from heathen and Christian writers, are abundant and satisfactory; and the answers which are given to the various objections made by Deists against the evidences of Christianity, are judiciously and temperately refuted. The author is unquestionably master of his subject; and has displayed much critical learning and sound sense, which, exerted in so noble a cause, do equal honour to his head and heart. Whoever he may be, we present him our thanks ;-commend his work to the heads of families, and the instructors of youth; and sincerely desire that it may be eminently and permanently useful.

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Review." An Essay on Divine Prescience, or the Foreknowledge of God, viewed in connection with the Liberty of Man in his moral actions." By the Rev. James Bromley, 8vo. pp. 156. Blanchard, London, 1820.

Ir so happened, that the important subject of which this volume treats, was brought under our inspection at the commencement of our literary labours, in consequence of a pamphlet written by a person who called himself Verax, and of some strictures which had been published in the Evangelical Magazine, on the theory of Dr.

Adam Clarke. Having, therefore, so recently delivered our sentiments on this abstruse but interesting subject, we shall confine our remarks at present to the ideas which the volume may suggest, referring our readers for something which has the appearance of dissertation to the first four numbers of the Imperial Magazine.

The preface to this volume is rather long, but it is judiciously written, and is not destitute either of merit or of interest.

After stating the importance of the subject, and the various difficulties attending its investigation, the author proceeds to point out its immediate connection with the Calvinistic controversy. He then adverts to the theories of Bird, Clarke, and Drew, gives a concise statement of what they have respectively advanced, and then assigns his reasons why he cannot assent to their conclusions. In these remarks his observations are frequently plausible, sometimes judicious, but rarely profound; and they seem to have been made, rather to avoid consequences, which the author conceived would result from their several hypotheses, than from any incongruous parts, which the theories in themselves presented to his view.

In this department of his work, the author seems to be invariably impressed with an idea, that in connecting the Prescience of God with the contingency of human actions, certain concessions must be made by the friends of liberty, to those of necessity, of which neither Bird, nor Clarke, nor Drew, seems to have been aware. It is, however, but justice to state, that he mentions the names and talents of these authors with profound respect; and nothing, we conceive, that he has advanced, can reasonably give them the least offence. On the diminutive points at issue between them, it is scarcely the province of a reviewer to give an opinion. We have stated facts, and we leave the result to our readers.

Having thus prepared the way, Mr. Bromley introduces his own theory in the following positions. "1. That the great God knows all things. 2. That for any being to know what will be the result of an absolute contingency, involves a contradiction, and is, in the nature of things, absolutely impossible. 3. That these two positions are in per

Being has the most perfect knowledge of all possible results; and to answer it in the affirmative, is to make the infinite knowledge of the infinite Jehovah dependent upon the result of a contingency."-pp. 69.

In the 7th chapter the author treats of the Divine knowledge in connection with simple duration. In this he has embodied much strength of reasoning. | The subject is well argued. His views are enlarged and comprehensive; his discriminations between duration and time are clear and unembarrassed; and in general they seem to be correct. Throughout the whole, the reasonings are energetic, manly, and conclusive. The strength of intellect, and the power of genius, displayed in this chapter, appear to great advantage; and prepare the reader for that acute development of theory, which he is taught to expect. The author gains upon us as we advance; and, directing us by his own example, to examine particular terms and phrases to which we have been long accustomed to annex specific ideas, conducts us into a region where the temerity of enterprise is amply recompensed by the efforts of originality.

In his 9th chapter, Mr. Bromley argues that God is and must be perfectly free; that he cannot be governed even by motive, otherwise motive would be God; and that the supposition terminates in some palpable absurdities. But on this point he shall speak for himself.

"If the volitions of the Divine Being are necessary, that which necessitates them must be something in the Divine Being himself, or something out of and distinct from Himself. If this necessitating cause be something out of Himself, it is obvious, he cannot be independent in his volitions; but must be subject to that, the influence of which necessitates his volitions. Neither, in this case, can he be eternal in his volitions; for they must be posterior to that, the influence of which infallibly excites them; or if they be eternal, then there must be an eternal something, out of and distinct from the Divine Being, which necessarily and eternally excites his volitions. Nay, in this case he cannot be the supreme, all-powerful, and infinite First Cause; for the supreme, all-powerful, and infinite First Cause must be that thing, whatever it may be, by whose necessitating influence he is infallibly governed. No. 13.-VOL. II.

"If the other alternative be taken, and it is said, that the divine volitions are necessarily determined by something in the divine nature itself, the difficulty is rather increased than removed. By this supposition, the Deity is set before us, as having in his nature two qualities or powers, a superior and inferior; one which infallibly necessitates, and another which is infallibly necessitated. Nay, by this scheme, the Divine Nature is made to impose necessity upon the Divine Nature; and thus we have Deity necessitating Deity: and as that volition by which he imposes necessity upon all other volitions, must itself be unnecessitated, we are left to contemplate a Being, the whole of whose volitions must be necessary, and who nevertheless must have one volition that is not necessary."-pp. 98.

Nor has the author omitted to notice the theory adopted by President Edwards on the doctrine of motives. From the celebrated treatise of this justly renowned author, several quotations are taken, and in various instances he exhibits the hypothesis, which has been the boast of an age, in a light which its advocates, we conceive, are not prepared to expect. But on this subject the author's sentiments shall appear in his own language.

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"By motive,' says President Edwards (page 7 on the Will,) I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition.' He informs us likewise (page 117,) that every act of the will whatsoever is excited by some motive.' And he also affirms (page 118,) that motive is the cause of the act of the will; and that volitions are properly the effects of their motives.' Now, let us examine how this doctrine admits of an application to the Divine Being.

"By this statement of the President, we have set before us two things;

first, a thing that moves, which is called motive; secondly, a thing that is moved, which is the divine will. Now the reader knows, because every body knows, that the thing which moves must, in its direct and operating power, be superior to the thing which is moved. It follows, that as the divine will is infinite, the motive which moves the divine will must be more than infinite; and as the divine will may be moved by ten thousand motives, we are brought to the strange M