Billeder på siden
PDF
ePub

The French army was now difengaged, and the main ftrength of the Auftrians broken: but there ftill remained confiderable divifions, without the difperfion, or the capture of which, the victory obtained over them would not be complete, as they would either throw themselves into Mantua, join the papal forces, or retreat into the Imperial territories, where they would help to form a new army. For these reasons, as not a moment was to be loft in preventing the vanquished Auftrians from effecting their retreat; on the very night of the fourteenth, as foon as the battle had terminated in favour of the French, divifions were immediately difpatched to purfue every body of Auftrians that ftill kept together. They had not quitted a ftrong pofition at Corona, near Rivoli, where they remained in expectation of being able to collect and arrange their retreating troops; but before this could be effected, a large divifion of the French, after marching with all expedition during the night of the fourteenth, came upon their rear next morning, while they were attacked in front by general Joubert. They refifted vigoroufly at firft; but were at last thrown into diforder. Those who were able to make a retreat, directed it towards the Tyrol but no lefs than fix thousand were fo completely furrounded, that they were obliged to lay down their arms.

Buonaparte himfelf, with a ftrong divifion, having left the neceffary orders with general Jourbert, proceeded, immediately after the battle, in queft of Provera, an Auftrian general, who had, on feveral occafions, highly diftinguifhed himfelf, by the kilfulness of his ma

nœuvres. He was at the head of ten thousand men, and had croffed the Adige, where he had forced the French, that guarded the paflage, to retire, and he was now marching with all speed towards Mantua. But he was overtaken, early in the morning of the 15th, by general Augereau, who cut off the whole of his rear. He made his way,

:

however, by a running fight, to the French lines of circumvallation at Mantua, where he arrived at noon, after lofing two thousand men, and fourteen pieces of cannon. He was now reduced through this laft, and the other encounters on his march, to no more than fix thousand men. With this diminifhed furce, he did not, however, hesitate to affault the entrenchments of the befiegers at the fuburbs of St. George, by carrying which he would have fecured his entrance into the city but they were fo ftrong and well defended, that he was repulfed. His fituation was now fuch, that unless he could enter Mantua, he muft yield to the enemy. To avoid this difafter, Provera made a refolute at: tack on the French post of La Favorita, another fuburb, while a ftrong detachment from the garrifon fupported him. But this attempt, which was made in the night of the fifteenth, in hope of furprifing the enemy, failed in every point. The Auftrians, who had fallied out of the city, were driven back by general Victor: and general Serrarier took a pofition between La Favorita and St. George, which fecured this latter poft, and enabled the corps ftationed there to join that of Serrarier. Thus reinforced, he fell upon Provera's rear, while his front was occupied in the attack

of

of La Favorita, and other troops advanced upon him at the fame time: thus furrounded on every fide,all hope of affiftance from the garrifon was given over, and he was compelled to furrender himself, with his whole remaining force, confifting of feven thousand horfe and foot, and twenty-two pieces of cannon, befide all the baggage and ammunition. What added confiderably to the misfortune of this day was the lofs of the volunteer corps of young gentlemen of Vienna, who were all either flain or made prifoners.

This day decided the fate of Mantua. Though it continued to make a courageous defence, it was evident, that being now deprived of all reasonable hope of relief, all farther refiftance would be fruitlefs, and would only add to the numbers that had fallen in this deftructive fiege. Every day brought fresh tidings of the loffes and defeats of the Auftrians, who were purfued in all directions, and totally difabled from making any effectual stand.

The battle of Arcola had deftroyed the fourth, and the battle of Rivoli the fifth, army oppofed to Buonaparte. He had, fince the commencement of this year, been victorious in eight engagements, two of them pitched battles, wherein the lofs of the Auftrians amounted to twenty-five thoufand prifoners, exclufive of the flain, who were calculated at fix thoufand. The fatigues and exertions of the French had been fuch, that Buonaparte, in his difpatches to the directory, afferted that they had, while fighting at intervals, occafionally measured thirty miles of ground in a day,

The Auftrians were, in the mean time, retreating to their ftrong holds on the Brenta, which Alvinzi was employed in rendering tenable against the purfuing enemy. But the expeditious movements of the. French afforded him no refpite. General Augereau croffed the lower Brenta, and advanced to Citadella, a place of firength, from whence he diflodged the enemy; while Maflena, pafling it in front of Baffano, compelled the Auftrians to evacuate it with precipitation, though they had prepared to defend it. They withdrew to Carpanedolo, higher up the river; but were followed and defeated by the French, who forced their pallage over the bridge at that place, after an obftinate conflict, wherein they flew and took upwards of a thousand of the enemy: this action happened on the twenty-fixth. Fortunately for the Auftrians, the heavy rains that enfued, preferved the remainder of them, who hafted, with all fpeed, towards the narrow pafles of the entrance into the Tyrol. A division of the French, under ́ Joubert, overtook them, however, at Avis, and a part of their rear-guard was taken. They retired to Tertola, a place advantageoafly fituated between the lake of Cuarda and the Adige, where they made preparations to difpute the march of the French to Trent: but they were driven from this poft, and fled to Roveredo, which they were allo compelled to abandon by Joubert, who, purfuing his fuccefs, made himfelf mafter of Trent Here two thoufand fick and wounded fell into his hands, and as many more had been made prifoners in the different encounters previously to the taking of this city,

The Auftrians had now posted themselves in force at Lavis, intending to stop the progrefs of the French, by occupying the other fide of the river Lavifio; but this intention was fruftrated, by the rapid advance of Joubert, who forced them from this important pofition, after fuftaining a great lofs of their beft troops, and in particular of a felect corps of Hungarians. Here the divifion of Joubert was reinforced by that. of Maffena, who had been equally fuccefsful; and, in his purfuit of the Auftrians, after the action at Carpanadolo, had taken feveral places of ftrength, and driven them to the other fide of the Pradas, after feizing a large part of their baggage.

The Imperial armies were now. totally expelled from Italy, and nothing remained to the emperor but the city of Mantua, which was fo clofely blockaded, and fo vigoroufly preffed, that no fupplies of provifions, or of men, could enter. The garrifon, defpairing of all relief, began to think it time to furrender, weakened by the great flaughter it had fuffered in fo many fallies, and by a contagious diftemper, that committed great ravages in the city. The Auftrians agreed, at length, to a capitulation, upon the fecond day of February. The terms were as honourable as the defence had been brave. The French general fhewed a laudable propenfity to pay due regard to the merit of his rival, who, notwithstanding his late ill fuccefs, was defervedly efteemed a warrior of the most diftinguished rank. He granted him an escort of two hundred horfe and feven hundred foot, whom he was permitted to felect, together with thirty pieces of artillery: the gene

rals, and principal officers under him, were allowed, in like manner, to accompany him on their parole; the reft of the garrifon remained prifoners of war.

The northern parts of the papal territories were already in the poffeffion of the French, and it was expected that as foon as Buonaparte was free from inquietude, on account of the Auftrian armies ftill hovering on the borders of Germany, and had fecured the capture of Mantua, he would immediately proceed, to Rome itself, and dictate the conditions of a peace.

The pope, in the mean time, relied upon the exertions of the emperor, and had determined to wait the iffue of the operations of his army, under Alvinzi, firmly hoping that it would be more fuccefsful than thofe that had preceded it. Buonaparte was fincerely defirous of a pacification with the head of the Romish church, a refpectful treatment of whom would, he was confcious, be highly gratifying to all the Roman catholic ftates and people. Prompted by these motives, and intirely averse at coercive meafures, he wrote a letter to cardinal Mattæi, prime minifter to his holinefs, requesting him to prevail on the pope to recommence pacific negociations, in order to prevent the march of the French armies into his territories, and to reprefent to him the inutility of arming his fubjects against men who had overcome fo many formidable enemies, and whom his own people were wholly incapable to refift.

This letter was dated the twentyfixth of October, 1796. Buonaparte was then preparing to march againft

[graphic]

against Alvinzi, who was at the head of a numerous army, and had obtained fome fucceffes over the French, which had revived the hopes of the Auftrians, and their adherents. But the battle of Arcola, wherein these were completely defeated, and the fubfequent advantages gained by the French, made, at laft, fuch an impreffion on the court of Rome, that, dreading to wait any longer for more fortunate events, the cardinal was directed to return an answer. This came to pafs after the lapfe of fix weeks from the receipt of the general's letter. The motive for this delay being obvious, it was neceffary to qualify it, fo as to foften his difpleafure at an anfwer being fo long deferred. The cardinal laid before the general the anxiety of the pope to remedy the diforders that had fo long diftracted France, and the facrifices he had confented to make of every worldly confideration, for the fake of reftoring a good understanding between France and the Roman fee. He complained that, not fatisfied with thefe conceffions, the French government, elated with the, fuccefs of its arms, had made requifitions incompatible with the dictates of his confcience, and fubverfive of all Chriftian and moral principles. Grieved at fuch intolerable demands, he had implored the affiftance of heaven, to direct him how to act in fo difficult a fituation. Doubtlefs, faid the cardinal, he was infpired, on this occafion, by that holy fpirit which had animated the primitive martyrs in the caufe for which they fuffered. Having laboured, in vain, to bring the directory to a more equitable way of thinking, he thought it neceflary to refift them by open force. He

admonished the general to reflect, that the death which awaited men in battle was the commencement of eternal life and happiness to the righteous, and of everlasting, mifery to the wicked. Armed with this conviction, faid the cardinal, we fhall oppofe you with that confidence in the divine aid, which a juft caufe iufpires. He reminded him that he was not invincible, and that though infidels, and pretended philofophers, ridiculed the idea of affiftance from heaven, yet, if Providence were pleafed to interpofe, the French would contend in vain against the power of the Almighty He concluded, by telling the general, that if the French were de-, firous of peace, the Roman fee defired it ftill more, and was willing to fubfcribe to any terms, confcientious and equitable, in order to obtain it.

[ocr errors]

Such was the purport of this remarkable letter, which, to speak truth, was written at a time, when the reafonings it contained were little calculated to influence the proceedings of fuch a people as the French. Nor did the court of Vienna itself teftify much willingnefs to be connected with a power whofe co-operations were likely to prove fo feeble. But the folicitations of the court of Rome were so preffing, that the Imperial minifters, unwilling wholly to abandon the holy fee to the control of France, confented to join a body of troops to thofe that were now raifing in every part of the papal dominions.

In this dereliction of the pope, the moft fervent of his former adherents feemed, at this period, to agree without reluctance. So efficacious was either the dread, or the influence, of France over the

The Auftrians had now pofted themselves in force at Lavis, intending to stop the progrefs of the French, by occupying the other fide of the river Lavifio; but this intention was fruftrated, by the rapid advance of Joubert, who forced them from this important pofition, after fuftaining a great lofs of their best troops, and in particular of a felect corps of Hungarians. Here the divifion of Joubert was reinforced by that. of Maflena, who had been equally fuccefsful; and, in his purfuit of the Auftrians, after the action at Carpanadolo, had taken feveral places of ftrength, and driven them to the other fide of the Pradas, after feizing a large part of their baggage.

The Imperial armies were now. totally expelled from Italy, and nothing remained to the emperor but the city of Mantua, which was fo clofely blockaded, and fo vigoroufly preffed, that no fupplies of provifions, or of men, could enter. The garrifon, defpairing of all relief, began to think it time to furrender, weakened by the great flaughter it had fuffered in fo many fallies, and by a contagious diftemper, that committed great ravages in the city. The Auftrians agreed, at length, to a capitulation, upon the fecond day of February. The terms were as honourable as the defence had been brave. The French general fhewed a laudable propenfity to pay due regard to the merit of his rival, who, notwithstanding his late ill fuccefs, was defervedly efteemed a warrior of the most diftinguished rank. He granted him an efcort of two hundred horfe and feven hundred foot, whom he was permitted to felect, together with thirty pieces of artillery: the gene

rals, and principal officers under him, were allowed, in like manner, to accompany him on their parole; the reft of the garrifon remained prifoners of war.

The northern parts of the papal territories were already in the poffeffion of the French, and it was expected that as foon as Buonaparte was free from inquietude, on account of the Auftrian armies ftil hovering on the borders of Germany, and had fecured the capture of Mantua, he would immediately proceed to Rome itself, and dictate the conditions of a peace.

The pope, in the mean time, relied upon the exertions of the emperor, and had determined to wait the iffue of the operations of his

army, under Alvinzi, firmly hoping that it would be more fuccefsful than thofe that had preceded it. Buonaparte was fincerely defirous of a pacification with the head of the Romish church, a refpectful treatment of whom would, he was confcious, be highly gratifying to all the Roman catholic ftates and people. Prompted by these motives, and intirely averfe at coercive measures, he wrote a letter to cardinal Mattæi, prime minister to his holinefs, requefting him to prevail on the pope to recommence pacific negociations, in order to prevent the march of the French armies into his territories, and to reprefent to him the inutility of arming his fubjects against men who had overcome fo many formidable enemies, and whom his own people were wholly incapable to refift.

This letter was dated the twentyfixth of October, 1796. Buonaparte was then preparing to march

against

« ForrigeFortsæt »