benevolence, and (3) desire to teach], being received, and acted upon, effects the object desired. And so the instruction given by competent persons is authority, and these competent persons are authorities. From the Ayur-veda, which conveys instruction given by competent persons in reference to objects perceptible by the senses, it is to be inferred that that part also of the Veda which is concerned with imperceptible objects 110 is authoritative, since the cause, the authoritativeness of competent persons, is the same in both cases; and the same inference is to be drawn from the fact that a portion of the injunctions of the last mentioned part of the Veda also have reference to perceptible objects, as in the case of the precept, 'Let the man who desires landed property sacrifice,' etc., etc. In common life, too, men usually rely upon instruction. And the authority of an ordinary instructor depends (1) upon his knowledge of the matter to be taught, (2) upon his disposition to shew kindness to others, and (3) upon his desire to declare the truth. From its being accepted, the instruction imparted by competent persons constitutes proof. And from the fact that the seers and declarers are the same in both cases, viz. that the competent seers and declarers of the contents of the (rest of the) Veda are the very same as those of the Ayur-veda, etc., we must infer that the authoritativeness of the former is like that of the latter. But on the hypothesis that the authority of the Vedic injunctions is derived from their eternity, it will be improper to say that it arises from the authoritativeness of competent persons, since the authority of words as exponents of meanings springs from their declarative character, and not from their eternity. For on the supposition of the eternity of words, every (word) would express every (thing), which would be contrary to the fixity of their signification. If it be objected that unless words are eternal, they cannot be declarative, we deny this, as it is not witnessed in the case of secular words. If it be urged again that secular words also are eternal, we must again demur, since the discrepancy of purport arising from the injunctions of incompetent persons would be at variance with this." After some further argumentation Vätsyāyana concludes: "The eternity of the Vedas [really] consists in the unbroken continuity of their tradition, study, and application, both in the Manvantaras and 110 Compare the commentator's remarks introductory to the Nyaya aphorism ii. 57, quoted above, p. 112.

Yugas which are past, and those which are to come; whilst their authority arises from the authoritativeness of the competent persons (who uttered them). And this is common to them with secular words."

The phrase sakshāt-kṛita-dharmūnaḥ, "possessing an intuitive perception of duty," which is employed by Vatsyāyana in the preceding extract as a definition of aptaḥ, "competent persons," is one which had previously been applied by Yaska (Nirukta, i. 20) to describe the character of the rishis: Sākshāt-kṛita-dharmāṇaḥ ṛishayo babhūvuḥ | te 'varebhyo 'sākshāt-kṛita-dharmabhyaḥ upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ | upadeśāya glayanto 'vare bilma-grahanaya imam grantham samāmnāsishur vedam cha vedāngāni cha | "The rishis, who had an intuitive perception of duty, handed down the hymns by (oral) instruction to men of later ages, who had not that intuitive perception. These, declining in their power of giving instruction, compiled this work (the Nirukta), the Veda, and the Vedangas, in order to facilitate the comprehension of details."

The Vaiseshika.-Among the aphorisms of this system also there are some which, in opposition to the Mīmānsakas, assert, 1st, that the Vedas are the product of an intelligent mind; and 2nd (if the interpretation of the commentator is to be received) that they have been uttered by God.

The second aphorism of the first section of the first book is as follows: Yato 'bhyudaya-niśśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ |

"Righteousness is that through which happiness and future perfection 112 are attained."

After explaining this the commentator proceeds to introduce the next aphorism by the following remarks:

Nanu nivṛitti-lakshano dharmas tattva-jnāna-dvārā niśśreyasa-hetur ity

111 Of the aphorisms, which I am about to quote, the first has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne (who published a small portion of these Sūtras with an English version in 1851); and it, as well as the others, is briefly commented upon by the Rev. Prof. Banerjea, in his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, pp. 474 ff., and Pref. p. ix., note. See my article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, No. xx. for 1862, entitled "Does the Vaiseshika philosophy acknowledge a Deity or not?" from which the translations now given have been transferred with but little alteration and a few additions. And compare Dr. Roer's German translation of the Vaiseshika aphorisms in the Journal of the German Oriental Society for 1867, pp. 309 ff.

112 The Commentator explains abhyudaya as=tattva-jnānam, “a knowledge of the reality," and nisśreyasa as atyantikī duḥkha-nivṛittiḥ, "the complete cessation of suffering."

attra śrutiḥ pramāṇam | śruter eva prāmānye vayam̃ vipratipadyāmahe "anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ" | . . . . na cha āmnāya-pra| tipadakam kinchid asti nityatve viprattipattau | nitya-nirdoshatvam apr sandigdham | paurusheyatve tu bhrama-pramāda-vipratipatti-karaṇāpātavādi-sambhāvanayā āptoktatvam api sandigdham eva iti na niśśreyasam na vā tattra tattva-jnānam dvāram na vā dharmaḥ iti sarvam etad ākulam ataḥ aha "tad-vachanādāmnāyasya prāmānyam" | "tal" ity anupakrāntam api prasiddhi-siddhatayā īśvaram parāmṛiśati | yathā "tad-aprāmānyam anṛita-vyāghāta-punarukta-doshebhyaḥ" iti Gautamiya-sütre tach-chhabdena anupakrānto 'pi vedaḥ parāmṛiśyate | tatha cha tad-vachanāt tena iśvarena praṇayanād āmnāyāsya vedasya prāmāṇyam | yadvā “tad” iti sannihitam dharmam eva parāmṛiśati | tathā cha dharmasya "vachanāt” pratipādanād “āmnāyasya” vedasya prāmānyam | yad hi vākyam prāmānikam artham pratipādayati tat pramānam wa yataḥ ity arthaḥ | iśvaras tad-āptatvam cha sādhayishyate |

"But may it not be objected here that it is the Veda which proves that righteousness, in the form of abstinence from action, is, by means of the knowledge of absolute truth, the cause of future perfection; but that we dispute the authority of the Veda because it is chargeable with the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology 113 And further, there is nothing to prove the authority of the Veda, for its eternity is disputed, its eternal faultlessness is doubted, and if it have a personal author, the fact of this person being a competent utterer is questioned, since there is an apprehension of error, inadvertence, contradiction, and want of skill in composition attaching to him Thus there is neither any such thing as future perfection, nor is either a knowledge of absolute truth the instrument thereof, or righteousness. Thus everything is perplexed."

In answer to all this the author of the aphorism says:

"The authority of the sacred record arises from its being attered by Him."

"Here," says the commentator, "the word tad (His) refers to Īśvara (God); as, though no mention of Him has yet been introduced, He is proved by common notoriety to be meant; just as in the aphorism of Gautama: Its want of authority is shown by the faults of falsehood,

113 Here the same illustrations are given as in the commentary on the Nyāya aphorisms, quoted above, pp. 113 ff.

contradiction, and tautology,' the Veda, though not previously introduced, is intended by the word tad." And so [the meaning of the aphorism is that] the authority of the sacred record, i.e. the Veda, is proved by its being spoken by Him, composed by Him, by Isvara. Or, tad (its) 114 may denote dharma (duty) which immediately precedes ; and then [the sense will be that] the authority of the sacred record, i.e. the Veda, arises from its declaring, i.e. establishing, duty, for the text which establishes any authoritative matter must be itself an authority. The proof of Isvara and his competence will be hereafter stated." The commentator then goes on to answer the charges of falsehood, contradiction, and tautology alleged against the Veda.

The next aphorism which I shall quote (vi. 1, 1) is thus introduced by the commentator:

Buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛitir vede | samsāra-müla-kāranayor dharmādharmayoḥ pariksha shashṭhādhyāyārthaḥ | dharmādharmau cha "svargakāmo yajeta" "na kalanjam bhakshayed" ityādi-vidhi-nishedha-balakalpaniyau vidhi-nishedha-vākyayoḥ prāmānye sati syātām | tat-prāmāṇyam cha vaktur yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnāna-lakshana-guna-pūrvakatvād upapadyate | svataḥ prāmānyasya nishedhät | ataḥ prathamam veda-prāmānya-prayojaka-guṇa-sādhanam upakramate | "vākya-kṛitir” vākyarachanā | să buddhi-pūrvā vaktṛi-yathārtha-vākyārtha-jnāna-pūrvā | vākya-rachanätvät | "nadi-tire pancha phalani santi" ity asmad-ādivākya-rachanā-vat | “vede" iti vākya-samudāye ity arthaḥ | tattra samudāyinām vākyānāṁ kṛitiḥ pakshaḥ | na cha asmad-ādi-buddhi-pūrvaka

114 For the sake of the reader who does not know Sanskrit, it may be mentioned that tad being in the crude, or uninflected form, may denote any of the three genders, and may be rendered either 'his,'' hers,' or 'its.' I may observe that the alternative explanation which the commentator gives of the Aphorism, i. 1, 3, viz. that the authority of the Veda arises from its being declarative of duty, is a much less probable one than the other, that its authority is derived from its being the utterance of God; for it does not clearly appear how the subject of a book can establish its authority; and, in fact, the commentator, when he states this interpretation, is obliged, in order to give it the least appearance of plausibility, to assume the authoritative character of the precepts in the Veda, and from this assumption to infer the authority of the book which delivers them. I may also observe that Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapanchānana, the author of the Gloss on S'ankara Misra's Commentary, takes no notice of this alternative interpretation; and that in his comment on the same aphorism when repeated at the close of the work (x. 2, 9) S'ankara Miśra himself does not put it forward a second time. Dr. Roer (Journ. Germ. Or. Soc. for 1867, p. 310) argues in favour of the former of the two interpretations as the true one

tvena anyatha-siddhiḥ | "svarga-kāmo yajeta" ityādāv ishṭa-sādhanatāyāḥ kāryyatāyāḥ vā asmad-ādi-buddhy-agocharatvāt | tena svatantrapurusha-pūrvakatvam vede siddhyati | vedatvam cha śabda-tad-upajīvipramānātirikta - pramāṇa-janya-pramity-avishayārthakatve sati śabda

janya-vākyārtha-jnānājanya-pramāna-śabdatvam |

"An examination of righteousness and unrighteousness, which are the original causes of the world, 115 forms the subject of the 6th section. Now, righteousness and unrighteousness are to be constituted by virtue of such injunctions and prohibitions as these: The man who desires paradise should sacrifice,' 'Let no one eat garlic,' etc., provided these injunctions and prohibitions be authoritative. And this authoritativeness depends upon the fact of the utterer [of these injunctions or prohibitions] possessing the quality of understanding the correct meaning of sentences, for the supposition of inherent authoritativeness is untenable. The author, therefore, first of all enters upon the proof of that quality which gives rise to the authoritativeness of the Veda.

"Aphorism vi. 1. 1.-'There is in the Veda a construction of sentences which is produced (lit. preceded) by intelligence.'"

"The construction of sentences,' the composition of sentences, 'is produced by intelligence,' i.e. by a knowledge of the correct meaning of sentences on the part of the utterer [of them]; [and this is proved] by the fact of these sentences possessing an arrangement like the arrangement of such sentences as 'There are five fruits on the river side,' composed by such persons as ourselves. In the Veda,' i.e. in the collection of sentences (so called). Here the construction of the sentences composing the collection is the subject of the proposition which is asserted. And this construction must not be ascribed to a wrong cause by assuming that it was the work of a [limited] intelligence such as ours. [Because it was not a limited intelligence which produced these sentences]. For it is not an object of apprehension to the understandings of persons like ourselves that such injunctions as, 'He who desires paradise should sacrifice,' are the instruments of obtaining what we desire, or that they are obligatory in themselves. Hence in the case of the Veda the agency of a self-dependent person is

115 This, I suppose, means that the existence of the world in its present or developed form, is necessary in order to furnish the means of rewarding righteousness and punishing unrighteousness.