of the Author of Nature, on some occasions, very difficult to be understood. His works are often executed with much skill when there seems no good reason for exerting that skill. The crea tion of a fly, for example, must have required great ingenuity; but it may be said, what is the use of it now that it is created? It affords food indeed to the spider; but would the world have suffered any great loss if neither spiders nor flies had ever existed?

The extensive variety that exists in Nature may perhaps be thus accounted for: The Author of the universe is possessed of boundless intelligence and energy. He delights to exert these qualities in their full extent; but this cannot be accomplished without a vast variety of operations. The fabric of Nature is an exertion of great power and intelligence. Had a single plant, or an animal that now exists in it, been left out, the universe would have been a less excellent effort of skill than it actually is. It would therefore have been a less complete, and consequently a less valuable exertion of the wisdom of its great Artist. To make a man required much discernment; but perhaps it did not require much less to make a fly. Both of them could find room in this world; and had it wanted either of them, it would have been a less perfect fabric; that is, there would have been less mind or contrivance exerted in its formation. A man

would rather wish to have been the author of many ingenious inventions than of one only; and the Author of the universe has chosen rather to be the maker of a thousand worlds, and of a thousand animals, than of one world and one a nimal.

4th, The mind of man can attend with accuracy only to one object at a time, and it cannot perform vigorously more than one action at the same instant, But it would appear that the Mind which governs this world must possess the capacity of attending at once to an immense variety of objects, and of making the most various exertions of power at the same time. These qualities or attributes have been denominated the omniscience and omnipresence of the Deity: But as the investigation of them is attended with considerable difficuties, I shall refer it to the following Chapter; in which I mean to consider very particularly the kind of connection that subsists between the Author of Nature and his Works.

5th, It has been disputed, Whether the quality of goodness, or of benevolence and love to his creatures, can with propriety be ascribed to the Supreme Intelligence? It is evident, that what we call the benevolent affections, which arise in us from the habitual remembrance of pleasures enjoyed in society, cannot belong to his nature.

At the same time, it is obvious,

that he prefers happiness to misery, as many pleasures are enjoyed by his creatures. He probably never fails to produce happiness when it is not inconsistent with the production of intelligence, which, being more valuable in his eyes, always obtains a preference. He has made the perfection or chief good of the inferior animals in a great measure to consist of pleasure. The ordinary state of their existence is happy; and by depriving them both of foresight and recollection, he has rendered it impossible for them to fall into severe distress. Yet, even with regard to them, the acquisition of skill or intelligence is accounted preferable to pleasure; and to induce them to acquire that skill, they are exposed to various sufferings. Man has appetites and affections like the inferior animals. To him, therefore, in a certain degree, pleasure is a good, and pain is an evil: But he is also possessed of a mind capable of recollecting the past and of investigating the future. As its improvement is the purpose of his existence, his appetites, affections, pleasures, and sufferings, are all made subservient to that important object. In the estimation, then, of the Maker of this world, happiness and misery are objects only of secondary consideration. The production of intelligence in his creatures is always his principal aim, to which their pleasures are continually sacrificed. What we call goodness or benevo

lence, therefore, cannot be regarded as a pri mary or ruling principle of action with the Deity, nor can it, perhaps, be said with pro priety that he loves his creatures. He approves of the meanest of them as an exertion of wisdom. He must be satisfied with human nature in an eminent degree, when he views the progress in which it is engaged, and discerns the height of excellence to which, by his care, it is destined to reach.

After all, it is very little that we know of the character of the Author of the universe. We can only say, that he is one Being, and that his intelligence possesses these marks of perfection, that though active, it is steadfast; and though, in this world, it confines itself to a single plan of operation, yet the variety of contrivance which it exhibits is unbounded.

CHAP. III.

OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEITY
AND THE UNIVERSE.

As the objects and operations that appear in Nature could not produce themselves, we are under the necessity of ascribing their existence to some powerful and intelligent cause. The term GOD, or DEITY, is only the appellation or name given by men to the cause of all things.

There are two ways in which the Deity may be the cause of whatever exists :

He may have formed at first the plan' of the universe, and so perfectly adjusted all its parts, that it proceeds of itself in its destined career, without requiring any farther interposition on his part: Or,

He may not only have originally contrived and put in motion the universe, but he may still be the preserver of it, and the energetic or immediate cause and producer of all its move

ments.