knowledge of religion and of nature, than they could have been amidst the distraction of a numerous assembly, by the artificial language of poetry, however adorned or rendered pleasing. The fine arts, therefore, are not now so necessary to the improvement of the human mind as they anciently were; and have therefore justly fallen into greater neglect. Even in ancient times something of this kind occurred. It was gradually found that all poets were not capable of singing their own verses, nor all musicians of becoming poets. It was also found that both poetry and music were injured by too close a connection. Poetry and music, therefore, became distinct arts. Some wrote verses, and others sung them. Both arts were improved; but both lost their political importance. Music, especially instrumental music, became an intricate art; but the musician lost his respectability, because he no longer uttered his own thoughts, or rather, in the use of an instrument, he could utter no thoughts at all. Poetry, no longer fettered by music, became more rational and elaborate, and approached more nearly to prose. As wealth increased, and books multiplied, poetry was studied, as now, in solitude by many who disregarded music. Men of talents also began to cast off the fetters of numbers, and to write in prose. Thus, in proportion to the degree in which literature abounded and

was improved, the fine arts lost their value and their influence.

The use of the fine arts, then, seems to be this: When men are altogether barbarous and ignorant, it is of much importance to prevail with them to exert their faculties with regard even to the most trifling objects. A marvellous tale told them in a song produces this effect. All the efforts of the fine arts are addressed to the passions. It is necessary they should be so to excite the attention of barbarians. They have only an indirect tendency, therefore, to render mankind rational. They foster and soothe the passions of love, ambition, and vanity; but they also teach men to admire skill and ability, and to take delight in something else than war, gaming, gluttony, and idleness, which are the vices of all savages. As succeeding artists improve upon each other, their countrymen become more discerning and skilful, till at last a great proportion of mankind learn to take delight in the exertion of thought, and in the pursuits of literature and of knowledge. When this object is accomplished, the fine arts have done their duty; and an important duty it is, seeing they are the means of alluring the human race to the pursuit of intellectual improvement. In themselves, however, and without regard to this object, they are of -little real value; for a man is not a more excel

lent being when his ears are tickled by music than when he hears it not; and we derive no greater improvement from an important truth, when it is conveyed to us in rhyme, than when it is conveyed in prose. To be a good judge of painting or of music, a man must no doubt possess a certain degree of intellect; but this degree is so moderate, and is capable of being acquired in so many other ways in a literary age, that the production of it, by means of these arts, affords no adequate reward for their laborious cultivation.

I cannot help observing that, in the history of mankind, superstition and the fine arts go hand in hand, and mutually support each other. The poetry, painting, music, and architecture, of the Greeks and Romans were chiefly employed in the service of the popular mythology or idolatrous religion of these nations; and it was by the liberality of superstitious devotees that these arts were supported. In the same manner, the superstition of the church of Rome was the chief support of the fine arts in Europe. nature of these arts to undermine, the fabric to which they cling. instructing the human race to powers of reflection, they taught men to despise a degrading superstition; and at the same time to engage in the investigation of truth and of nature, which supersedes the desire of the exVOL. I.

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But it is the

like the ivy,

By gradually exercise their

hibition of human art. The church of Rome has fallen, or is falling, because the very arts which it supported, and by which it was for a time upheld, taught men to exert their reason, and to press forward to that science which is more valuable than it or them. These arts will decline in Europe along with the superstitious establishment, whose patronage supported their splendour. But the example of Scotland, and of other protestant countries, shews that, if literature is generally cultivated, the intellectual interests of mankind will suffer nothing by the loss.

CHAP. V.

CAUSES OF ERROR IN SCIENCE.

WHEN we perceive the existence of any object, or that it resembles or differs from another object, this act is treasured up in the memory, and thereafter we express the recollection of such previous perceptions by the word belief. We say that we believe in the existence of a particular object, or that it possesses certain qualities. Hence, if the human understanding be an in

strument correctly formed for the discernment of truth, and if memory be a correct record of its judgments, it would seem that no erroneous belief or opinion ought to find its way into the human mind. This, however, is very far from being the state of the fact; and it may be proper here, very shortly, to take notice of some of the chief modes in which speculative errors obtain existence.

1st, The very limited nature of the human constitution exposes the understanding to great hazard of forming erroneous decisions. It is seldom that the objects which are to be compared can be perceived by the senses at the same period of time. If they are placed in distant situations, and cannot be brought together, or if a past is to be compared with a present event, as the weather of the last with that of the present season, the intervention of memory becomes absolutely necessary; and one of the objects at least can only be perceived as existing in that record. Hence, if the object or event was originally attended to in a negligent manner, or not sufficiently reflected upon, the traces of it may have faded, and the comparison will be imperfectly made.

2d, From the difficulty of retaining in the memory the whole individual objects that we observe in Nature, we are induced to arrange them or their qualities into classes; but from