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with a design to provoke a rupture, the dissimulation of Calvo laid him open to the imputation of treachery, which the system he pursued very much strengthened, for while in the act of making promises, his commissaries were every where intercepting the supplies provided by the British commissaries, for their own army; and even when Lord Wellington halted at Merida, on the eighth day after his departure from Deleytosa, he had found none of those supplies on the road which Calvo had with so much confidence promised him. Being thus, however, out of the reach of the army of Eguia, and having been enabled to march his army in divisions, he was supplied regularly with necessaries.

In the meantime Marquis Wellesley had employed himself zealously in endeavouring to fix the Junta to some systematic mode of provisioning the armies, and after much controversy, that body requested he would suggest such a plan, as might in future prevent all misunderstanding, and on the 21st of August the following was submitted to the Junta by that minister.

"To an army of 25,000 men in that country, 1000 mules and 100 carts should be attached; these would provide for the transport of the hospital stores, military chest, and five days' rations of rice, biscuit, and bacon; but they were necessary for the immediate service of the army, and were not to be considered as part of the train employed in conducting supplies from the magazines to the army. Two lines of magazines should be formed between the armies in their present position and Seville. The depôts nearest the army should be at Villa Nova de la Serena, Don Benito, Almendralijo, and Asauchal; they should be formed of flour, biscuit, rice, bacon, barley, oats, wine, and brandy; that part of the country was equal to supply these depôts, and mules and carts also as means of transport. The second depôt should be at Monasterio and Olalla, and be entirely supplied from Seville and its vicinity, both with stores and means of transport; this should be the principal magazine of wine and brandy, and of biscuit, for which Seville was famous. A military officer, named by the British General, and assisted by six or eight commissaries, should be at the head of each line of depôts; the mules and carts should be divided into brigades, each brigade escorted by an officer and a sufficient number of men, under command of the officer at the head of the magazines, and these officers should be answerable for the regular and punctual delivery of the supplies. This system should commence at Cadiz, where all the articles, both of provision and transport, which could be

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collected from that vicinity, and from 'Africa, if needful, should be placed under the direction of a proper officer; Cadiz should furnish the means of conveying these articles to Seville, and at Seville a similar arrangement should be made for communicating with Santa Olalla, and Monasterio. Regular halting places should be made for the convoys, and provision made at each for the men and beasts employed; regular daily returns made to the British General, and to the government at Seville, of the state of each magazine and each convoy, and a proper system of rewards established for those who distinguished themselves in providing stores and safely delivering them."

Marquis Wellesley was not unaware of the difficulty of carrying such a scheme into execution in a country like Spain, where regularity of carriage is unknown; yet with due exertion on the part of the Junta, and under the regulation of an intelligent English commissariat, he felt a confidence in its completion. On the 23d the Marquis desired a reply, the Junta not having made any to his proposal, and on the 25th, Don Martin de Garay put into his hands a set of regulations for the management of the depôts, when they should have been formed. As this was not, of course, satisfactory to the Marquis, he urged the Junta to decide upon his plan, or reject it, and at the end of nine days, viz. on the 30th of August, he received a verbal assent, and there the matter rested.

Having expressed a full and decided approval of the plan delivered in by the Marquis, the Junta proceeded to profess its confidence in the co-operation of the British army with the patrio's, and its immediate return to Spain, when they might together mové forward against the enemy; but Marquis Wellesley was not duped by their apparent warmth and sincerity, and as no means were used to put his plan in practice, he evidently, and with justice, suspected that treason was lurking somewhere; "for," said he, person acquainted with the real condition of the British and Spanish forces at this time, could reasonably advise a forward movement against the enemy, with any other view than the certain destruction of the allied armies."

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The true cause which had checked an army covered with glory, and rendered it unfit for service, was plainly developed, and the popular indignation arose against the government, which repelled it by the most artful and traiterous fabrications: demands, they whispered, had been made by the Court of Great-Britain for the cession of Cadiz, and the island of Cuba, and that a new change of

government was proposed, the refusal of which preliminaries had caused the retreat of Lord Wellington. These reports, if not circulated by the Junta, were not contradicted by that body. Marquis Wellesley, in the midst of all the insincerity and weakness of the government, yet saw that the Spanish people had done their duty, and were ready to continue the defenders of their country; but as to the Junta and General officers, there certainly appeared in their conduct a decided enmity to the Spanish cause.

The palpable turpitude of the existing government, induced Marquis Wellesley to recommend the assembling of the Cortes, yet he was not regardless of any suggestion for employing the British troops; and a plan being proposed to him, he without hesitation imparted it to Lord Wellington. It was the wish of the Junta that the British army should take a position on the left bank of the Guadiana, and occupy Merida as an advanced-post-their right at Almendralijo, and their left extending to Badajoz; by which ar. rangement Portugal would be covered, Seville protected, and support afforded to the left of the patriot army, which should in that case be placed în cantonments at Medellin, Don Benito, and Villa Nueva de la Serena.

Lord Wellington was decidedly averse to this plan, and distinctly stated his opinion on it. The Spanish army was, he thought, in the best position in that part of the country, and such a one as they might hold, had they the power to hold any thing while they held it, they covered the Guadiana, and had a secure retreat: and he recommended that the bridge of boats opposite Almaraz should be removed, and the Spanish army hold their position as long as possible. Lord Wellington represented the state of the British army to be such as could give no reasonable hope of co-operation, and that the Guadiana was not defensible against the enemy with the force he had, as it afforded no commanding position.

Lord Wellington felt that his determination might have an unfavourable effect on the Spanish armies, which were too liable to be panic-struck by any untoward event; he therefore declared he did not intend to quit Spain with precipitation. The Spanish Junta being incapable of conceiving any enlarged and patriotic plan for the deliverance of their country, sacrificed important advantages for the sake of obtaining a few trifling political objects: this was not to be concealed from Lord Wellington, who readily saw by the distribution of their force, that military operations, and the defence of the country, were criminally neglected. The Junta, as a further

inducement to Lord Wellington to forego his design of quitting Spain, offered to place under his orders a corps of 12,000 men, which was to be left in Estremadura; a number by no means equal to the service they were intended for. The Junta of Estremadura insisted upon having the Duke of Albuquerque to command in that province, and the government having yielded to this desire, had the weakness to reduce the army which they so unwillingly trusted to that much-wronged nobleman.

It was impossible for Lord Wellington to accept the command unconditionally, unless he had received the sanction of his own government; and conceiving it would be inconsistent with the operations he was aware the British army would soon be engaged in, he prudently declined it altogether. Lord Wellington had obtained intelligence that a Council of War, held by the French at Salamanca, had determined them to make an attack on Cuidad Rodrigo: this place was the only source of communication which the Spanish government possessed with the northern provinces, and should the French succeed there, it would put them in secure possession of Old Castile, and probably of Almeida; he therefore turned his thoughts to the relief of Cuidad Rodrigo. Whilst the British General was constructing measures for the succour of that city, the Cabildo, or corporation, gave another irrefragible proof of the ill-will they entertained against the British:-a quantity of biscuit, to the amount of 100,000 pounds weight, had been paid for, and deposited in that city by a British Commissary; of this, 30,000 pounds were seized by order of the Cabildo, who alleged, as an extenuation of such an infamous breach of friendship and alliance, that it was by way of acquittal to the city for the debts incurred by the army of Sir John Moore, which remained unpaid. This was the more un. pardonable, as it was an acknowledged fact that the Commissary then at Cuidad Rodrigo, had orders to reimburse the Cabildo for the debt in question. This palpable animosity to the British, which actuated the conduct of those functionaries, convinced Marquis Wellesley that the government had not a sincere concurrence in the endeavours of the British towards the emancipation of Spain; for it certainly evinced no symptoms of disapprobation at this and other similar conduct,-and when from the want of mules or other beasts of draught, with which Lord Wellington could not be supplied, he was obliged to abandon his ammunition, the government soon found means to transport it to their own stores.

This turpitude on the part of those men, who, styling themselves patriots, were in fact the bitterest enemies to their country, was

more detrimental to her interests than the presence of the French armies; and the British minister and Commander-in-Chief, aware that efficient co-operations between the armies of England and Spain, under such circumstances, was impossible, abandoned the idea, although the cabinet of St. James's had it then in contemplation to increase the force of Lord Wellington to 30,000 men, provided measures were adopted to supply his troops, and the chief command of the two armies vested in him.

In consequence of these convictions, Lord Wellington proceeded to Badajoz in the beginning of September, and took up a position partly on the Portuguese frontier, and partly on the Spanish territory, by which he could menace the flank and rear of the French army, should it make a forward movement towards Andalusia.

(To be continued.)

MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE.

HINTS EOR REWARDING THE BRITISH JUNIOR OFFICERS AND PRIVATES SERVING IN THE PENINSULA.

December 2d, 1813.

Sir, AT the present moment, when victory has so completely declared for the cause of freedom to Europe; when the allied sovereigns in the north, and our own warlike sons in the south, led on by the ⚫ immortal Wellington, have brought the avengers of French perfidy and injustice to the frontiers of the French empire, nay actually planted their victorious standards on French ground, every one to whom the glory of Britain is dear, must acknowledge, (and he may do so with exultation) to accomplish this great work, our glorious country has set the example, has planted herself in the breach, and nobly dared the consequences of a single-handed contest, which we shall now see how the mighty boaster will in his turn support. Having thus premised, my intention is to bring to the recollection of the country the noble deeds of Britain's favourite sons, whose martial ardour is raised to the noblest pitch of heroism: need I present to their minds the dauntless courage which led them forwards to storm Badajos, Burgos, St. Sebastian, and the enemy's lines in front of Bayonne. I speak not of general actions, where, certainly, the same spirit triumphed on every occasion; but the forlorn hope of a storming party; the silent advance of men -seeking and courting danger to almost certain death: this is the devotion of heroes to their country: should, then, the memory of such honourable deeds perish for ever? Should the names of these

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