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republican government has been established and news from our fellow students, brothers and friends who are in the midst of the struggle, elucidate the actual conditions in China. Knowing them, we publicly announce the definite stand that the students are willing to make for the republic, the establishment of which will go down into history as the greatest event of the twentieth century-the political emancipation of 400,000,000 souls.

New occasions teach new duties,
Time makes ancient good uncouth,
They must UPWARD still and ONWARD,
Who would keep abreast of TRUTH.


Again, it was estimated that no less than 75 per cent of the provisional Republican Cabinet of Dr. Sun consisted of returned students from Europe and America, while even the coalition provisional cabinet of President Yuan Shih Kai had 50 per cent of them with Tang Shao Yi as the first premier.

To say that returned students from America and Europe would not entertain revolutionary ideas on account of materialistic and selfish ambitions would be a charge too extravagant and the contention would fall by its own weight of exaggeration. For did not Dr. Yung Wing, the first student graduated in America, stake his whole life in a revolutionary attempt after four great constructive institutions, namely, the Kiangnan Arsenal, the China Merchants' Steamship Navigation Company, the National Telegraph System and the Educational Mission of the seventies. It was indeed an inspiring experience when the speaker called on this "Father of Modern Education in China" to discuss for two hours upon the comprehensive plan he was laying for the educational, industrial and military reorganization of China, when he was invited by his friend, Dr. Sun Yat Sen to give his advice after the establishment of the republic.

The ideal returned student from America is therefore not a destructive but a constructive man, and it was only when repeatedly defeated that he will adopt destructive measures as proved by Dr. Yung Wing and Dr. Sun Yat Sen, both of whom received the American and European influence of living a broader and deeper life. Nevertheless, we must give all credit to our fellow students from Japan from their intense

enthusiasm and patriotism and to the many earnest reformers among the people at home that gave such an impetus to the Revolution from the very start.


A cowl does not make a monk and the name alone cannot transform China into a real republic. Reality and not idealism is the sure basis of a modern state. Rabid emotion has played its part, and a mighty important part, in stirring up enthusiasm and devotion, but any continued indulgence in it, would sweep an individual or a community off its own feet, as history has proved time and again. China is no exception, and as the republic is established, it is time that enthusiasm should be superseded by discerning foresight and cool judgement, so that a strong, prosperous and centralized republic might be insured for the generations to come, as the problems yet to be surmounted are stupendous.

During the revolution, the public sentiment in China demanded the adoption of the American government as the model and since the number of students in Japan is rapidly diminishing and as more students are coming to America, the responsibility resting upon their shoulders to develop China along republican ideals is consequently increased. If they are true to their training as was Dr. Yung Wing, the first student, then "there is also a hope and promise that God means to build up in that land some strong, free and characteristic manhood which shall help the world to its completeness."




By Masujiro Honda, D. Litt, Tokyo, Japan; Recently Editor of "The Oriental Review"

From geographic and other causes, the United States of America has been comparatively independent, both politically and commercially, of the continents other than its This fact has enabled the Washington government occasionally to project unconventional ideas and principles into the arena of international dealings. While American diplomacy, therefore, may be a source of irritation to some nations, to others it may prove a cause for thankfulness. Whatever the result, American diplomacy bears a distinct stamp of its own, and does credit to the country of great ideals. Only when it is actuated by self-interest does this attitude defeat its own purposes and alienate the sympathy and respect of other nations.

Japan's relations with China are as vital as those of England with the continent of Europe. Tokyo diplomacy can neither be purely academic, nor ignore the claims and sentiments of the four hundred million co-racials. Just as the British Empire would be threatened by the rise of a continental rival, so Japan's safety demands that no one of her three great neighbors, Russia, China, or America, should obtain an undue share of influence in the Far East. Moreover, the fact that European powers have vested interests more firmly planted in China than has America, requires Japan to be more or less on the side of the former when Chinese problems are to be internationally settled.

Besides this fundamental difference between American and

Japanese diplomacy in China, there is another point of divergence which makes the lack of understanding more apparent than real. In the democratic country with the Monroe doctrine theoretically accepted, international dealings have naturally to be guided by popular desires and to administer to private interests. Even such a disinterested act as that of returning to China the over-received part of the Boxer indemnity was made an occasion for educating Chinese youths in American colleges, which, it was claimed, would eventually further the trade, as well as foster the friendship, between the two peoples. American diplomacy is, in this way, more a matter of home politics than an international affair, as some shrewd critics have asserted with regard to the Panama Canal toll question, the Jewish passport case, and the withdrawal from the six-power loan group. Japanese diplomacy, on the contrary, has been characterised by a bureaucratic secrecy, and a tendency to take the people into its confidence after the inevitable had been accepted. This was notably the case with the terms of the Portsmouth peace treaty and the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" to restrict Japanese immigrants to America. In fact, a few years ago an English journalist advised the Japanese neither to apologise or explain, but to carry on their plans silently and tenaciously, for the reason that the outside world would be sure to suspect, criticize, or even incriminate whatever they did, as a result of the important position which Japan had then attained in world politics. Hence, the more need of frankly telling the American public what the Japanese have seen and felt concerning America's policies in China.

The primary object of Commodore Perry's visits to Japan, sixty years ago, was to prepare an approach, an entrance to Chinese trade, which in those days was a goal of general European rivalry. This successfully accomplished, about thirty years later, General U. S. Grant, ex-President of the United States, cautioned Japan and China against the danger of becoming a common prey to foreign aggressors, which, he said, would be the result, if the two Asiatic peoples were not banded together for mutual protection. As late as the

close of the Russo-Japanese war, there had been no single sign of conflict between American and Japanese diplomacy over the Chinese situation. As soon, however, as Japan inherited a part of the Russian lease of the Manchurian railway zone, a lease which does not expire until 1938, an anti-Japanese campaign was systematically inaugurated by the occidental press, which, in a more or less disguised form, the Washington government seemed to support. Beginning with the far-famed Rooseveltian pronouncement that "America must dominate the Pacific;" Taft's (then secretary of war) speech at Shanghai in 1907, which laid stress on the application of the open-door principle to the entire territories of China; Secretary of State Knox's proposal to neutralize the Manchurian railways by four powers, without consulting the wishes of the lawful owners of these railways; American support of a scheme to construct a new line of railway which would greatly reduce the usefulness of the Russo-Japanese line if the scheme was carried through; the newspaper agitation against the alleged Japanese rebate in Manchuria; the prominent part played by an American financier in the organization of the four-power group for Chinese loans, into which Russia and Japan were afterwards admitted with some difficulty; the recent withdrawal of the United States from the six-power group; and the independent recognition of the Chinese Republic by the Washington government in the face of an agreement among leading powers to act in unison in this matter-all these happenings seem to indicate that American diplomacy attaches more importance to China's welfare than to the interests and sympathies of other nations. Whether this attitude is attributable to a noble aspiration to help an under-dog, or to a practical desire for commercial expansion, its historical development, independently of its psychological value, is well worth our notice.

The traditional foreign policy of China was to set one strong nation to check another. It was in accordance with this principle that a triple European interference was invited at the close of her conflict with Japan. Again in the RussoJapanese war, China hoped for a chance of recovering her

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