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repeat, would doubtless be sufficiently sound and logical, if we should admit the foundation as resting in immutable truth. So, indeed, would the reasoning of a man be correct, who should first lay it down as a fixed fact that Hartford was submerged in twenty feet of water; and, then, proceed to lecture to the people of New York, stating that none of the houses could be entered or inhabited except on the second and third floors; and that the citizens were obliged to do their trading and visiting by means of boats and various kinds of vessels. But suppose a skeptic should doubt, not the premises which the lecturer had assumed with so much confidence, but the general conclusions about going only in boats from place to place. Accordingly he would ask-“ Are not some houses built sufficiently firm and tight to keep the water out the lower stories? Are the people in fact all driven from their kitchens and stores to the upper floors?" Most certainly," replies the lecturer, "for this very good and satisfactory reason the water is twenty feet high, above the surface of the earth. If the water is so high throughout Hartford, your judgment will enable you to perceive, that it would necessarily flow into the houses through the lower windows, &c.; and that all the effects named must result as a natural consequence, from such an inundation." "True," replies the skeptic, "the inhabitants of Hartford must be disturbed and suffering just as you describe. For if there are twenty feet in height of water, in the streets, your reasoning is all entirely sound and conclusive. But I would prefer being better satisfied first as to the foundation upon which you predicate the account, that is, to ascertain if there be an inundation. Now, this skeptic comes directly to Hartford, and discovers, to his great surprise and satisfaction, no water in the streets, that no such deluge had taken place, and the inhabitants were undisturbed. He therefore says to himself: "the lecturer reasoned very legitimately from his undemon

strated premises; but now, the whole relation falls to earth, because the foundation is shown to be a groundless or untenable assumption."

So with Dr. B's definition. His reasonings would be perfectly logical and conclusive-indeed, I may say quite unanswerable if he first makes it appear satisfactory and certain, that his interpretations of Nature and Supernaturalism are based and grounded in the essence of truth. But a true reformer in thought—a true investigator, one whose faith is an effect of a preponderance of adequate evidence, and not of theological and superficial education-must have the strongest possible historical, chronological, and intuitive demonstration that Nature is not "the system of God," before the conclusions, or superstructure, which are made to repose upon that proposition, are, in his opinion, entitled to careful consideration and worthy of credence.

His definition of supernaturalism in contradistinction to Nature, is not essentially different from the common orthodox opinions on that head. It is substantially identical with the written views of all the principal Christian scholars. Hence Dr. B. is not so truly a reformer in spirit; but an iconoclast-a reformer of the FORM. This fact must be a matter of sincere regret to all lovers of free thought, of unrestricted inquiry, and mental progression.

The Lecturer briefly alluded to the "confusion among rationalists" as to what Nature is, or should be defined to mean. He thought this fact "weakened" the force of all their arguments against supernaturalism. But this is evidently a misapprehension. Rationalistic arguments may be sound in Chemisistry, in Geology, in Astronomy, &c.; while their individual definitions of the general system of Nature may be as heterogeneous and conflicting as the different learned commentaries upon the Sacred Scriptures. It is my impression, that the Lecturer has not given his "definition" of Nature

and of Super-nature sufficient reflection. There is an absence of consistency and congruity in his views—a result, it appears to me, of his repugnance to seeing and acknowledging new truths in the multiform and stupendous developments of the present era. Does he remember the opening text quoted from St. Paul-" And he is before all things, and IN him all things consist"? Now, if "Nature is not the system of God," or included within that system; how,-I inquire, can the above text be a perfect and infallible utterance of truth? If "all things consist" in God,-how can Nature be outside or beneath the including spirit? If the supernaturalist means to say, that Nature is the Material Universe, and that the supernaturalistic realm should be understood to mean the Spiritual Universe,-in which the Spirit of God is manifested more visibly than in the physical creation; then, he is certainly developing an unreal and hence wholly unnecessary difference between Rationalists and Irrationalists. For the above is comprehensively our "definition" of the system of Nature.

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Upon this basis, the term "super-nature" may be reasonably employed to signify any thing which is high and spiritually exalted, yet homogeneous with the visible and material;--the difference in this interpretation consisting not in the kind and quality, but in the DEGREE and condition exclusively. Thus, Thus, for example, the human body is called the "physical man," and the human mind the "spiritual man;" yet the two, being united by the common ligaments and ties of sympathy and harmony, constitute ONE harmonious system. Even so,-on the soul-exalting principle that ALL truth is a Unit and intrinsically harmonious,— may we not rationally conclude, that the material creation, expanding far and wide throughout the illimitable infinitude, is the "physical universe;" and that the superior and ultimate departments of the same identical system,-embracing

all the future habitations and realms of the soul,-constitute the "spiritual universe," wherein, more particularly and manifestly, we shall enjoy "the Lord of Hosts"-all the more for then fully realizing the now inconceivably glorious fact, that in him all things consist?

This is the definition of NATURE which is suggested by the Harmonial Philosophy. Now, why does Dr. B. refuse to recognize a definition, which may be considered as the only real rationalistic view of Nature known to the world? For all the scientific and philosophic views ever elsewhere presented,--except in three or four instances of eminent productions,—are mainly fragmentary, speculative, or hypothetical. If Dr. B. would accept the Rationalistic method of reconciling "naturalism with supernaturalism," he would most assuredly escape the horrid overwhelming vortex of theological inconsistences to which he is now evidently but unconsciously hastening. Indeed, he would then survive the keener and far-reaching analysis of the rising generations of the earth, and would hold a sacred place in the reasonable affections of his advancing countrymen, as the leader of a principle of Conservatism, which favored the development of science and the application of a pure religious philosophy to the work of human redemption and universal improvement.

But what a low and unsatisfactory estimate did Dr. Bmake of Nature! It would seem that he had gone back to Job in order to get a "definition" of the magnitudes and extents of the system of the world—yea, gone back three thousand years, to a period when the people had no ships whereby to learn the breadth and wonders of the sea; no systems of measurement to calculate latitudes and longitudes, and the length of the earth; no telescopes, wherewith to ascertain the extents and immensities of creation-a period, in short, when the territories of Oregon would fill the

then prevailing conceptions of Nature, and Lake Erie the general idea of a Sea!

The wondrous immensities and peaceful harmonies of the Universe, the unutterable unity and silent operations of all created things, we are too apt to forget or neglect to properly examine. 66 What mere assertion will make any man believe," remarks the celebrated HERSCHEL, in his Discourse on Natural Philosophy, "that in one second of time, in one beat of the pendulum of a clock, a ray of light travels over one hundred and ninety-two thousand miles, and would, therefore, perform the tour of the world in about the same time that it requires to wink with our eyelids, and in much less than a swift runner occupies in taking a single stride? What mortal can be made to believe, without demonstration, that the sun is almost a million times larger than the earth? and that, although so remote from us that a cannon-ball, shot directly toward it and maintaining its full speed, would be twenty years in reaching it, it yet affects the earth, by its attraction, in an appreciable instant of time? Who would not ask for demonstration, when told that a gnat's wing, in its ordinary flight, beats many hundred times in a second? or, that there exist animated and regularly organized beings, many thousands of whose bodies, laid close together, would not extend an inch? But what are these to the astonishing truths which modern optical inquiries have disclosed, which teach us, that every point of a medium through which a ray of light passes is affected with a succession of periodical movements, regularly recurring, at equal intervals, no less than five hundred millions of millions of times in a single second! that it is by such movements, communicated to the nerves of the eyes, that we see; nay, more, that it is the difference, in the frequency of their recurrence, which affects us with the sense of the diversity of color; that, for instance, in acquiring the sense of redness, our eyes are affected four