CONCERNING THE WORKS OF GO D. HAVING confidered the Divine attributes, we come to confider the Works of God, or thofe acts of Almighty God, which are terminated in fomething without himfelf. And these are of two kinds. 1. The internal, or immanent works of God, which, though they are within himself, yet I call them works, because they are terminated in fomething without him. And thofe are of two kinds, viz. his knowledge, or foreknowledge, which relates to God, as we represent him to ourselves, under the notion of an intellectual being: and the counsel or determination of his will, as we represent him to ourselves, as a free agent, or one who works secundum intentionem 1. 2. The external or tranfient works of Almighty God: and these are of two kinds,viz. the work of creation, and the work of providence, or gubernation. The work of the creation is again of two kinds; viz. creatio prima,' the production of fomething, or fimple creation;' and creatio secunda, the production of fomething out of what pre-existed;' but yet fuch a production as exceeded the activity or power of any natural cause; as the production of the heavenly and elementary bodies, the first production of manners. The work of his providence is of two kinds, viz. First, the general providence that concerns the univerfe, and the particular beings therein, as they are exertions of the Divine Providence, viz. 1. The common influx, whereby every thing is pre ? according to intention. ferved in genere entis; and in the particular nature of ens tale. 2. The gubernation, or regiment of every thing. The special work of Divine Providence is that which relates to intellectual natures, viz, angels or men. And that part of the Divine fpecial providence, re lating to men, is of two kinds, viz. that which relates to him, in reference to his temporal fubfiftence, civil or political: or that part of the Divine fpecial providence that concerns man in reference to his, everlafting state or condition, which lets in the whole divine œconomy, in relation to religion and religious con cernments. To begin with the first of these kind of works, the Divine knowledge and fore-knowledge of things. We must premise, as we have done formerly, that we are not able to have a right and due conception ei ther of the knowledge, or of the counfel of Almighty God; only thus much we are certain, that it is quite another thing than any thing we can imagine concerning it, and the reafon is, because we have no other measure to frame in ourselves a conception of knowledge, but only the idea or image of that knowledge. which we have in ourselves, which is utterly unfuitable and difanalogical to that knowledge which is in God, or the manner or nature of it. It is much more poffible, that a child of a span long; nay, that a worm, or a fly, might have a juft and adequate conception of the knowledge of the wifeft man in the world, and the manner of it, than it is poffible for the wifeft and most knowing man to have a right measure or estimate of the knowledge of God, or of the manner or nature of it. And the reason is apparent; for the knowledge of a child and a man differ only in degrees; the knowledge. of a worm and a man, though they differ not only in degrees, but in kind and nature, and therefore cannot form to itself the conception or image of the knowledge of a man for it; but yet they agree in this, that even the knowledge of a man is quid finitum: but the knowledge knowledge that a man hath, and the knowlege that? God hath, differed not only in degree, and in their kind and nature, but differ as quod finitum, and quod infinitum; and confequently impoffible that the finite nature of the knowledge of man can be any measure or image of the infinite knowledge of Almighty God. This therefore we may fuppofe concerning the knowledge of God; indeed rather what it is not, than what it is. 1. It is not barely an objective knowledge, or fuch a knowledge as arifeth from the impreffion, that the scibile, or thing known,' makes upon the intellect. And this is evident, because that this divine knowledge pre-exists all things that are without him to be known; he knows all things before they had any being, and therefore before they had an objective impreffion upon that which knows. 2. It is not a difcurfive, or rational knowledge; for that seems proper to the human nature, deducing of one thing from another, and collecting the effect from the cause; for this is a gradual fucceffive knowledge, a manner of acting incompatible to a moft fimple and uncompounded being. 3. It is not properly an intuitive knowledge; for all intuition prefuppofeth fomewhat pre-exifting to what is fo looked into: this fuppofition (in reference to the knowledge of Almighty God) muft either fuppofe an intuition of the things themselves, which is in truth nothing but an objective knowledge. But this ferves not here, for the knowledge of Almighty God preexists the very being of all things without him, and therefore it cannot be barely fuch an intuitive knowledge or else it must suppose a pre-determination of every thing that shall be in the divine will; and fo by the intuition of himself, and of his own most wise and powerful determination, he infpects whatsoever shall be. This, though it be true, yet it takes not up the whole extenfion of the Divine knowledge. For Almighty Almighty God doth most certainly know fome things that are not actually within the compass of an absolute and complete determination. He knows not only what fhall be, but what may be; not only what is within the compafs of his purpose and determination, but what is within the compass of his Almighty power and omnipotence; and not only that neither, there is a knowledge which fome do, and we may call scientia conditionata, a knowledge what a free agent would do under fuch or fuch an objective motion, though he were not predetermined by the Divine will. And to put a period to our progreffion, even negative, in this inquiry into the Divine knowledge, his understanding is perfect, unfearchable, and, which is more than all we can elfe fay, his understanding is infinite, exceeding the very compafs of scibilia them. felves, fo far as they have, or indeed can have, any actual existence; for that which is potentially infinite is nevertheless impoffible to be actually infinite: but the divine knowledge is actually infinite, for it underftands its own infinite being, which were enough to denominate it fuch, were there no other scibile; and in the understanding of its own infinite being, it underftands its infinite power, and is, as I may fay, commenfurate to the uttermoft activity of that infinite power: and a though, what may be, is but quid potentiale, for it is not, and poffibly never fhall be, yet he actually understands whatfoever may be, or that hath potentiam non repugnantia to be, though it never fhall be actually. Secondly: Touching the counsel of the divine will, it is a depth and height above all created understanding to fearch into. All things are brought about by the moft powerful counfel of his will, and yet he altereth not that law or rule of working which he hath implanted into every thing, unless it be very rarely, and for the manifeftations of the fupremacy of his empire and power: fo that ordinarily things natu rally |