is a confciousness of what paffes in the mind *. Some philosophers define it an inner sentiment of a thing, whereof one may have a clear and diftinct notion: in this sense they say, that we do not know our own foul, nor are we assured of the existence of our own thoughts, otherwise than by consciousness †.

IV. Intelligence relates chiefly to those abstract propositions, which carry their own evidence with them, and admit no doubt about them. Our perception of this self-evidence in any proposition, is called intelligence; it is our knowledge of those first principles of truth, which are as it were wrought into the very nature and make of our mind. Accordingly an intelligent being, must have some immediate object of his understanding, or at least a capacity of having fuch: an intelligent being, among the immediate objects of his mind, must have some that are abstract and general; those ideas or objects that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to that mind, whose ideas they are: these propositions are called axioms or maxims, or first principles; these are the very foundation of all improved knowledge and reasonings; and such an immediate view of things in their own nature, is sometimes called intuition.

V. Reasoning is the next fort of evidence, and that is, when one truth is inferred or drawn from others, by natural and just methods of argument; as, when I furvey the heavens and earth, this gives evidence to my reason, that there is a God who made them ||. Thus, by the help of truths already known, more may be discovered; for those inferences which arife presently from the application of general truths, to the particular things and cafes contained under them, must be juft, and will hold good, not only in respect of axioms and first truths, but also and equally of theorems and other general truths. When they are more known, these may be capable of the like applications, and the truth of such consequences as are made by virtue of them, will always be as evident as that of the theorems themselves *: in other words, every just consequence is founded on some known truth; by virtue of which, one thing follows from another, and if the premisses are true, and the inferences are just, they will be so too. That power which any intelligent being has of surveying his own ideas, and comparing them; of forming to himself out of those that are immediate and abstract, such general and fundamental truths as he can be sure of, and of making such inferences and conclufions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth after it comes to be known, in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove some assertion, resolve some question, determine what is fit to be done upon occafion, &c. the cafe or thing under confideration, being first fairly stated and prepared, is what I mean by the faculty of reason, or what intitles him to the epithet rational; or, in short, reason is the faculty for making fuch inferences and conclusions, as are mentioned under the preceding proposition †.

"The propositions, which I believe upon this kind of evidence, are called conclusions or rational truths, and the knowledge we gain this way is properly science."

It is likewise remarked by the aforecited judicious author, in treating of the nature and foundations of probability, that the force of it results from reason and observation together 1. As the one is not sufficient without the other, reason without observation wants matter to work upon, and observations are neither to be made justly by ourselves, nor to be rightly chosen out of those made by others; nor to be aptly applied,

* Wollaston's Religion of Nature, p. 43. 4to Edit.

† Ibid. p. 45. Some useful observations in the seq.

‡ This is objected to by other authors, as those observations arise

from the forementioned springs of knowledge.

VOL. I.

d

:

without the assistance of reason; both together may support opinion and practice in the absence of knowledge and certainty; for those observations upon the nature of men and things, which we have made ourselves, we know; and our own reasoning concerning them, and deductions from them, we know; and from hence there cannot but arife in many cases an internal obligation to give our affent to this, rather than that, or to act one way rather than another: and as to the observations of others, they may be so cautioufly and skillfully taken under our notice, as to become almost our own, fince our own reason and experience may direct us in the choice and use of them.

VI. Another kind of evidence, is the teftimony of others, and this is a large part of our knowledge. Ten thousand things there are which we believe, merely upon the authority or credit of those who have spoken or written of them; it is by this that most of the transactions of human life are managed, we know the characters and laws of our present governors, as well as things that are at a vast distance from us, in foreign nations, or in ancient ages: according as the perfons who inform us of any thing, are many, or few, or more or less wife, and faithful, and credible, fo our faith is more or less firm or wavering, and the propofition believed either certain or doubtful; but in matters of faith an exceeding great probability is called a inoral certainty *. Histories written by faithful and credible authors, and read with judgment, may supply us with examples, parallel cafes, and general remarks, for forming our manners and principles too; and by the frequent perusal of them, and meditation upon them, a judicious judgment is formed of many dubious cafes, and of matters of great importance.

To conclude, that we ought to follow probability in this cafe, as well as the forementioned, is evident; because where there is no greater certainty to be had, * See Dr. Watts's Logic, and Ditton on the Refurrection.

it becomes our only light and guide; and it must be reasonable to direct our steps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by; and, if it be reasonable, we are obliged to do it. When there is nothing in the opposite scale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the course of nature must turn the beam *.

With regard to divine teftimony, though it comes under the denomination of the evidence of testimony, is of a fuperior nature; and the affent to a proposition upon this evidence is stiled divine faith, and fo far as we understand the meaning of this word it produces a fupernatural certainty, or an absolute infallible assurance.

VII. Inspiration is a fort of evidence distinct from all the former, and that is when fuch an overpowering impression of any propofition is made upon the mind by God himself, that gives a convincing and indubitable evidence of the truth and divinity of it. But as this is of the highest kind of evidence, chiefly, if not folely, confined to the prophets, and some of the earliest apostles and first propagators of chriftianity, it is not so applicable to our present purpose, to the nature of those truths it concerns us to know in the state and circumstances in which Divine Providence hath placed us. This kind of evidence has been so often pretended to, either as working on the outward fenfes, or by impreffions on the imagination, spiritual feelings, fudden and powerful impulfes on the mind, whereby some persons have fancied a superior or divine light and power attending them, which they could neither explain or prove to the fatisfaction of rational and judicious perfons, that such pretensions have been often, and, I think, very justly exploded, as the effect of weakness and enthusiasm.

The various kinds of evidence upon which we believe any proposition, afford us the following remarks.

* Wollaston's Religion of Nature, p. 59.

I. That there are some propositions that admit of

different kinds of evidence, and of which we have an unquestionable certainty, and consequently may be confidered as fundamental truths, to direct our inquiries and conduct.

II. That, though some of these evidences are superior to others in their nature, and give a greater ground of certainty in some points, more immediately those which are the subject of divine revelation; yet that reason in its own nature will always lead us into truth in matters within its compass, if it were used aright, or it would require us to suspend our judgement where there is want of evidence; and it must, at the same time, and with equal certainty, be admitted, as the proper means to judge of the reality and degrees of other kinds of evidence, upon which any other proposition may present itself to our minds, and claim our affent *. But it will also follow, that if the judgment be corrupted, and the understanding darkened, with respect to religious principles and moral truths, which concern the rectitude and just conduct and true happiness of intelligent and free beings, he is then under as great an incapacity of reasoning, and incapable to difcern the proper difference of actions and characters, as if he had been formed with a natural incapacity of reasoning.

Religion is wholly founded in reason, and directed by it; and therefore, when this light, this sacred and divine light, is not attended to; when imagination, passion, and prejudices, and false conceptions, ufurp the place, and are allowed all that authority and influence, which only belong to truth, and the dictates of a fober well-informed judgment, it must unavoidably follow, that the truths of religion will be obscured by igno