son of St. Teresa, called as he was by a special vocation to be a most ardent lover of Jesus crucified, will not fail as a missionary to the votaries of a world enslaved by basest pleasures and degrading passions, even if the fruits of that mission

be miracles of conversion. The fact that the book is the work of a devout layman should be only an additional recommendation to "liberal" Catholics, who live in a chronic fear of being overcome by "priest-ridden" sentiments.

THE CHILDREN OF MARY. Baltimore Kelly, Piet & Co., 1874. Received through Cunningham & Son.

This book is a reprint of a well-known compilation, containing short sketches of certain very devout young ladies, who some years since edified the "maison des oiseaux" at Paris, by their exemplary piety. The handsome style in which this new edition is issued would make it a very neat present for the young lady members of the world-wide association of the "Enfants de Marie," and while serving to encourage their devotion and zeal, its perusal would at the same time not do one bit of harm to some of the "fast" daughters of the palatial house of Liberalism.

TIGRANES. A Tale of the times of Julian the Apostate. By Father George Joseph Franco, S.J. 1 vol. 12mo.

LIFE OF ST. THOMAS OF VILLANOVA, with an Introductory Sketch of the Men, the Manners, and the Morals of the Sixteenth Century. 1 vol. 12mo.

ADELINE DE CHAZAL; or, First Experience of the World after Leaving School. Translated from the French. 1 vol. 12mo.

AMELIA; or, The Triumph of Piety. Approved by the Archbishop of Tours. 1 vol. 12mo.

We have received from P. F. Cun

ningham & Son, 29 South Tenth Street,

the above new Catholic books, which we most cordially recommend, not only to general readers but also to our schools, academies, and colleges, as very suitable for premiums. We have postponed until our July number a review especially of the two first-named works, because the lateness of the date of their

reception prevents us from criticizing them as fully and as favorably as we know their merits deserve. TIGRANES, the first on the list, is familiar to most of the readers of the "Messenger of the Sacred Heart," it being reprinted in book form from that popular serial.

MADAME AGNES AND THE FARM OF NU

CERON. New York Catholic Publication Society, 1874. Received through Cunningham & Sen.

It is scarcely necessary for us to review or recommend the two capital novelettes so well known to the readers of the Catholic World, in which their publication serially has just been completed, and which now come to us beautifully bound in the uniform style with which all the novels from that excellent magazine have, from time to time, been presented in a permanent form to the public.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

From P. O'Shea, N. Y.: "The Neptune;" "Rosemary;" "Truth and Trust;""The Vestal, an historical tale of the century."

From D & J. Sadlier & Co., N. Y. : "For Husks Food;" "Gerald Marsdale."

THE man who writes the history of Italy for this century will find a frequent necessity for inserting the name of Giuseppe Garibaldi. That man has had a considerable share in the political movements that mark the last forty years; not, how ever, as much by his suggestion of a motive nor his direction of movements. Garibaldi has been eminently instrumental in the great movements that distinguish the latter half of the present century, and his name has been heard in most of the calls for assistance in the cause of violent national change, or if not in the calls, at least in the response. The biography of Garibaldi will be an important ingredient in the element of history. Not as a statesman, for he has no single quality of statesmanship; not for military science or successful strategy: he has none of the former with which to accomplish the latter. One or two instances

VOL. VII.-9

are cited by his admirers of what is called his brilliant success in a military movement. Those who know anything of the history of the events with which his movements were connected understand well that he acted for the sake of action and not for results; and if, in the war between Sardinia and Austria, it is said by his friends that he was kept from position when action would have been conspicuous and probably would have produced important success, it is with greater certainty, with greater appearance of probability declared that a want of confidence in his ability to manage any considerable number of men induced the superior officer to place him in a position, which if it allowed of no favorable action, secured the whole army from the disadvantage of his mistakes; mistakes most liable to occur with one who trusted more to his influence in minor politics than to his

statesmanship; more to knowing of the passions of the men placed under his command than to his knowledge of the art of war. Events showed that the leaders were correct. Garibaldi was wisely kept out of the way of the main army; he and his sub-command were only slight impediments to the general force.

We have said that Garibaldi is not a statesman: he is a great destroyer; his whole idea seeming to be to disturb, not to settle; to upturn, not to establish. Nor has he anywhere manifested a disposition favorable to the people, excepting to nurture discontent and promote convulsions. Fortunately for him the circumstances of many of the people with whom he acts are such as to make it much easier to promote disquietude and induce rebellion than it is to soothe and make peaceful. Garibaldi has undoubtedly a strong sense of what the people have suffered by bad government, and this strong sense is much more likely to be correct than are his views of measures and means for alleviating those sufferings. He labors under an error common to reformers, viz., that the opposite of wrong is right.

We are not about to prepare a biography of Garibaldi, or to write an essay on systems of government. We intend only to present some characteristics of the man and of events in his career by which opinion as to his claim to universal admiration may be appreciated.

Three points in Garibaldi's character have commended him to the earnest approval of the mass of people with whom he has been connected, or who have heard of him as active in the revolution which is now going on throughout the civilized world.

One is his undoubted personal individual courage: perhaps no man doubted that.

Another, his unchangeable zeal

in the cause which he undertakes to aid. We need not cite instances to prove that be his opinion right or wrong, he is constant to the

cause.

Another, and a very important element in the character of Garibaldi, is his entire disregard of pecuniary results, not merely his neglect of the ordinary means by which such men fill their purses, but his absolute refusal to profit pecuniarily by any position to which he is called.

When Garibaldi was the dictator in Naples, and commanded the millions of dollars which were a part of the spoils of the city, he, in his anxiety to get away from association with Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, and unwilling to touch a carlino that belonged to the king, borrowed ten pounds sterling of an English gentleman, and hastened to his island of Capræa.

That probably was only a striking instance of what had marked his whole dealings with the public. Certainly the people understood the act and allowed it to increase their confidence in him.

Having done credit, perhaps more than justice, to certain qualities and conduct of Garibaldi, and being willing to admit that motives honestly held by him influenced in all these, we now wish to refer to him as deficient in statesmanship, as dangerous by his susceptibility to flattery and his tenacity of hate and desire of revenge. Nor must we omit two other elements of character. Garibaldi, under pretence of dislike to a particular church, is an enemy and contemner of Christianity, and while he denounces, with more than gentlemanly emphasis, the public respect which is paid to religious institutions, religious places, and religi ous observance, he improves the opportunities by acquiring personal consideration, by accommodating himself to the habit of

the people, and making demonstrations of respect to what he coarsely denounces as superstition and folly.

It is probable that none who think at all, have ever thought that Garibaldi possessed any of the qualities which go to make up even a second or third rate executive or legislative officer. His career as a member of the Italian Parliament was distinguished more by his sullen retirement to, and his masterly inactivity at his island of Capræa than by any suggestion or defence of measures for public good in Turin. His consideration among men of political distinction was less for any qualities which he possessed for political action than for the good opinion entertained of him by the lower stratum of the people. Nor was it believed by the ruling classes that Garibaldi had influence among the people equal to what a certain indefinable affection for him seemed to intimate to the less observing. It was better to keep up that feeling of the lower masses for Garibaldi than to allow a more subtle politician and skilful warrior to supersede him, and to acquire an influence which might be dangerous to the views of the existing powers; and so, in numerous instances, Garibaldi was tickled with some evidence of public confidence, and intimation of considerable employment, which, however, was never to be realized, lest his unskilfulness should jeopard the plans of the government, or his accidental success should jeopard the government itself.

The rulers of Turin were corrupt and false in almost every respect; it is, then, natural that they should suspect others of the same bad qualities. But that government, bad as it was, faithless to its promises to others, was true to itself. It never rewarded Garibaldi for his exertion to extend Sardinian rule from Piedmont over all

Italy, and transfer the seat of power from Turin to Rome, because that government knew that its destruction of certain small governments in Italy was only a part of the plan of Garibaldi, and that some step in advance would invite the destruction of the kingdom of United Italy. There was a religious sentiment remaining among the Italians which had been more than sufficiently outraged by the language and acts of Garibaldi, and so the masters of the government aimed to pause while they yet had political power, and showed a little hesitancy in robbing all the churches, and paused to manufacture some reason or excuse for what had been done, and to prepare the way for what was to be accomplished.

The delay was not a part of Garibaldi's system. He wished to crush the Church forever by destroying the means of its perpetuation, and ruining as far as possible all evidence of its existence. That he was a contemner of Christianity is evident, not only from his habitual neglect, but from his gross vituperation; and one opportunity presented itself for showing his hatred of religion and of offering an insult to God in pouring ridicule upon the first sacrament of Christ's Church. In his dodging about Italy he met with a family that had recently been enlarged by the addition of an infant. Forthwith the mission of the Liberator must be glorified, and Garibaldi was allowed to outrage the religious sense of Christianity by conferring on the child the sacrament of baptism. We do not know that we are exactly correct in stating that the religious sense of Christianity was outraged by the act of blasphemy, for we recollect that it was presented to the public by correspondents of newspapers, and generally as an ordinary exercise of the liberator's power superseding the functions of the

ministers of the Church. In the baptism the name of Italy was used instead of the Holy Trinity.

"But Garibaldi was successful in his efforts to conquer the south of Italy and revolutionize the Two Sicilies, and, therefore, he must be a great general." The history of this event would be quite too extended for an essay. The strong government of Ferdinand II had irritated one portion of his subjects, and had failed to insure the sympathies of another part, failed from neglect to secure them by employment, and the island of Sicily had never forgiven the affront of withdrawing the royal family from Palermo, and ruling that faithful island from the faithless peninsula. "Come," said they often enough, "take away from the capital city of this island the paraphernalia of royalty, or come and wear them here. We support the weight of a kingly government; let us have the benefit of royal presence."

The motley troops of Victor Emmanuel were landed at Marsalla, under the guns of an English fleet of three-deckers, that prevented the action of the Neapolitan small er vessels, that should have, and without English guns could have, prevented the aggression. The troops thus landed proceeded to Palermo. Not a gun was fired, because probably none was owned in the whole distance from Marsalla to Palermo; and the conquest of the last-named city was, it is generally understood, the result of bribery to insure an easy conquest. It was stated that forty-four thousand ducats was the sum accepted for that purpose; and the marching and countermarching, and other mimic manœuvres at the gate of the city, were as much a matter of plan as it regarded the two forces, in that work, as are the movement of the two armies, that of the white and that of the red rose, in Shakspeare's historical play. And

the witnesses of the compact awaited with no impatience the result of the game on the deck or in the cabin of the British ship of war in the bay. It was not the military ability of Garibaldi, but the venal cupidity of one sent against him by the King of Italy.

Garibaldi proceeded to the conquest of Messina; that was.not difficult. The city has no defence excepting the old citadel above it. To the astonishment of the rebel leaders, or rather the invader, the citadel of Messina was commanded by an old soldier; he refused submission to Garibaldi, who tried his military abilities, and failed. He proceeded to the Continent, and the citadel of Messina never yielded till the kingdom fell with the fall of Gaeta, many months afterwards. Naples was also sold out, and Garibaldi got possession without the exhibition of military skill.

The Neapolitan forces took position some eight or ten miles beyond Naples, towards Capua, and the entire want of practical military knowledge in Garibaldi was daily manifested. Neither he nor his officers could use a cannon, and in the daily skirmishes between the two parties some English and some American navy officers used to amuse themselves by discharging the field-pieces which Garibaldi possessed, but did not know how to use. The arrival of Victor Emmanuel with his army relieved Garibaldi from his condition, which was daily becoming worse; deprived the English and American lieutenants of the pleasant opportunity of exercising their skill in gunnery, and compelled Francis the Second to leave the beautiful capital of a nation which his father knew how to rule, but which the son did not know how to retain. In none of the movements of the invasion which ended in the destruction of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies did Garibaldi show any military