the other fide of the houfe, not to defend the minifter, but to defend their country: and he called upon both fides to co-operate in delivering their country from its prefent difficulties, and to act in fuch a way that every man in the house might be able to fay, that, he had done nothing of which he was to be afhamed. He then moved, " that a humble address be prefented to his majefty, representing to his majefty, that, upon mature deliberation, his faithful commons were of opinion, that his gracious and be nign endeavours, to promote the reftoration of the general tranquillity of Europe had failed of their effect either from mifconception, on the part of the French government, or from the terms propofed having been ill-explained to the people of that country. His faithful commons, therefore, befeeched his majefty to adopt fuch measures as might tend, in the moft fpeedy and effectual manner, to remove these mifconceptions, and to vindicate the fincerity of his defire for the reestablishment of peace, in the eyes of Europe and of the world."

This motion was feconded by fir John Macpherson.

Mr. Pitt was of opinion, that no practical benefit whatever could arife either from the motion itself, or the arguments by which it was fupported. A peace, he faid, did not depend on the earnestness of their defires to obtain it, nor on any previous declarations of that houfe, which were rather apt to fruftrate than accelerate the object which they folicited. It depended on the free but reafonable operations of the executive government, the difpofition of the enemy, and the general pofture of affairs, combined

with various other circumftances too numerous and too complex to be detailed. The honourable gentleman alleges, that he has reafon to fuppofe, that, fuffering as the French people muft do under the inevitable horrors of war, they muft earneftly and anxioufly defire peace; and, on that ground, he affumes, that, a paragraph, which appeared, fo long as December 24, in a French paper, tending to fake off from the directory the odium of the breach of the late negociation for peace, and throw it on this country, muft have been an official manifefto, and publifhed by fpecial authority. He does not fay, that he is perfectly fatisfied of the authenticity of the statements in that paper; but he thinks them fufficiently authentic for calling in queftion the fincerity of the executive government of this country, in the late negociation; and he farther thinks, that fome thing ought immediately to be attempted, to do away any impreffion that the statements in that paper might have on the opinions of the people of France, and of Europe in general. But it would be fingular, by a manifefto, to refute a declaration which it had no authority to confider as official; to expofe the British nation to a fresh infult, and to encourage the enemy to defeat the very practical measures which it had adopted for the restoration of tranquillity. It would appear, on inquiry, that minifters had not only performed the whole of what Mr. Pollen's motion propofed, but even gone beyond the direct terms of it. There might be a chance, he said, for making overtures of peace, which the executive government only know how to come at.

Break down that paling, by

an

an imprudent and hafty ftep, and that chance is utterly loft." He could not at prefent enter into a detail of particulars. He had no hefitation, however, in declaring, that the difpofition of his majefty's minifters went beyond the purpose of the motion before them; and, that in confequence of difpatches received from his Imperial majefty, who had refused to negociate for peace, but in conjunction with Great Britain, a confidential perfon was to be fent, from this country to Vienna, with inftructions to enable the emperor to conduct farther negociations, in concert with his allies. He, therefore, hoped that Mr. Pollen would withdraw his motion, rather than perfevere in a measure which would tend to defeat the end which it propofed.

Colonel Porter difavowed all confidence in minifters. The chancellor of the exchequer had come to the house with a flourishing defcription of the state of the finances; and in a few weeks thereafter, we were found to be in a fituation little fhort of bankruptcy. At all events, the prefent motion could do no harm; it fhould, therefore, have his fupport.

Mr. Addington had flattered himfelf that, after what had paffed, Mr. Pollen would have withdrawn his motion. This motion, he observed, was founded on two grounds, ftated in a French paper: first, the origin of the war, which was attributed to the British miniftry; fecondly, the infincerity of the British government in its overtures for peace. He made a variety of obfervations, tending to thew, that minifters were dragged into the war against their wills; and, alfo, that they had not neglected any feasible opportunities

or means of pacification. If we were to make any application for peace, he said, in our prefent circumftances, the enemy might fuppole, that we were driven to it by the recent occurrences at the bank. It had been asked, what had been gained by the war? This was an improper queftion, as it was a war of defence: but, we had retained our character, atchieved great conquefs, and made a difcovery of eafy means of preferving internal tranquillity. We had nearly deftroyed the marine of France, and given a fevere blow to that of Spain. We had, in a great degree, quafhed thofe dangerous principles that were abroad, and fecured our honour, our liberty, and, he trufted, our conftitution. Thefe were fome of the advantages we had gained by the war: and, on thefe grounds, he would vote againft the motion, and move the order of the day.

Mr. Fox thought, as he knew the country alfo thought, that peace was the only means of averting our impending ruin. But what does the minifter, who has had fo large a fhare in producing your prefent calamities, propofe to you to night? That you fhould ftill repose your confidence in him: ftill confide in thofe councils which have been fo fatal. It seemed, Mr. Hammond, of whofe abilities he had no doubt, was going to Vienna, and, on this the minifter expected them to ftop at once, in the performance of their duty. We are now to negociate, fays the minifter, in conjunction with the emperor, and Buonaparte is to be negociator for peace with us both. Do not put me under difficulties, by your untimely interference. Το that, as a general principle, Mr. Fox

had no difficulty in affenting, though perhaps he would not agree with the minifter as to the extent to which that principle might be carried. The prefent queftion was not, whether any minifter, under any circumstances, fhould have the confidence of the houfe, during a negociation, but whether the prefent minifter, under the prefent circumftances, fhould poffefs that confidence? A motion was made for peace, by an honourable gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce) two years ago. What was the language then? "Do not vote for this propofition, but truft in me." He prevailed with this houfe to do then what he afks you to do now; to confide in his fincerity. After a confiderable lapfe of time, a negociation was at laft attempted, through the medium of Mr. Wickham, and afterwards carried on by the embassy of lord Malmesbury. This negociation became a fubject of difcuffion in this house, which was told, after every means had been made ufe of to evade all meafures that could lead to any ferious negociation, that there was not a heart in England fo "profligate as to wifh, nor a hand fo daftardly as to fign, nor a man to be found fo degenerate, as to be the courier of a commiffion to be fent to France, to ftipulate for peace." We have tried our executive government enough, faid Mr. Fox, to be confident we can do no good to our country, by trying fuch means any longer. Let us now try means that we have not tried. My opinion is, that, let who will be the negociators for peace, certainly, ftill more if the prefent minifters are to be the negociators, the chance of obtaining it will be infinitely increased, f parliament should give that nego

13

ciation the fanction of its vote. But it feems the French will be encouraged if this houfe fhould interfere and dictate to the executive government. Will they really think worfe of your energy, if they find that you are determined to take your own affairs into your own hands, inftead of confiding to the prefent minifters. Will they really expect to make better terms of peace with the people of England, fpeaking to them through the medium of reprefentatives, than with the prefent executive government? Do they expect more real care of the interest of the people of England from a reigning faction, than from the people themselves, fpeaking through the medium of their reprefentatives? I apprehend the contrary; and that, as we should expect more juftice from the French people themselves, than we do of any faction among them, fo would they from the people of Great Britain; and, in that view, I should hope, that neither the republic of France would be hoftile to Great Britain, nor the limited monarchy of this country be hoftile to the juft claims and true interefts of the republic of France. I wish to know what better pledge you could give of fincerity to France, in your defire for peace, than to tell them, by a vote of the houfe of commons, that you are willing to negociate: and what is more likely to lead to a restoration of tranquillity, upon a folid and per

manent foundation?

Colonel Fullarton obferved, that the prefent queftion, ftripped of all diplomatic ambiguity, food exactly thus: is this country prepared to admit, that Belgium thall not be reftored to the emperor, and that the Rhine fhall be the boundary of France? If not, the French will

answer,

anfwer, come and take Belgium. Thefe are not times for entrusting the most important interefts of the country to plenipotentiaries who entrench themfelves behind the ramparts of etiquette, and ftalk on the ftilts of ambaladorial mightinefs. Undoubtedly, every returning fentiment of mutual forbearance and amity ought, by every practicable mode, to be encouraged. Per

haps, with this view, no better beacon or directory can be found, in the annals of negociation, than the conduct of our Indian government, in the year 1781, when French, Dutch, Myforeans, and all, were in arms against the English; and our intereft in the caft were, if poffible, more unprofperous than they are at prefent on the continent of Europe. An honourable baronet, now a member of this houfe, then fecond in council, and afterwards governor-general in India, in conjuction with lord Macartney and fir Eyre Coote, intimated to the Mahrattas, that, unlefs in fo far as might be neceflary to fupport exifting engagements with allies, the English government was determined, that their operations against the Mahrattas fhould be naval, and defenfive merely. This they intimated to the Poonah government, and, from that moment, not a fhot was fired between the Mahrattas and the English. There is one point, which must not be omitted. It is well known, that the French, from the commencement of the war, have refifted all ideas of treating collectively with the confederated powers: in fo doing, they have proved their wifdom; for, by treating individually, they have detached every power from the confederacy excepting

Auftria and England. If the French lofe all hope of detaching thefe powers from each other, they can no longer have the fame object left for perfifting in that policy; at leaft, it may no longer be impracticable to devife means for bringing them to treat on general principles, and collective arrangements. This can hardly be effected without a congrefs, in fome form or other. Under this impreffion, he would take the liberty of reading fuch a form of refolutions as he conceived would meet the object in view, not meaning, however, at all, to prefs them on the house at prefent:

Refolved, "That it is the opinion of this houfe, that, whenever a proper opportunity occurs, the moft eligible mode of establishing the tranquillity of Europe, on a fecure foundation, will be, by affembling a general congrefs, fuch as took place laft century, previous to the peace of Munster. That the object of this congrefs ought to be, to fpecify and declare to all mankind the principles of right and wrong, which ought to govern the relations between independent flates; to fpecify and declare to all mankind the principles of fecurity, property, and public credit, which it is neceflary to recognize, and render effectual, before any pacification can be negociated with stability or honour.

"In the event of the Belligerent powers not acceding to this opinion, it will become this houfe to make known the grounds on which the war is continued, to afcertain the form on which it is to be conducted, and to declare the principles on which a ceffion of hoftilities ought to be concluded, on the part of his Britannic majeity."