the negociation, was entirely owing to the unreasonableness of the enemy. They have taken advantage, he faid, of the fituation in which their great fuccefs has placed them. If they fhould be able to continue their fucceffes; if they fhould, in confequence, rife in their demands; there must be great alteration in the conduct of minifters, or our fituation would be deplorable indeed. I cannot help, here, reflect ing on the period of the American war. Men used then to fay, it is not our fault; we are not to blame; it is all owing to the unreafonableness of the enemy that we do not obtain peace. Infatuated and felf-abused men! They were afterwards, fatally for the interefts of this country, convinced of the folly of their arguments, and obliged to accept of terms far more against them, than they might have obtained, had negociations been of fered long before they were.

But, on the other hand, Mr. Fox contended that there was a great deal of infincerity, artifice, and cunning, in the conduct of the British minifter in that business. If the British minifter had fome reason to fufpect the fincerity of the French directory, had not they, at least, equal grounds to enter tain fome doubts with refpect to his views in the negociation.-When lord Malmesbury, faid Mr. Fox, in addreffing the French minifter, fo often brings forward his profeffion of high confideration, I cannot but fmile; when I recolle&t that lord Auckland was made a peer, merely because he declared that the men who are now addressed, in fuch refpectful terms, ought to be put under the fword of the law, and because he de

nounced them as mifcreants, and traitors to all Europe." The minifter, he obferved, whatever may have been his fincerity in the tranfaction, was no ftranger to the advantages that may be derived from the idea of a pending negociation. That he now feels thofe advantages nobody will difpute. I know that fome weeks ago a very confident report was circulated, with refpect to the probability of a peace. It would be curious to know how far lord Malmesbury, at that period, was influenced by any fuch belief. It does not appear, from the papers on the table, that, at that moment, he could reasonably hope for a fuccefsful iffue to his negociation. It feems dubious, indeed, from the infpection of those papers, whether lord Malmesbury was not fent over merely to fhew his diplomatic dexterity; to fence and parry with Mr. de la Croix, in order to evince his fuperior fkill and adroitness in the management of argument, and the arts of political fineffe; to confound the fallow capacity, and fuperficial reasoning, of the French minifter, and to make the cause of this coun try the better. While lord Malmefbury was employed, thus honourably, in the difplay of his talents, at Paris, the minifter had an useful object of policy to answer at home. It was found convenient, for the purpose of financial arrangements, to hold out the hope of peace, till fuch time as it was found that the appearance of negociation might be renounced without any unfavourable effect, as to the fupplies of the year. When the French asked lord Malmesbury what terms he was prepared to propofe, he was unprovided with an answer, and obliged to fend to this country for inftruc

tions. What inference can be drawn from this conduct, on the part of minifters, but that, by thus bringing forward a futile, illufory, and unmeaning bafis, they expected to difguft the French in the first inftance, and fo get rid of the negociation? and, if the French, who must have felt themselves mocked by this treatment, and have been more and more affured of the infincerity of our minifters, had ftopped all farther proceedings, would they not have been fully justified? Undoubtedly, minifters expected that they would have refented the infult, and have broken off the negociation at the outlet. They thus hoped to have obtained eafy credit for their pacific intentions, and to have thrown upon the enemy the odium of a determined purpofe of hoftility, and an unreasonable rejection of the preliminary bafis of negociation. Unfortunately, however, for this project, the bafis was recognized. The disappointment of minifters was evident: lord Malmesbury was unprepared how to act, and compelled to fend for farther inftructions. The question then became," fince the French have fo unexpectedly accepted the bafis we intended to be rejected, what can we find that they must be indifpenfibly called upon to refuse?" Lord Malmesbury, who had before no terms to propofe, was now inftructed to bring forward fuch as could not be fuppofed to undergo much difcuffion; fuch as could not readily fail to effect the purpose of being rejected. The three great powers of the continent of Europe, will all of them be left with confiderable acquifitions? The king of Pruffia has gained a third part of Poland; Ruffia has ob

tained a confiderable extent of territory from that unfortunate country; and, in addition to his fhare of the divifion, it is alfo propofed, that the emperor of Germany fhall alfo be put in poffeffion of Maestricht, or fome other place. France is to be left with only Savoy, Nice, and Avignon. Is it fair that all the other powers fhould gain more than France? is the ftate of the war fuch as to juftify this propofition? When Great Britain made a propofition fo unreasonable, France took a step calculated to give confidence to the people in those countries the had annexed to the republic, by declaring that the could not, on any account, give them up. In the conference which took place between the British ambaffador and the French minifter, the former declared, that, the king of Great Britain would not recede from his demand, with refpect to the Netherlands. Muft not the French, in confequence of this declaration, have been induced to affume an equally refolute tone, with refpect to their intention of keeping that territory; when, from the nature of the terms proposed, they perceived no likelihood of ob taining peace? As to the French minifter having afked lord Malme bury to give in his ultimatum, it evidently meant no more than that he fhould make a formal declaration of what he had faid with regard to Belgium: a demand which could not furely be confidered as unrea fonable. Whatever the English miniftry might think on that fubject, the world at large would confider the memorial of lord Malmesbury as the fine qua non of the court of Great Britain, refpecting Belgium. If, Mr. Fox proceeded, the house fhall be of opinion, that Belgium

is really entitled to be regarded as a fine qua non; that it is an object for which this country ought to continue the war till it has expended another hundred millions, and fhed the blood of half a million more wretched beings: if the houfe think. fo, it ought openly to declare its opinion. If, on the contrary, the houfe fhall think with me, that it is not worth the risk of this country, to expend fuch immenfe treafures of money and blood, in order to reftore it to the emperor, who, after all, may perhaps, in a fhort time, be no longer our ally: then, let them act like men, and, by some fair and unequivocal amendment, convince the country, and fhew the world, that they will not be longer fubfervient to fuch a dreadful wafte of blood and treafure. But if it be true that the negociation was broken off, on the ground that the retention of Belgium was made a fine qua non, on the one part; and its reftoration to the emperor a fine qua non, on the other; I afk, on what ground was this done? Was the emperor a party to the negociation? Here then is a fine qua non made in a matter intended folely for the benefit of the emperor, to which, nevertheless, he is not a party, and which we do not know whether he himself would abfolutely infift on or not! Surely this might have been known before the negociation was entered upon. When we were so often fending fuch immenfe fums to the emperor, millions after millions, fome perfon or other, employed in thofe offices, might have afked the queftioned. Had any one done fo? No. I ask any impartial man, if this is not a mere mockery? but, fays the right honourable gentleman,

with great emphafis, why did not the directory present a contre projet ? To whom fhould they prefent it? was the emperor a party? No. They had, then, no one to prefent it to, for, every thing contained in our projet was for the emperor's benefit alone. I agree with the right honourable gentleman as to the principle, that a people who come into the power of another people, by the chance of war, cannot, by the law of nations, be dif pofed of lawfully, till the definitive treaty of peace is concluded; but this is very different from a people who are left at liberty to chule a government for themfelves, and who, after fuch liberty, voluntarily adopt the ftep of uniting themselves with their neighbours; and those, who, perhaps, at one time, might have claimed over them the right of conqueft. The French, Mr. Fox obferved, were now, and always had been, reprefented, by minifters, as a horde of affaffins. Suppofe the Corficans had chofen the king of Great Britain for their king, and intreated, in the strongest terms, that they might not be given up to thofe affaffins, would it be faid, by the British minifter, in a negociation for peace, that Corfica was an object of restoration? Mr. Fox believed that it would not: and might not the French ufe the fame arguments refpecting Belgium? On former occafions, when the conquefts in the Weft Indies were mentioned, as means of negociation, the idea of the fatus quo ante bellum was turned into ridicule. Martinico, particularly, (though in this negociation the minifter had lowered his tone) was, on those occafions, not to be confidered as a conqueft in former wars; but as territory re

ceived

ceived at the request of the inhabitants, who had defired to be taken under the protection of his Britannic majefty. Mr. Fox concluded his fpeech with moving, as an amendment to the addrefs, that, after the words" returning his majesty thanks for his gracious message," there be inferted the following:

"That this houfe has learnt, with inexpreffible concern, that the negociation, his majefty lately commenced, for the reftoration of peace, has been unhappily fruftrated.

"In fo awful and momentous a crifis, the houfe of commons feel it their duty to speak to his majefty, with that freedom and earneftnefs which becomes men anxious to preferve the honour of his majesty's crown, and to fecure the interefts of his people. That, in doing this, they fincerely deplore, that they are under the neceffity of declaring, that, as well from the manner in which the late negociation has been conducted, as from the fubftance of the memorial, which appears to have produced the abrupt termina tion of it, they have reafon to think his majesty's minifters were not fincere in their endeavours to procure the bleffings of peace, fo neceflary for this diftreffed country; and that all profpect of pacification feems intirely removed from their view: for, on the one hand, his majefty's minifters infift upon the reftoration of the Netherlands to the emperor, as a fine qua non, from which they have pledged his majefty not to recede; while, on the other, the executive directory of the French republic, with equal pertinacity, claim the prefervation of that part of their conqueft, as a condition from which they cannot depart.

"That, under thefe circum

ftances, this houfe cannot help fa menting the rafhnefs and injuftice of his majefty's minifters, whofe long-continued mifconduct has produced this embarraffing fituation, by advifing his majefty, before the bleffing of peace had been unfortunately interrupted, to refufe all negociation for the adjuftment of the then fubfifting differences, although, at that time, the Netherlands, now the main obftacle to the return of tranquillity, fo far from being confidered as an object of conteft, was folemnly renounced, and the peace of Europe offered into his majefty's hands, upon the bafis of that renunciation, and upon the fecurity and independence of Holland, whilft fhe preferved her neutrality towards France.

"That this houfe has farther deeply to regret that, foon after the commencement of the war, when, by the vigour of his majesty's arms, with the affiftance of thofe of his allies, the republic of Holland had been refcued from invafion, and the greateft part of the Netherlands had been recovered by the emperor; at a time, too, when most of the princes of Europe, with refources yet unexhaufted, continued firm in their alliance with Great Britain, his majesty's minifters did not avail themfelves of this high and commanding pofition, for the negociation of an honourable peace, and the establishment of the political balance of Europe; that, on the contrary, without any example in the principles and practices of this or any other nation, it is with pain this houfe recollects, his majesty's minifter refused to fel on foot any negociation whatfoever with the French republic, not upon a real or even alleged unwillingnefs on his

part