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of an orderly standing close beside him. The Resident then retired, taking the two companies with him, to some distance from the walls, and went himself to the cantonment, where he found all the disposable troops already under arms; and although he was fully sensible that a shot fired at the British Resident was tantamount to an open declaration of war, he was very averse to resort to extremities. It was not till after a long consultation with the late Lieut.-Col. Lyons, of the 10th regt. N.I., then commanding officer of the troops at Delhi, that the simultaneous storm of the two principal gates of the palace was decided on. Mr. Seton first proposed to surround the walls with parties of troops, to prevent the escape of the prince, until the detachments at Merut and Rewaree could be called to his assistance; as he considered the great bronze gates could not be forced by the six-pounders of the artillery. This, too, was the opinion of the artillery-officer who happened to be present, and which nearly caused the miscarriage of the undertaking. Mr. Seton's objections were overruled, by pointing out to him, that the delay of a few hours would enable the insurgents to barricade the gates, and render the capture of the palace impossible, except by regular siege. The strength of the garrison at this period consisted of the 1st bat. 10th (now the 14th) and the 2d bat. 24th (now the 48th) N.I., and four six-pounders; but several companies were detached from both corps, which proved of little importance, for the accidental presence of the 6th regt. of cavalry, then on the march from Merut to Hurriana, and of two treasure-escorts from Muttra and Kurnaul, served to check any spirit of insubordination in the city. Information was sent to the officers commanding those corps, and, as soon as they arrived, the troops moved to the assault; one column, commanded by the late Colonel Lyons, accompanied by Mr. Seton in person; the other by the late Major Macpherson, of the 17th regt. N.I.; and both succeeded. A six-pounder was attached to each, but the opinion before adverted to had induced the artillery officer to bring a ninepounder, mounted on a ship-carriage, which had been used to fire the morning and evening gun at the residency, to force open the Delhi gate. It was found difficult to move; and instead of blowing open, he commenced battering the gate, with no effect. A heavy fire of musketry was opened on the insurgents, who had manned the walls, and the six-pounder was brought up in the interim, which forced open the wicket, after a few rounds. The other gates were forced in the same manner, and also the gate of the enclosure to the hall of audience.

The poor King and his turbulent son retired, during the advance of the troops, by the water-gate, to the Jumna; and on the prince seeing the impossibility of escape, he gave himself up to a party of the cavalry, and was removed from the palace, and placed in confinement, till he was sent to

Allahabad.

The loss sustained by the troops was only sixteen wounded, and that of the insurgents did not amount to more than sixty or seventy killed and wounded. Every endeavour that the well-known kindness and humanity of the Resident could suggest was speedily used to pacify the King and the family; and though the Tasheh Khuna, or royal wardrobe, was plundered, and his troops disarmed, during the assault, most of the shawls and valuable articles were recovered and returned; and compensation was given for all the damage done, as far as could be ascertained.

The endeavour to conciliate the King was successful; and the deference paid to him by the officer who was appointed to command the guards at the gates, was of great service in reconciling him to the change.

FAMINE IN INDIA.

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR-It is a fact perfectly well known to every one at all acquainted with the history of India, and, as may be fairly presumed, to none better than to those who preside over her councils, that the plains of that country are periodically wasted, and her cities depopulated, by the most dreadful visitation to which the human race is liable; and yet, to the best of my knowledge and belief, no attempt has hitherto been made by the British Government, by legislative enactment or otherwise, to avert the evil of famine, or to alleviate its effects. I do not mean to deny that temporary expedients are resorted to when the calamity is at hand, and the people are perishing for want of food; but no precautionary steps have ever been taken on a comprehensive scale to anticipate its approach. Peculiar diseases must be prevented by special precautions, or cured by specific remedies. The ordinary provisions of legislation. are plainly insufficient to protect the lives of the population from this destructive infliction; and, therefore, it is the bounden duty of Government to devise and to supply more effectual means of prevention. It will not be asserted, that because famine is a contingent, and possibly a remote evil, therefore it is undeserving the attention of Government. If the time of its approach is uncertain and distant, its effects are, in an equal proportion, disastrous and lasting. It is worse than a pestilence in itself, and is usually followed by a pestilence. It presents a combination of human suffering, more intense and more universal, within its range, than any plague that ever desolated the earth. No man who has not witnessed a land of famine, can form any conception of its complicated horrors. Its moral and physical effects are equally lamentable. There is not only a wholesale destruction of life by lingering torments, but there is a disruption and dissolution of every social tie and moral principle—a total debasement of human nature, which shocks the sense. Mothers slay their children, or sell them into slavery or prostitution, without remorse; husbands, their wives; brothers, their sisters; every natural affection being absorbed in the universal principle of self-preservation; and this effect always does and will ensue. We need only turn to the accounts of those who have survived to narrate their own conduct and feelings under the influence of starvation at sea, or elsewhere, to be convinced that man, in his extremity, is worse than a brute.

It is impossible not to feel some surprise that a powerful, an energetic, and, by peculiar assumption, a paternal Government, should not have turned its early attention to this important subject; but the time of British legislators in India has usually been absorbed by more pressing, because more immediate, difficulties and dangers. For many years they had to struggle with numerous enemies for political existence. "Wars and rumours of wars" filled the land; and even in more peaceable times, the details of a Government so extensive and unsettled, and the adjustment of interests so diverse and complicated, must necessarily have occupied a large proportion of their care. But that no steps have yet been taken to avert the miseries of famine, is no reason that attention should not now be called to the subject, much less is it a proof that no measures might be devised to anticipate and prevent this dreadful calamity. That heretofore Government had never legislated to prevent famine, is, I believe, unquestionable. What precautions were ever taken? Where are they to be seen or heard of? I have resided many years in India, and I have seen whole provinces desolated by famine, and I protest-not in the spirit of

detraction, nor even of censure, but because it is the simple truth-that I know of none. Since 1832, nearly the whole of British India has been wasted by this scourge; and the history of this period affords pregnant proof that the Government of each presidency was successively taken by surprise. In 1833, some of the dependencies of the Bombay Government suffered: what preparation had been made or precaution taken ?-None. I answer boldly, because the negative is susceptible of proof. If the contemporary journals of the Bombay presidency are examined, a voluminous discussion will be found in their columns on a measure which the Government, in its extremity, had been induced to authorize, and which it would not have authorized had it not been in extremity. This was, to throw open the granaries of certain monopolists in the (I think) Poonah Bazar. I neither justify nor censure the proceeding-legally, perhaps, it was wrong; morally, right-but I deduce from the fact, that the Government had no resource within itself, or it would not have ventured to infringe the rights of the subject, or to invade private property. Within the Madras territories, in the same year, the destruction of life from famine was awful. A hundred thousand and upwards of these poor wretches fled the country, and congregated at Madras, or other places, where they were chiefly supported by the adventitious aid of private charity.* Myriads perished at home, or on the roads; and the remnant who did not fly the country, and yet contrived to sustain life, was reduced to a state of emaciation that beggars all description. Was this Government better prepared?—No. The public coffers were opened to relieve the sufferers; attempts were made to transport corn from districts less denuded of the means of subsistence; taxes were remitted; all that human wisdom could devise, or active benevolence perform, as far as time and circumstance would permit, was readily undertaken, and every sacrifice cheerfully made but all proved unavailing. The Government, as before and since, was overtaken by a calamity, against which no preparation had been made; and the people died.

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At this moment, large portions of the British possessions, which then escaped the withering grasp of famine, are being destroyed by the same fatal infliction. Month after month the Indian journals are filled with the most appalling accounts of the ravages which famine is making in the Upper Provinces of Hindustan. Was the Bengal Government-the Supreme Government of India,

* For the only details of this famine published in Europe that I have met with, vide the Asiatie Journal for October, November, and December 1833, and January and February 1834. The dearth began to be felt with severity in March 1833, and continued until the end of August. The scanty information derivable from the notices in the Journal only applies to Madras, where no famine actually existed, but whither the sufferers fled in great numbers. The scenes of distress witnessed at the presidency, and described in the work quoted, give but a faint idea of the sufferings of the people in the interior, where the dearth prevailed. In Madras, was congregated every resource, public and private; the power and wealth of Government being bountifully aided by the contributions of private benevolence. These resources, too, were in the hands of Europeans, under whose active superintendance the money was applied in the most beneficial way; but, in the famished region, these resources and this superintendance were not obtainable; and, as a natural consequence, the destruction of human life was proportionately increased. I passed through the provinces when the famine was at its height: the remnant of the population had assembled on the public road, on each side of which was a row of trees, which produced a small fruit called the Indian fig. The poor creatures gathered up the fruit that fell, but the nourishment of such food was inadequate to preserve life long, even had the quantity been sufficient. They were nearly entirely without clothing, but their extreme and continued distress had destroyed all feeling of shame or decency. Let it not be thought that I mean this reproachfully: I mention the fact, and consider it a natural effect. Their personal appearance was scarcely human. Their anatomy was nearly as much developed as that of actual skeletons. The articulation of each joint, but for the skin, might have been traced. Their bellies were unnaturally swollen, from unwholesome food, I imagine; and their colour was the deepest jet. Their cries for charity to casual travellers were quite unearthly. The face of the country was in keeping with the misery of the population: "the heaven above was as brass, and the earth beneath as iron;" for which quotation I am indebted to the Friend of India, and it is a perfect description of a country consuming by drought.

the seat of legislation, the focus of power-was this Government, I say, better prepared than the Local Governments were, to meet the impending evil?— Alas! No. I extract from the Asiatic Journal for June 1838, a few passages, which will at once describe the condition of the people, and indicate the means of alleviation which the Government had been enabled to command: "The distress prevailing in the interior of the British provinces in Upper India, owing to the late drought and dearth, is still a prominent and painful topic in the latest accounts from Calcutta. The details of the sufferings of the lower classes of the natives are dreadful. When we find the Cawnpore Relief Society stating, as the result of actual observation, that the number of deaths from exposure and starvation, throughout that station only, in five* months, was upwards of 1,200; and that 1,300 persons were relieved daily with a few pice or cowries (less than a farthing); when we read that at Agra men, women, and children are crushed to death in the struggle to obtain the scanty pittance which the hand of charity extends to them; that the inhabitants of Agra are denying themselves their usual evening rides, because of the intolerable effluvia arising from the dead bodies surrounding the station; and that a nullah near Cawnpore is said to be choaked with the corpses of the multitudes starved to death, the picture can scarcely be heightened by the powerful imagination of a Dante." So far for the suffering; and now for the remedy: "It is gratifying to observe, that not only the Government, but individuals (chiefly European, indeed), have humanely endeavoured to lessen the sufferings of the poor; but the distress is on a scale so gigantic, that it surpasses human power to provide a remedy. The suspension of the revenue, the employment of the able-bodied, and a large contribution to funds raised by individual subscriptions, is all the Government can do in this emergency: the cause of the evil being unlooked-for, and not to be provided against." In a meeting which was held in the Town-hall, Calcutta, on the 28th February, whereat the bishop presided, I find it stated that the Government had resolved not "to sanction the grant of eleemosynary aid from the public coffers to persons unable to work," and who thus were left to perish because of their weakness. In the Asiatic Journal, the number of able-bodied in the employ of Government is stated at a thousand men; and it is expressly declared, in the published report of the Cawnpore Society, that "this plan of relief adopted by Government can barely procure a daily meal :" so that the wives and children of even these men were left to an inevitable death by starvation. One thousand men, then, by the benevolent interposition of Government, are saved from a miserable death; while hundreds of thousands, whose lives depend upon the care of the same Government, are consigned to a deplorable fate. This is not a fact of which the distant rumour only is heard, but it is a stern reality received directly from the authenticated reports of public meetings-an evil which has penetrated to the doors of our countrymen in India, and before whose eyes it is passing, or has passed, in dreadful array. Is it not evident, then, that the Bengal Government also has been "tried in the balance and found wanting?”—that, as the Bombay and the Madras Governments in former years were overtaken, surprised, and paralyzed by the famine, so it has happened to the Supreme Government at the present time?-that nothing has been learnt from experience, and that if a remedy is to be provided, it is still to be suggested? It is under this conviction, and because experience tells us that famine is a periodical evil, and when it does come, * For five read four. The above extract is from a summary of eastern news, by the Editor of the Asiatic Journal; but on referring to the original report of the Cawnpore Society, from which he quotes, and which is published in the same book (page 70 of Asiatic Intelligence), I find that the report included from the 1st September 1837 to 1st January 1838, a period of four months only.

productive of tremendous suffering, that I now venture to offer some suggestions, which, whether intrinsically sound or not, may attract the attention of wiser heads to the subject, and possibly prove an eventual means of averting this calamity from our Indian possessions. I am satisfied that a comprehensive plan of prevention might be adopted, and I purpose to propound a scheme, which it will be easily seen is not original, to which I entreat the attention of those upon whom the task of legislating for India more immediately devolves. I beg them to disregard any deficiencies of mine, which cannot affect the main point in debate, but ever to keep in view these facts, that the territories over which it has pleased Providence to place them in authority, are subject to an appalling visitation; that this calamity recurs periodically; that the people over whom they rule look up to them for protection; that the means of preventing, or at least of alleviating, its fatal effects, are in their own hands, and that it is their bounden duty to apply them. It matters not, then, whether I express myself well or ill, or whether my suggestions are wise or foolish; the facts remain the same, the responsibility rests where it did, and the subject is entitled to their anxious deliberation.

Before we consider the means of prevention, it is necessary to refer to the original causes of famine, and to the incidental circumstances which, in India, tend to increase its range, and to protract its influence. For many months in the year, the plains of India are parched up by the intense heat of a vertical sun, which dries up all superficial vegetation. During this season, the seed is sown and undergoes the preliminary process of germination beneath the surface of the ground: the rain falls, and the country is immediately covered with verdure; but if the rain does not fall, the process of germination is not completed, and the seed dies. This is not, as in more moderate climates, a partial effect, but it is universal throughout every district that is not blessed with its perennial supply of water, for the rays of the sun destroy every blade of grass that is not sustained by the fertilizing power of moisture: nor can any artificial means be applied as a substitute for rain. Irrigation is practised in all parts of the country, but the tanks and water-courses derive their supply of water from rain. The largest rivers sink into comparatively small streams by the termination of what is called the hot season; the wells are nearly exhausted, and do not furnish more water than is requisite for the ordinary purposes of man, nor could water derived from such sources be generally applied. It seems, then, to be beyond the power of human skill or industry to correct the original cause of famine-which is drought-or of human prescience to predict the time of its occurrence, as this depends upon circumstances which cannot be foreseen. To meet the emergency, therefore, a permanent provision must be made, or it would be useless.

Again, a failure of crops in other countries might produce scarcity, but not famine. The reason that it is felt so severely in India is, that the food of the inhabitants is confined entirely to rice, or wheat, or other grain. Rice is the staple food in the southern parts, and wheat, or a sort of vetch called dhāl, in Central and Upper India; and this is nearly the sole nourishment of the people: their existence, therefore, depends upon their crops. Being thoughtless and improvident to a proverb, they neither provide against the encroachments of famine, nor do they foresee its approach until it has actually befallen them. Indeed, a little consideration will show that no single individual could lay up a store for his own use, without the manifest danger of losing his little hoard when a general dearth prevailed, and probably his life in its defence; for, in such times, there is no respect of persons or property. The European

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