Nor do I see any way how to avoid or escape these perplexities, if we abandon this supposition of a common head or representative of mankind, who may be supposed according to a just constitution to involve his posterity together with himself in a state of guilt and misery. Is it not much easier, to suppose that God looks upon these young creatures not as innocent or guiltless, but as some way involved or interested in sin or guilt, when in the very original course of nature which he appointed, he brings them into being in such miserable circumstances, and so exposed to sin as well as pain? I say, is it not much easier to suppose, that they are looked on as some way under guilt and condemnation, than that the appointment and providence of a good and holy God should bring them hourly into being, in the midst of such sinful and miserable circumstances, and punish them with such early pains and sorrows, while he looks upon them as perfectly innocent and guiltless?

The fact is evident. The great God, who is both just and good, has appointed and continues such a law of propagation, whereby millions of infants without any personal sin or fault of their own are brought into being under these wretched circumstances, inclined to sin, and liable to a thousand sorrows and pains, and death. This is plain and certain fact, beyond all reasonable doubt or contest: Now will not the equity or justice, and the goodness of God be much better vindicated by supposing some original and righteous constitution*, whereby these young creatures are some way involved in the guilt or sin of their original parent and representative, and so made liable to misery, than by supposing them to be entirely innocent without any charge of imputed sin, and yet brought into being daily by the God of nature, in a condition of such proneness to sin, and exposed to such miseries? And as the glorious and holy nature and actions of God are best vindicated by such a suppossition, so without it I cannot well explain the scriptural account of this matter in that one short sentence; Rom. v. 12. By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned; that is, sin is imputed, or, which is much one in St. Paul's language, death, the penalty of sin, has passed on all, or has reigned over all, and therefore all are esteemed in some sort as guilty and condemned in the sight of God, though they did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression, that is, they did not commit actual personal sin against a known law as Adam did §. But I give but a single hint in this place, because I have reserved the scriptural account for another part of the discourse.

The righteousness of this constitution appears plain in propositions V. and VI. under question III. and section II. in question IV.

§ I confess that it is from scripture I derive my sentiments on this subject, and I firmly believe this doctrine of the imputation of sin from Adam to all his offspring.

QUEST. III.-How could a holy, a wise, and a righteous God, who is also a Being of infinite Goodness, establish such a Constitution, that all Mankind should derive their Being from such a natural Parent and legal Representative, whereby such universal Sinfulness and Misery should in the Event, be spread through all human Nature in all following Ages?

Answer. If this constitution was not only in itself a wise and a righteous thing in the universal Creator and Governor of the world, but if it was also the effect of goodness in God, as an universal Father of his intelligent creatures, then surely we shall silence all our censures of it at once. If it was a more probable way, so far as we can see, to secure the continuance of man and his whole race in the image and favour of his Maker, though it happened to have a contrary event by the negligence and faulty conduct of the first man, yet I say, it was a more proper and probable means to secure man in his happiness, then all must confess that this original constitution doth not impeach the holiness, justice or goodness of God. Now let us enter into particulars, and enquire whether this constitution be not only just and holy, but also good and kind, and most proper and likely to secure innocent man: Perhaps this will appear in the following propositions :

I. God created man an intelligent and holy creature, but capable of mistake and sin; a compound being made up of flesh and spirit, or an animal and a mind, with power also to propagate his kind in long successive generations. Now that this could not be unjust, will appear by particulars.-1. There is no injustice in God in creating such a being as man, a creature capable of mistaking and capable of sinning. What if man was formed with intellectual powers inferior to those of an angel? Let him remember that even an angel is capable of mistake and sin also: Nor has man any reason to complain that he was not made an angel; for by the same reason an angel might complain that he was not an archangel: And this sort of unreasonable complaint might upon the same foot have run through all lower orders of being, and would have laid a restraint upon God the Creator, from making any lower ranks of intelligent creatures whatsoever. According to this way of arguing, God would never have manifested the rich variety of his wisdom in the various ranks and degrees of creatures; for no rank of beings but the uppermost could ever have been formed. Nay, it may be doubted, according to this way of arguing, whether any creature at all could be formed: For perhaps the highest creature considered merely in his own natural powers might be capable of mistake and defect in duty. But if it be not an unfit or improper thing for an almighty God to make any creature, it is not unfit

for him to make a fallible creature, and capable of some defect, though he was originally perfect. And since he is a God of infinite wisdom, he thought it very becoming his character to manifest this infinitely various wisdom in the formation of a vast variety of ranks of beings, some of which should have higher and nobler intellectual powers, and should be further out of the reach of temptation and mistake, and others of them of lower or meaner intellectual powers, and more within the danger of mistake and temptation. Now this carries no injustice with it, provided that every rank of beings has a sufficient power to guard against its dangers of mistaking, and against the assaults of the temptations to which it might be exposed.

2. Nor was it unjust in God to unite an animal body to this rational mind; for by this union there is a rich variety of new powers arising in that creature, such as sense, appetite, passion, together with all the sensible qualities of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, &c. and the government of animal engines by a mind, all which manifest the various and astonishing riches of divine wisdom in the contriving of such a wondrous creature as man. And if it should be objected, That the mind or spirit is exposed to some temptations by reason of this union with animal nature, let it be remembered, that the innocent spirit or rational principle was formed in a state of power and dominion over all the appetites and passions that arise from flesh and blood; and had abundant capacity to resist all these temptations, while reason maintained its superior post in which it was created, and it did govern sense, appetite and passion. And besides, if there are some supposed inconveniences attending a spirit united to an animal body, so there are many certain advantages arising from it in the innocent state. The spirit is hereby made capable of tasting all the pleasures of sense, and of the more boundless power of imagination, and making use of the additional powers or organs of the animal, viz. eyes, ears, tongue, hands, &c. and all the vigorous efforts of the better passions, for the discharge of its duty, for the honour of its God, for the benefit of its fellow-creatures, and for the happiness of itself.

3. There could be no injustice in appointing such a creature to propagate its own kind by marriage, and to furnish it with all proper powers for that purpose: For if man continued in innocence, he would then enjoy all the innocent pleasures of numerous society, and some of those too springing from himself in every age, together with all the tender and endeared sentiments and delights of sons and daughters, and as Milton expresses it, "Relations dear, and all the charities Of father, son and brother,"

which would greatly add to the happiness of his earthly state.

II. Though man was created with powers inferior to some other intellectual beings, yet he was formed in the image of his Maker, and in his Maker's favour; in a state of perfect innocence, holiness and peace, with sufficient knowledge to defend and secure him from fatal mistakes, and with sufficient power to resist temptation and to maintain himself in this holy and happy state: But at the same time he was furnished with a liberty of will, that is, with a power to chuse good or evil, to disobey his Maker, as well as obey him, to use his understanding well in governing his sense, appetite and passion, or to abuse his understanding, and darken and weaken it by giving the reins to sensuality and his meaner powers: he had a liberty or free-will to watch against temptation or to be negligent, to resist it or to comply with it, to abide in the favour and image of his Maker, or to fall from his Maker's image and favour, according as he should use his liberty well or ill.

Now here is no injustice, nor any want of goodness in making man a free creature: For it is by this freedom that he becomes capable of moral government: It is this that renders him a proper subject of rewards, if he maintains his virtue and obeys his Maker; and it gives him a power of advancing himself by his obedience in his Maker's love: And it is this liberty also that renders him a proper subject of punishment if he neglect his watch, and turn aside to the paths of vice and disobedience.

III. Innocent man had probably some privileges given him by divine favour, above what were necessary and due to the mere state of his creation, viz. he might be indulged to converse with his Maker, perhaps in a visible manner, and to receive special and peculiar communications from him: He might be situated in a place of very great pleasure, with all varieties of tasteful food, and other instruments and objects for his refreshment and delight, and with encouragements to hope, and assurances to expect, that if he continued always humbly dependent upon God, and ever watchful against temptation, and attentive to his duty, he should have strong divine aids in case of danger, upon his application to his Maker for them. This is a very reasonable supposition, derived from the weakness of man, the fallibility of his nature, and from the abounding goodness of his Maker.

IV. Man was not only by the constitution of his nature put under a law of obedience to God his Maker, in whatsoever he should require of him, but also he might have that law set before him in some more express manner, together with the penalty or threatening annexed to it, viz. If thou obeyest not thy God in the duty which reason requires, thou shalt surely lose thy present privileges, and life itself. Now this ought to have been a constant and powerful guard to him against all temptations, if he

had the command and the threatening so expressly set before him.

V. There is also abundant reason to believe, that he had not only a law given him with a penalty threatened for the breach of it, but also a covenant made with him, and a promise given to him, not only of continuing in his present happiness, but of being immutably confirmed and established in immortality; and perhaps, of enjoying some greater happiness if he continued to obey God, and abstain from sin.

This covenant, indeed, seems to be a matter of pure divine favour, above and beyond what was due to him as a creature: For after he had fulfilled his obedience to the law for many years, and continued in the possession of his present comforts, God considered as an absolute sovereign might have annihilated him, and have done him no wrong, so far as I can judge. The great God is absolute Lord of all, and if we consider only his sovereignty and his justice, be might, I think, have taken away from a creature what he had given him without any injustice at all? So that this covenant of life or promise of immortality, and especially of superior happiness as a reward of his obedience, was the mere effect of divine goodness. And yet we cannot but suppose there was such a covenant made with innocent man, and such a promise of life and even of superior happiness given him upon condition of obedience during his state of trial, if we consider the following things:

1

1. I might in the first place argue thus: The great goodness of God, so far as it has been manifested in his conduct towards his creatures, seems to plead for it, that man should have some reward of his obedience, some additional gratifications and blessings above the mere continuance of this present life and peace: For it hath not been the way of God in any of his dispensations with the children of men, so far as we can learn from observation or scripture, to set his creatures at work for nothing; 1 Cor. ix. 9, 10. God will have the or rewarded that treads out the corn by forbidding to muzzle him, and permitting him to eat, and so he will have his ministers rewarded with a maintenance. Ezek. xxix. 19, 20. God bestows all the riches and the spoil of Egypt to reward Nebuchadnezzar and his army for the service which they had served against Tyrus, for they wrought for me saith the Lord. It is described as the known character of God, and what every man is called to believe, that, he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him: Heb. xi. 6. And it has been his constant course of transaction with his creatures, to encourage them to duty by the promise of some reward above their present state and circumstances: And if it is thus in our fallen state, why should it not be much rather in the state of innocence ?

2. I argue thus: God made the soul of man in its own nature immortal: Now if man had continued innocent, and