when it is drawn up for a considerable time, often in the narrow neck of a congested road. Still more awkward is the position when there is a stationary heavy vehicle on both sides of the road, with only space between for one line of passing traffic. The claims of those who have houses or business premises opening into a narrow, congested roadway must receive consideration, but this should not interfere with a measure of fair regulation. Whenever there is an alternative route this slow heavy traffic should be diverted. I inquired some months ago why a number of large empty vehicles were passing along a crowded street at the time. when traffic was very heavy, and it was difficult even to cross the road in safety. The answer was that they drove through the crowded street for the purpose of advertisement. But whatever may be the reason, such vehicles should be diverted, as they could have been to a large extent in the particular case to which I refer. Improved regulations would not take the place of widened or new roads, but the expenditure of huge sums may be rendered comparatively ineffective through a want of due regulations. The conclusion is that a better regulation of motor traffic in country lanes and main arterial roads is urgently needed in the interest of all classes of traffic, and in order that reasonable protection may be afforded against a growing source of nuisance and danger.

PARMOOR,

THE GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY

It is proposed in the following pages to discuss the three most important questions of foreign policy which have had to be decided by the present Government, namely the Ruhr, the Corfu incident, and the Turkish treaty. Criticism has generally taken the form of saying that they have done too little and said too little. Their actions will be discussed later, but a word may be said concerning expressions of Ministerial opinion with regard to foreign affairs. What too often happens is something of this kind. An 'incident' occurs somewhere beyond the seas. A Minister feels called upon to make a pronouncement about it. He decorates with the flowers of his eloquence the information hastily collected by a civil servant who has never been to the place in question, and spends the next few weeks in vainly endeavouring to induce the facts of the case to adapt themselves to the points of his speech. In questions of internal policy, such as housing or unemployment, the fullest and freest discussion is desirable. Governments can often, without loss of prestige, accept amendments to their policy from their own supporters, or even from the Opposition. foreign affairs, however, it is often the case that the least said, the soonest mended. A premature declaration of policy, which must often be based upon an imperfect knowledge of the situation, may irretrievably commit the Government to points upon which they might otherwise be enabled to compromise, and by hurting the feelings of foreign nations, who are often, to our ideas, amazingly thin-skinned, prevent the possibility of an amicable settlement.

FRANCE AND THE RUHR

In

The critics of the Government's policy with regard to the Ruhr may be divided into two classes: those who consider that we ought to support the French through thick and thin and those who consider that we should definitely put an end to the Entente. As against the first, I hope to show that our interests and those of France are not, and never have been, identical, and, as against the second, that the termination of the Entente might have consequences far more serious than they apparently suppose.

The importance of the Entente lies in the fact that it is the most hopeful method of preventing our conflicting interests in various parts of the world from leading to war.

In the 120 years before Waterloo we were at war with France more often than not, and since then there have been several occasions on which we have been on the verge of war. If the Entente had been in existence at the time of the Fashoda incident the question would probably have been settled at a private conference between representatives of the two Powers, as the Egyptian and other questions afterwards were.

It is worthy of remark, by the way, that the Fashoda question was of far greater importance than was alleged by the Liberals. Fashoda itself is merely a village, but its strategical position is such that the Power which occupies it commands the whole of the White Nile basin, an area of over 200,000 square miles. The fact is that there is, as there has been for the last 250 years, a certain amount of friction between British and French policy in many parts of the world. This has usually been caused by both nations pursuing what they considered to be their legitimate national interests. Within recent years there has been friction in Egypt, Nigeria, Newfoundland, Abyssinia, and Syria, and in various other parts of the world. At the present moment there is friction at Tangier.

It is apparently believed by Socialists and others who have the word 'militarism' always in their mouths that there exist in this and other countries bodies of responsible men who regard war as an end in itself. Whatever may have been the case as regards ancient conquerors, such as Alexander or Pyrrhus, it may safely be said that such an opinion has never been held by any ruler or body of rulers in modern Europe.

Even Napoleon believed that France's interests were identical with his own, and his wars were chiefly due to his desire to stabilise his position and to employ a vast army which was in existence before he came into power, and which, for both political and economic reasons, he was unable to disband.

Wars, as a rule, arise from one of two causes. In one a nation finds that a growing population needs territorial and economic expansion, and seeks it at the expense of its weaker neighbours. In general terms it may be said that such was Germany's reason for embarking on the Great War. In the other two nations find their interests irreconcilable. Such was the cause of our wars with France in the eighteenth century. India was the principal bone of contention. We could not both have it, and the result of the French failure was the national bankruptcy which led to the Revolution, while the result of our success was a century of commercial expansion and supremacy.

It is easy for a Government to declare, and to wage, war if they have behind them an enthusiastic population. It is less easy to kindle this enthusiasm unless the people have been taught to regard the opponent nation as their natural enemies, and war as desirable or inevitable. Those therefore who, on the platform and in the Press, are abusing and preaching hatred of France, are adopting the surest course to make it easy for the Government of this 'country to declare war against France when the next serious clash between our interests arises.

The aspect of the Entente which I have described is, no doubt, present in the minds of the Government, and also in that of Lord Grey of Fallodon, to whom the existence of the Entente is so largely due, but it has been disregarded by Messrs. Asquith and Lloyd George, and is probably strange to the Socialist demagogues. Mr. Asquith has stated that the Entente cannot continue unless the French abandon the views of M. Poincaré and adopt those of Mr. Asquith. It is difficult to imagine that he seriously expects the French to become a nation of Wee Frees, or that he proposes that we should declare war upon them unless they do so, but allowance must be made for the difficulty he finds in obtaining material adequate to support the platform of a united Liberal Party.

Mr. Lloyd George, though responsible as much as anyone for the present state of Europe, appears to take a malicious pleasure in the difficulties of the Government, and by his rabidly antiFrench utterances has done his best to prevent an amicable settlement. Neither he nor Mr. Asquith has stated what the Government ought to do.

The suggestion of the Labour Party is that we should invite America to intervene, which she has repeatedly and emphatically declined to do. That she is right from her own point of view will only be doubted by those who consider themselves competent to step, at a moment's notice, into President Coolidge's shoes.

The only suggestion for action comes from Lord Birkenhead, who recommends the withdrawal of our representative from the Reparations Commission and of our Army from the Rhine. There are numerous arguments in favour of this course, but the chief one against it is that it would not solve the problem.

France's action in the Ruhr can be regarded in four different

ways:

1. As a legitimate and the most promising way of obtaining reparations.

2. As a genuine, but mistaken, scheme for exacting reparations for herself and her allies as fixed by the Treaty.

3. As advantageous to France and legitimately taken in her own interests, but detrimental to this country.

4. As due to lust for power, territory, and revenge.

The first view is that adopted by Lord Rothermere and his school, and they recommend in consequence that we should support France in her actions. Mere verbal support would

obviously have little effect, and the only effective method would be to increase our Rhine Army and occupy another slice of German territory. Besides being very expensive, this would probably result in creating further chaos in Germany and thus further postponing both the possibility of obtaining reparations and the resumption of normal trade.

The second view is that adopted by the Government, and it is difficult in this case to see what they could do except what they are doing; that is, to maintain friendly relations with France without actively supporting her. To sit on the fence is never heroic, but if the ground on both sides is flooded it may be the only prudent course.

The third view is one which should be considered by the advocates of unconditional support of France. Although she may fail to obtain reparations, and therefore prevent us from obtaining any, she may succeed in breaking up Germany and in concluding treaties satisfactory to herself, but injurious to us, with the secessionist States. On several occasions since the war, in Turkey, in Poland, and elsewhere, she has acted with an exclusive consideration of her own interests, and may be presumed to be capable of doing so again. It would be impossible altogether to blame her. A country which finds itself in difficulty or danger is bound to consider its own interests before those of foreigners, and there can be no doubt that there is throughout France a genuine fear that it is only a question of time before a united Germany will again be in a position to attack her, and this time to conquer her.

If the British Government were to adopt this view of the case, it is still difficult to see what action they could take. It is very doubtful whether we should be able, even if we were willing, to turn the French out of the Ruhr by force of arms, even with such assistance as Germany might be able to give us were we to form an alliance with her. It is quite clear that we cannot persuade the French to leave the Ruhr. The only other alternative would be to form an alliance with Italy against France, and there appears to be no prospect of our being able to achieve this. The only course would seem to be to await events. It seems likely that the French are beginning to realise that they have got themselves into an awkward position, and their reception of Lord Curzon's statement at the Imperial Conference does not appear to indicate a feeling of calm confidence.

Those who consider that France is out to dominate Europe have logically no alternative to urging an immediate declaration