The main result of the Washington Conference, in the view of competent naval critics, is to leave Japan practically supreme in the Western Pacific. Thanks to the collapse of Russia, Japan is absolutely mistress of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, while her long line of islands, ending with the Pescadores, enables her to command the coast of China down to Hong Kong.

The Five-Power Pact, now duly ratified, not only limits American battleship building, wherein America's strength lies, but it gives Japan a naval holiday in which to develop her own shipbuilding resources, both private and State-owned. This she is doing, and she is at the present time not only building ships of the smaller types not forbidden by the Treaty, but she is also accumulating large stores of oil and building oil tankers. Besides, we are told officially (Hansard, July 19, 1923, p. 2644) she is spending no less than 2,000,000l. on her naval bases and strengthening her fortifications.

As far as the United States are concerned, their nearest base to the Philippines is Pearl Harbour (Honolulu), 5000 miles from the axis of the Western Pacific, which is a straight line drawn from Nagasaki to the Philippines. On this point a prominent American naval officer has stated that

the Philippines are there for Japan whenever she likes to take them, and nothing can prevent her from seizing them whenever she feels inclined to do so. As at present circumstanced we could do nothing whatever to protect them in time of war.11

Now there is a movement in the Philippines in favour of independence from America, just as there used to be a movement in Corea in favour of independence from China, and should this movement receive open or secret support from Japan, there is little doubt that the fate of Corea would follow. In that case, from what I heard in America last year, it is not inconceivable that America would acquiesce rather than fight. Beyond the Philippines lie the vast possessions of the Dutch East Indies, which, with the exception of Java, can hardly be said to be effectively occupied by the Netherlands, and which certainly could not offer any real resistance to Japan.12

11 Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific. The American Naval Department will this autumn submit to Congress proposals to spend 8,505,000l. on the naval base in the Hawaiian islands, 784,000l. at Cavite in the Philippines, and 142,000l. at Guam. The last two are within the treaty zone, but it is suggested that this expenditure is necessary to maintain them as efficient as in February 1922, when the Treaty was signed (The Times, August 25, 1923).

11 Cp. Report of the Dutch Commission on the Defences of Netherlands India, 1913; Manual of Netherlands India, compiled by the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, 1920, p. 531. A further Dutch Royal Commission appointed on November 29, 1922, reported on April 7, 1923, that a naval base at Tanjong Priok was indispensable, and that 5,000,000l. should be spent there with 1,500,000l. at Sourabaya. A subsidiary base at Rhio, near Singapore, was also recommended. Proposals on this subject were under consideration in the Dutch Upper House in August.

Enough has now been said to show that the matters relating to the Far East which await the deliberations of the Imperial Conference are of the utmost importance.

The Conference, as we have seen, has not only to decide (a) on the question of Imperial policy involved in our relations with Japan, (b) plans for carrying out that policy, but it has also (c) to provide for co-ordinated executive action, namely, machinery and funds; and in this connection I submit in conclusion that (i.) a special standing sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee should be appointed on which representation should be given to the Dominions and Dependencies immediately concerned, and such representatives should be men of decision as well as of experience, and (ii.) the Far Eastern fleet should be directed by a flag officer of high rank located at Singapore and assisted by a strong staff.

The British Commonwealth is a league of peace and if these steps are promptly taken an appeal to arms will probably be avoided, though in estimating probabilities account must be taken of Japan's predilection for preventive or defensive war, as shown in 1904, and her belief that war as such is an efficient cause of improvement in national economy. But if matters are allowed to drift we shall certainly wake up one fine morning and find ourselves in a position similar to that of 1914.

Above all, it is necessary for the Imperial Conference to recognise as the basis of its action that the expansion of Japan in some direction is inevitable, and that it must lay down a welldefined Imperial policy, for unless the objects and methods are definite the execution will assuredly be halting and feeble. For instance, Japan must be clearly informed in what light the permeation or annexation of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies by the Japanese will be regarded by the British Empire. Such problems are unwelcome to those who are responsible for the finance of Great Britain and the sister States, but unless they are fully and frankly faced now there will be even more unwelcome problems to be faced by those who come after us.

It is useless following the policy of the ostrich and hiding one's head in the sand. There is a belief in the United States that the British Navy will be used to defend American interests in the Philippines, there is a belief in some quarters in Canada and Australia that the American Navy will be used for their defence against Japan, and this is one of the causes of the apathy as to local naval forces. It is not too much to say that on all these questions an authoritative pronouncement is required, and that if none is forthcoming the Imperial Conference will have failed in its duty.

GEOFFREY DRAGE.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DOMINIONS

FOR the second time since the war, the Prime Ministers are meeting in conference this year, and one of their principal duties is to consider the conduct of the foreign policy of the Empire. During the Peace Conference, in the elation of victory, some striking but ambiguous pronouncements were made with regard to the status of the Dominions. Since then Dominion statesmen have endeavoured in one cryptic statement after another to illuminate without elucidating this important subject. They have shown little inclination, however, to come to grips with it and formulate a definite and practical means of tackling the problem. In 1921 the matter was completely set on one side. But if Mr. Bruce, the Prime Minister of Australia, is as good as his word, the question will be forced to an issue at the Conference this month. The difficulty is that, while Australia and New Zealand cannot afford to play with the issue, Canada and South Africa can, or at least think they can.

When Sir Joseph Ward brought his proposal for an Imperial Council before the Imperial Conference of 1911, Sir Wilfrid Laurier objected, saying that if a Dominion insisted on being consulted in regard to matters which might result in war, that would imply the necessity that they should take part in the war.' His successor, Sir Robert Borden, when he insisted at Paris on separate national status for Canada, made the whole basis of his claim the desire of Canada to assume the responsibility for conducting her own policy. Nothing less, he contended, would satisfy the aspirations of Canada for full nationhood. In reality, the principles of these two Canadian leaders were not as contradictory as they appear on the surface to be, for both were actuated by the instinct, which permeates American thought, to avoid entanglement abroad. Both statesmen believed that Canada had no urgent foreign problems of her own. Sir Wilfrid did not want to be involved in the foreign problems of the Empire, or committed to its foreign policy by sharing in its control. Sir Robert wanted independent status so that Canada could confine herself to the problems that concern her alone, and deal with them in her own way. Canada is so convinced that she has no foreign

policy to bother her that she spends practically nothing on defence. The present Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. MacKenzie King, an opponent of Sir Robert Borden, has been even more definite than Sir Robert, and in a recent statement announced that Canada's interest in the foreign affairs of the Empire would be limited to questions in which she was directly concerned, and she would not be involved in any war in which the Empire was engaged unless her Parliament, after consideration of her interests, decided otherwise. This statement was influenced, no doubt, by the opinion of French Canada, on which Mr. MacKenzie King depends, just as the similar attitude of Mr. Smuts is dictated by the need of conciliating Dutch opinion. A frank decision by a Dominion to control its own foreign policy from its own resources would have the advantage of causing a radical readjustment adapted to the needs of the new situation. The logical consequences of the independent policy would be worked out. The validity of the policy proposed would be tested by its application to various contingencies, and each part of the Empire would have to decide how it was placed, and make its representations and dispositions accordingly. As a matter of fact, nothing of the kind has ever been done by any of the Dominions, with the result that public opinion is only half informed. Disaffected opinion, which it is important for the time being to attract, secures important concessions while loyalist opinion is not aroused and is given no weight. It is not sufficient to say that a Dominion is going to control its own policy. What is that policy to be? And will it be a policy that can be pursued in isolation? There are very few nations in the world to-day who are powerful enough to pursue an isolated and independent policy. In any case to conduct foreign policy involves an expensive and elaborate mechanism. This does not exist at present, and the Dominions have shown no disposition to create it. There is no means of collecting information or of influencing foreign Governments. The only attempt made so far has been the proposal, not yet matured, to appoint a Canadian Ambassador to Washington. Mr. Smuts has deplored the lack of a separate diplomacy for South Africa, but has made no effort to appoint South African plenipotentiaries. As a matter of fact, the telegram summoning the Conference of 1921 shows that the British Government was experiencing the utmost difficulty in arousing any interest whatever in the conduct of foreign affairs throughout the Empire. When that Conference sat, British Ministers forcibly urged that after Paris it was anomalous for them to conduct the foreign policy of the whole Empire without consultatoin. But all attempts to put the matter on a logical and systematic basis were burked by the various Dominion representatives. No candid student examining the

It

history of the last few years can avoid the inference that a desire to participate in foreign policy, or even to control their own policy, is very far from the minds of Dominion statesmen. What they want is to limit the orbit of their activity, to discharge themselves from responsibility for foreign policy as a whole, and devote themselves entirely to home affairs. This conclusion is corroborated by the fact that neither South Africa nor Canada has made any preparations for defence nor attempts to cooperate with Great Britain in the general defence of the Empire. None of the Dominions can defend itself by its own resources. is true that the dangers of each differ. Canada is protected by the great Republic, and therefore does not fear an invasion, but this does not increase the national prestige of Canada. Even if the United States does not invade her neighbour, she could make Canada conform to her policy. The logical termination of this relationship is absorption.1 South Africa would be absolutely at the mercy of a strong enemy outside Europe, though such an enemy is at present distant. But the indifference of South Africa to her own defence is really due to the fact that South Africa has never finally settled the object of her allegiance. A study of this branch of the subject therefore leads to the conclusion that the interest of a Dominion in foreign affairs and defence varies in proportion to its apparent danger in the international complex.

It may be considered out of place for an Australian to criticise the action of other Dominions in the matter of defence. I do so merely to bring out in greater relief the position and policy of Australia. Australia, in good sooth, cannot exist unless her integrity is made an Imperial interest. The doctrine of entirely separate nationhood and individual responsibility propounded by Canada and South Africa is no good to us. If Australia is not to be overwhelmed, the principle of mutual responsibility and mutual sacrifice for the security of the Empire must be recognised. It is not much for a Dominion to ask-only such a guarantee of integrity as is provided by Article X. of the Covenant of the League of Nations as a basis of international peace. It is not suggested that Australian policy has been consistent or efficient. Before the war Australia voluntarily established a navy and compulsory military training. During the war we placed ourselves under the British command and fought as units in the British forces.

During the Peace Conference we claimed status-never really defined-of separate nationhood. The writer has never really quarrelled with the ideal of separate nationality, provided that

1 It will be noticed that when the American Senate ratified the recent Fisheries Treaty, separately negotiated and executed between Canada and the United States, it added a reservation that the treaty should bind the whole British Empire. The Senate appears to be taking the opportunity to force the issue.