1703]

CHANGES IN THE COALITION

881

by the defection, already mentioned, of the Elector of Bavaria; and Louis determined to take advantage of the road to Campaign Vienna thus opened to him, and to throw his chief efforts of 1703. in that direction. Thither therefore Villars marched through the Black Forest, having previously captured the fortress of Kehl opposite Strasbourg. The movement, however, was only partially successful; while Villars wished to march upon Vienna, already threatened by an insurrection in Hungary, the Elector insisted upon moving into the Tyrol. The peasantry of that mountainous district, deeply attached to Austria, thwarted all his efforts to advance, and when Louis of Baden, leaving the lines of Stolhofen, appeared in Bavaria, the Elector was compelled to withdraw and rejoin Villars. Too weak to defeat the Margrave, the combined generals were obliged to content themselves with checking the German troops coming against them from Franconia under Count Stirum at Hochstädt. Villars, who traced the ruin of the campaign to the rejection of his advice, clamoured to be recalled, and his place was but badly filled by Marsin.

Meanwhile, Marshal Tallard had been repairing last year's disasters in Alsace. Brisach had been taken, the Prince of Hesse, with troops from Stolhofen, had been defeated at Spires while attempting to relieve Landau, and that city had been retaken by the French (Nov. 17). In Flanders Marlborough had formed a great plan to conquer Antwerp and Ostend, but had been thwarted by the slowness of the Dutch, and by the defeat of their army under Opdam at Echeren. The Duke had to content himself with the capture of Bonn upon the Rhine, and with further progress upon the Meuse, where he captured Huy and Limburg.

The following year, 1704, saw a change in the ministry at home. Finding himself thwarted by the extreme High Tories, Marlborough had obtained their dismissal, and the admission of Harley and St. John to the ministry. In the meantime Louis was making vast efforts, and had set on foot no less than eight armies. There was to be war at once in Flanders, in Bavaria, in Alsace, in Savoy, in Lombardy, in Spain, and against the Cevennes. To Villars was intrusted the reduction of the Cevennes, which had been vainly attempted the preceding year by the Marshal Montreval. The Duke of Berwick was to subdue Portugal, Vendome to act against Savoy, Villeroi to stand on the defensive in Flanders, and the great effort of the year was again to be in Bavaria, where the events of the preceding year promised fresh success. There a considerable French army under Marsin had collected, and thither now was proceeding

a fresh army under Tallard, which would raise the forces in the country much beyond anything the Emperor could bring to meet them. Early in May Marshal Tallard led 15,000 troops through the Black Forest, and formed his junction with the Elector. He then hastened back to Alsace, where 30,000 men had been left to oppose the Margrave of Baden.

Critical position of Austria.

The position of the Emperor seemed indeed almost hopeless. While the French and Bavarians were advancing directly towards his capital on the west, the Hungarians, under Prince Ragotski, with constantly increasing forces, were approaching Vienna from the east, so that in June it became necessary to throw up works for the defence of the capital. Marlborough watched the coming crisis with much anxiety, and formed a plan of great boldness for the Emperor's relief. It was no less than to march the whole of the troops under his command, and to transfer the seat of war to Bavaria, interposing between Vienna and the advancing Bavarians. Previous experience had taught him that there was no hope of persuading the Dutch to countenance such a plan. To the States he therefore suggested only a campaign on the Moselle, and co-operation with Louis of Baden in the south; to Godolphin alone he told his secret. At length a threat that he would move upon the Moselle with the English alone, backed up by the influence of Heinsius, the Grand Pensionary, who was his constant friend, induced the Dutch to give their consent to the part of the plan he had disclosed to them. Other obstacles were met with from the other allies, but they were all at length overcome, and early in May Marlborough set out, ostensibly for the Moselle. To keep up this notion he went first to Coblenz, and the French proceeded to collect their armies to meet him. He then went on to Mayence, and it was believed that he intended to act in Alsace. He was there obliged to disclose his real object. He left the Rhine, marched up the Neckar, and advanced through the Duchy of Wurtemberg. On his road to Mondelsheim, he had a meeting with Eugene, who was commanding the Imperial army on the Rhine. To him he told his plans; and the intercourse of the two great chiefs ripened into unbroken friendship. They were there also joined by Louis of Baden, a punctilious German general of some ability, but belonging to an older school of tactics. Marlborough and Eugene suggested that the Margrave should retire to his lines at Stolhofen, and hold them against Tallard, while Eugene should bring such of the German army as was moveable to co-operate with

The march to
Blenheim.

Marlborough; and the difficulty of the chief command was compromised, the generals were to command on alternate days. After making

1704]

the English. honour.

THE MARCH TO BLENHEIM

The Margrave, however, insisted on the place of Eugene went back to the Rhine, the Margrave joined

883

these arrangements, the armies proceeded on their march through the rough hill country of Wurtemberg. Having crossed the Neckar at Laufen, they followed the course of its tributaries, by Gross Heppach, Ebersbach, and the difficult pass of Geislingen, and finally emerged upon the plains, reaching the Danube at Elchingen, a little to the east of Ulm. The Elector, expecting an attack upon that city, garrisoned it and withdrew, still on the north bank of the river, to Dillingen, further to the east. But Marlborough had no intention of attacking Ulm, he continued his march eastward, determining to pass round and beyond the Elector's army and to secure Donauwerth, which would supply him with a bridge to cross the river, and might be turned into a fortified place for his magazines. With some difficulty he persuaded Louis of Baden to march in this direction. His intention being at length evident, the Elector of Bavaria sent 12,000 men to occupy the strong hill of the Schellenberg, commanding Donauwerth. When the day broke, the English army were at Amerdingen, still fourteen miles from Donauwerth. It was however the day of Marlborough's 'command. At three in the morning he started on his march, and afraid of allowing the opportunity to slip, though his men were weary from their long journey, Marlborough determined to assault the Schellenberg that same afternoon. The battle was a fierce one, but the allies were entirely successful. The Bavarians fled in disorder. Some thousands crossed the bridge, but the weight of the fugitives broke it down, and a vast number were drowned in the river. The Elector of Bavaria now withdrew to Augsburg, to await the arrival of reinforcements from France. Marlborough and his army crossed the Lech, and proceeded to follow him. Bavaria was at his mercy. He offered the Elector terms of capitulation. They were however refused, and Marlborough was guilty of the one act which is a blot on his military career, he gave the country up to military execution.

The two French generals Villeroi and Tallard, outwitted by Marlborough's march, had meanwhile taken counsel together, and once more Tallard, leaving Villeroi in Alsace, led a reinforcement of 25,000 men to join the Bavarians. He was watched and followed by Prince Eugene, who reached the Danube at Dillingen almost at the moment that Tallard had formed his junction with the Bavarians at Augsburg. As Eugene's reinforcements were necessary, Marlborough fell back to meet him, and soon Eugene, leaving his troops behind him, appeared in person in the camp. Between them they persuaded the Margrave of Baden that the capture of the fortress of Ingolstadt

1704]

BATTLE OF BLENHEIM

885

was necessary, and that, as it had hitherto never been taken, it would be much to his honour to reduce it. Thus rid of their pretentious colleague, Eugene and Marlborough arranged their junction, which was finally made, without disturbance from the French, on the 11th of August, a little to the east of Hochstädt, on the north of the Danube. The combined armies of the French and Bavarians had also betaken themselves to the same side of the river, and were now advancing from the west to meet the allied army, should they wish to

Battle of

Aug. 13.

fight. It was believed, however, that such was not Marlborough's intention. Tallard thought he was withdrawing towards Nordlingen, and, as he said after the battle, had intended Blenheim. to fall upon him and fight him on his way thither. When it became evident that a battle was to be fought, the French general, advancing from Hochstädt, took up a strong position in the neighbourhood of the village of Blenheim. The hills which lie along the north of the Danube there fall back a little, enclosing a small plain. Across this runs a brook called the Nebel, at the foot

CON. MON.

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