more combined action, than in the feeble expeditions of the earlier part of the war. But as yet this was not foreseen. For some years the great war in the Peninsula was starved, while money was lavished upon useless and isolated efforts in other parts of the Continent; it was only slowly and by degrees that the genius, the steadfastness, the success, of Wellington taught England the necessity of large and well-continued efforts in one direction. The Asturian envoys were received with enthusiasm not only by the Opposition but by the Government. But the opportunity offered was not wisely made use of. Spain was inundated with agents of no political ability, who were deceived by the boasting assertions of the Spaniards. Money and arms were sent over in lavish quantities to be left unopened on the quays, appropriated by the rival juntas for their own personal or local advantage, or to fall into the hands of the enemy, and the Spaniards, who did little or nothing for themselves, were taught to demand the assistance of England as a right. An English force sent to Portugal. The position of Portugal seemed to offer a more favourable ground for action, and thither it was determined to send an English armament. But the Government could not yet conceive of war upon a large scale, and in entire ignorance of the real condition of Spain believed that a mere handful of English troops, aided by the boasted enthusiasm of the Spanish nation, would be able to withstand the enormous armies Napoleon was ready to pour into the Peninsula. The army at first sent was little better than an expeditionary force. A body of troops ready at Cork for war in South America were despatched under Sir Arthur Wellesley, at that time Secretary for Ireland; but by some ridiculous mismanagement two senior officers, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Hugh Dalrymple, Governor of Gibraltar, were put over his head, and Sir John Moore, who was despatched with a second body of troops to reinforce him, though he had served as commander-inchief both in Sicily and Sweden, also found himself in a subordinate position. The expedition touched first at Corunna, but was persuaded by the members of the local junta to proceed to Portugal, where they declared the numerous Spanish army was already collected, and whither they promised speedily to send reinforcements. Upon reaching Oporto, however, the commander found that there were no Spanish troops in the north of Portugal, neither were there any Portuguese troops; but upon the river Mondego there appeared to be a disorganized body of about 5000 men, representing 40,000 for 1808] THE PENINSULA WAR 1291 Wellesley lands whom the Bishop of Oporto had received accoutrements. With them there were some 10,000 peasants without arms. Wellesley had now a choice left. He might land north of Lisbon and act against Junot, or proceed to Cadiz, and joining Spencer, who had a small command there, act against the French in Spain. He preferred the first alternative, and determined to land at the at Figueras. Aug. 1, 1808. mouth of the Mondego, near Figueras. He sent to Cadiz for Spencer's troops, but fortunately that general, on hearing of the victory of Baylen, had already determined to sail for the Tagus. The two corps when joined amounted to about 12,000 men. The landing of the English at the Mondego confined the operations to that tongue of land which lies between the sea and the Tagus in its south-westerly course, and which is terminated by the city of Lisbon. Combat of Aug. 17. Wellesley determined to strike rapidly, and bring affairs in Portugal to a crisis at once. Therefore, although deserted by the Portuguese troops, he advanced directly southward towards Lisbon. Junot's troops were somewhat scattered, and the temper of the people prevented him from energetic action. He proceeded, however, to concentrate his troops, and while this movement was going forward the English army came into contact with one of his divisions under Laborde, occupying a strong position at the end of a valley leading from Obidos to Rorica. Here, after a Rorica. sharp contest, the French general found himself outflanked by the hills which line the valley, and withdrew, allowing Wellesley to proceed. Meanwhile Junot had been continuing his concentration, and had collected 14,000 men at Torres Vedras, to bar the road to Lisbon. Sir Harry Burrard, Wellesley's superior officer, had now arrived at the coast, and Wellesley begged him to allow Sir John Moore's division, on its arrival from England, to land on the Mondego river, and cross the tongue of land to the Tagus, thus cutting off the natural line of retreat into Spain, which would be up the valley of that river. He then proceeded to advance against Junot. But Burrard, a commonplace general, disregarding his advice, determined to bring Sir John Moore up as a reinforcement, and forbad Wellesley to undertake any offensive movement till that general's arrival. Wellesley was therefore obliged to return to his army, which was in position at Vimiero. A little hill covered the village to the front. On either side of it ran a chain of heights, from which on the east a branch ran off southwards. There was a direct road between Vimiero and Torres Vedras, and a second road from Torres Vedras to a place called Lourinham ran along the top of the branch ridge crossing the main ridge. On the hill before the village and upon the ridge to the west Wellesley took up his position, expecting Battle of Vimiero. Aug. 21, 1808. to be attacked on his right. But early on the 21st the French came into view on the Lourinham road, and as they pressed forward evidently threatened the left, and not the right, of the English position. A considerable body of troops was therefore moved from the right to the left ridge, a movement unobserved by the French, for the valley between the armies was thickly wooded. For the same reason a ravine which rendered the left wing nearly unassailable was unobserved by the French. Junot directed two main attacks, upon the central hill and upon the left ridge. The attack upon the centre was defeated, for it was open on the flank to the fire of an English brigade moving to the left, which halted half-way up the 1808] CONVENTION OF CINTRA 1293 hill when the strength of the central attack was seen; the left attack was ruined by the ravine. Meanwhile troops had been sent to turn the English left by the Lourinham road and to advance along the left ridge, which the French believed almost unoccupied ; but, as has been mentioned, it was now covered with troops, and Ferguson's brigade beat the assailants back, and pursued them along the ridge till he had wholly separated them from the rest of the French army. They must have capitulated had not an unexpected order arrived to halt. Sir Harry Burrard, who had been on the field all day, had just assumed the command, and the change of leaders became at once perceptible. When the battle was over, thirteen guns, and many prisoners, including a general, were in the hands of the English, and the French had lost between 2000 and 3000 men. The road to Torres Vedras from Lourinham, on which the beaten French army had collected, was two miles longer than the direct road from Vimiero. Wellesley designed to push forward with his victorious army, part of which had not been engaged, to forestall the French at Torres Vedras, and cut them off from Lisbon, a measure which, had Sir John Moore been landed from Mondego, must have completed their ruin. Again the prudence of Sir Harry Burrard thwarted Wellesley's plan. He was compelled to allow his army to rest in their old position. Sir Harry Burrard having thus spoilt a great victory, was almost immediately superseded by the arrival of Sir Hugh Dalrymple. Their combined wisdom allowed an advance upon Lisbon, but insisted on bringing Sir John Moore to join the army. While this was being settled, an envoy arrived from the French offering to treat, and finally the of Cintra. convention known as the Convention of Cintra was entered into, in many points against Wellesley's advice. It stipulated for the evacuation of Portugal, but for the transport of the whole French army, with their guns and horses, to France. It was likewise arranged that the Russian fleet, at that time in Lisbon, should be regarded as in a neutral port; but as some English regiments had got possession of the mouth of the river, and had hoisted the English flag, this clause was overruled, and Siniavin, the Russian admiral, with his fleet, passed into the hands of the English. Convention Aug. 30. It was not to be supposed that Napoleon would calmly watch the defeat of his troops even in an obscure corner of Europe, still less when their defeat seemed to thwart the completeness of his system, and was connected with events which had driven his brother from his throne. Though he knew Napoleon's position in Europe. that conquered Prussia beneath the surface was glowing with inextinguishable hatred, and though Austria, in spite of the war against England in which she was nominally engaged, was strengthening her army and re-establishing her finances in a way which seemed to threaten fresh efforts at freedom on her part, he determined to turn the full strength of his Empire upon the devoted Peninsula. He felt that so long as his friendship with Russia existed, so long as the Peace of Tilsitt held firm, his position was tolerably secure. He therefore renewed his alliance with Russia at a meeting with the Czar at Erfurth (Oct. 12), and suddenly ordered the widely scattered divisions of the grand army to concentrate on Paris preparatory to marching into Spain. in Spain. Unconscious of the coming danger and of the vast strength of Preparations its enemy, the central Junta at Madrid went on with its ill-arranged preparations to secure the freedom of Spain, and with its idle boasts as to the strength of the national armies. The English Government had not yet lost faith in Spanish assertions, nor learnt the absolute worthlessness of Spanish generals and armies; the fables of the Junta gained credence, and while all the other generals who had gone to Portugal were recalled, some 25,000 men were intrusted to Sir John Moore, with orders to advance into Spain and assist the Spanish troops, which were now occupying the valley of the Ebro and closing the French frontier. Even had the Spanish troops been worth anything, there was an absurd disproportion between the forces prepared and the scene of action for which they were intended Nor did this weakness fail to strike military men. The Duke of York, though by no means a first-rate general, called the attention of Government to the wide dissipation of the Spanish troops, and the great distance of Portugal from the scene of action, and gave it as his opinion that to employ less than 60,000 men was merely to waste them. The Government refused to listen to his advice, Lord Castlereagh, the War Minister, was unmoved, and Moore was sent forward to certain failure. With a raw commissariat, and ill supplied with money, although it was at that very time being lavished upon the Spaniards, he embarked upon his dangerous march through a country where the roads were so bad that his Sir John Moore's march to Salamanca. Oct. artillery to reach Salamanca had to proceed all up the valley of the Tagus almost to Madrid and come back to meet him at Salamanca, where he was to be joined by reinforcements from England under Sir David Baird. Moore's concentration at Salamanca was wholly based on the supposition |