made common cause with the Bretons might still have been successful. But trusting to help from England, which never came, they undertook a fruitless assault upon Granville in Normandy. Thinking themselves betrayed, and longing for their homes, the ill-organized mass of peasants insisted on being led southwards: even then there was some life in them. They defeated the republican General Rossignol and threw him back upon Rennes; but failing in an attack upon Angers, they marched pointlessly towards Le Mans. They were there received with terrible slaughter by Westermann, Kleber and Marçeau; 18,000 men, women and children were killed, and the rest fled, pursued by the pitiless Westermann. The fugitives reached the Loire, fought one final battle at Savenay near its mouth, where they were all, with the exception of some eight or ten thousand men, either put to death or captured.

Pitt's difficulty

In keeping up the coalition.

Thus revolutionary France had proved itself no contemptible enemy to the united troops of Europe, and established its rule unquestioned in France. It was plain that all hope of an easy subjugation of France was over, and it was with the greatest difficulty that Pitt was able to keep the coalition together; the eyes of Prussia were eagerly bent upon Poland, an easier prey than France. Of increase of territory England had no hope; the war had been forced on her, and was honestly a war of opinion. But any cessation of her efforts would have placed her in a worse position than when the war began, and Pitt and the upper classes of England were not blind to the fact that the occupation of the continental nations in the great war afforded England immense advantages both at sea and in the colonies; it was worth making great efforts to gain the undisputed mastery of the sea both in commerce and in arms. Nor did the large sums of money, raised chiefly by way of loan, appear so ruinous as they really were. The effect of large loans is to increase the wealth of the capitalist at the expense of the working man; nor, as the chief weight of the accumulating taxation falls on posterity, does it become immediately evident. Thus supplied with almost unlimited means, Pitt succeeded in keeping up the coalition, taking into English pay, it is almost true to say, the whole of the Prussian army, and doing nearly as much for the Austrians.

Pitt's energy was equalled by that of France, and the Convention had the additional advantage of being free from constitutional rules. Vast conscriptions filled their armies, forced requisitions supplied them with arms and equip

Continued
success of the
French in
1794.

1794]

THE COALITION FORMED

1171

ments. It was with the army of the North, 160,000 strong, under Pichegru, that the English had most to do. On each side the armies were divided into three divisions, and the duty of marching with 100,000 men on Paris was intrusted to Coburg. Defeated in the centre, the French had met with unexpected success on the left, Clairfait, the Austrian general, having been twice beaten at Moucron and at Courtray. Upon this, Pichegru almost destroyed his centre to strengthen his wings, and the threefold manœuvres became twofold. The key of the campaign was the possession of the Sambre; the Austrians lay in an advancing angle with their left upon that river from Mons to Charleroi. If the French could cross the Sambre they would be virtually in the rear of the Austrians. To this point, therefore, the Commissioners of the Convention, St. Just and Lebas, repaired, and attempted to inspire the troops with something of their own enthusiasm. Again and again the French were driven back. But Carnot's plan of massing troops was at length employed; the greater part of the army, which under Jourdan had been facing the Prussians on the Moselle, was turned northward, and Jourdan took command of 100,000, well known as the army of the Sambre and Meuse, just as the Commissioners had been driven back for the fifth time behind the river. After a sixth failure, the Commissioners insisting upon a seventh effort, the river was successfully crossed, and on the heights of Fleurus a battle was fought in which, though it was not completed, the Austrians were practically defeated. Step by step the English and the Austrians retired, the one towards Holland, the other towards the Rhine. By July the English were behind Breda, the Austrians beyond the Meuse. Want of supplies checked the French advance for a few weeks, but by October the English were driven into the corner between the Yssel and the Rhine, and the army of the Sambre and Meuse had captured Cologne and Coblenz. The occupation of Belgium by the French compelled the Prussians further south also to fall behind the Rhine, the left bank of which was thus in possession of the French army from Basle to the sea. Even south of that point successes had been won. The Sardinian position of Saorgio had been turned, and the passes of the Alps were opened to the French, who were thus in a position to invade Italy on the one hand and Holland on the other. The lateness of the season, and the wretched state of the equipment and commissariat, might have induced the French to be satisfied with these conquests, and few armies would have thought of facing an unusually severe winter shoeless and in rags, for to such a plight had the bad

management of the Revolutionary Government brought them.

But

to this army of enthusiasts the winter was but a useful ally for the conquest of Holland, where a strong feeling in their favour already existed among that large section of the people, who had seen with anger their attempted Revolution of 1787 suppressed by the arms of Prussia, and to whom the Government of the Stadtholder was very distasteful. The failure of the preceding campaign had obliged Pitt to insist upon the recall of the Duke of York, much to the King's displeasure, and Pichegru now found himself opposed to General Walmoden, the Hanoverian commander. But of opposition there was really none. The lines of the three great rivers, the Meuse, the Waal and the Lech, were abandoned without a fight, and crossed by the French, either upon the ice or by means of pontoons; and finally Walmoden left Holland to its fate, and retreated across the Yssel and the Ems to embark his army safely in Bremen. The

The French capture

Amsterdam and the Dutch fleet. 1795.

Stadtholder had already fled from the Hague and taken refuge in England. Amsterdam was occupied by the French without difficulty, the ragged regiments waiting patiently in the bitter snow in the streets of the rich city till their quarters were arranged for them without the least attempt at disorder. A striking finish was put to the campaign by the capture of the Dutch fleet in the Texel. The ships were icebound, and fell into the hands of a regiment of cavalry, who galloped across the ice to secure them. Holland was at once erected into a republic upon the French model.

Indirect advantages gained by England.

But in spite of these continual reverses of the allies, in spite of the perpetual failure of the British arms in the Low Countries, Pitt had not been mistaken in the indirect advantages which the war would give him. The conflagration at Toulon had inflicted an almost irreparable loss upon the French fleet. In Corsica the veteran patriot Paoli had aroused the feeling of his countrymen against France. Nelson and Hood, with 1000 British soldiers serving as marines in their ships, had taken Bastia, which was regarded as almost impregnable, and the people of Corsica had begged King George to accept their crown. While thus in the Mediterranean English supremacy had been established, a still greater success had attended her fleet off the coast of France. By immense exertions a powerful and well-equipped fleet of twenty-six ships had been assembled by Bon St. André and placed under the command of Villaret Joyeuse. It left the harbour of Brest for the purpose of convoying a large fleet laden with flour

1794]

DISSOLUTION OF THE COALITION

1173

from America. The English Channel fleet, under Lord Howe, sailed to meet it. In number of ships and weight of metal the English fleet was somewhat inferior, but the Revolution had stripped the French marine of its best officers, who had habitually been supplied by Brittany, now royalist in its tendencies. Bon St. André, originally a Calvinistic clergyman, had all the fearful energy Defeat of the belonging to the Conventional Commissioners, but little French fleet. of the skill of a seaman, yet he frequently overruled the commands of Villaret Joyeuse. Thus, when the fleets met upon the 1st of June, the French were unable to prevent Admiral Howe from repeating Rodney's well-known manœuvre of breaking the line. The defeat of the French was complete; several ships went down, and five line of battle-ships remained as English prizes.

June 1, 1794.

leave the

Upon the Continent, however, success had been wholly on the side of the French; the campaign of 1794 and the winter of 1795 had added Belgium, Holland, the left bank of the Rhine, part of Piedmont, Catalonia, and Navarre, to their dominions. The coalition began at once to fall to pieces. As it was plain that there was no further hope of a military promenade to Paris or of territory to be gained at an easy price, the King of Prussia, who had been only kept up to the mark by enormous subsidies from England, made his peace with the French. It was the pressure of England Prussia, Spain alone which had driven Spain and Holland into the and Holland war. Although Pitt had procured a change of ministry coalition. in Spain in accordance with his own views, and the substitution of Godoy for Miranda, the Spanish Government now awoke to its true interests. All the advantages of a maritime war of necessity fell to the lot of the English, and Spain saw herself aiding in the destruction of the only efficient rival to the English upon the sea, and thus in fact rendering certain her own insignificance on that element. The Spanish Government was therefore willing to treat. Holland, completely conquered, and with half its population preferring the French rule to that of the Prince of Orange, who had been forced upon the country, obtained peace by giving up its chief fortresses, paying a large indemnity, and making an offensive alliance with France against England, by which thirty ships of war were placed at the disposal of the French. Many of the smaller states both of Germany and Italy declared themselves neutral. England was thus practically left without allies, with the single exception of Austria, which was only induced to continue its engagements by a subsidy of four millions and a half. This series of treaties was completed in the course of the year [2 A]

CON. MON.

1795, chiefly by Barthélemy at Basle; the treaty with Tuscany, Feb. 9; with Holland [at the Hague], May 15; with Prussia, April 5; and with Spain, July 14.

La Vendée.

The campaign of the following year, 1795, was confined to the Rhine, where Pichegru commanded the army of the Rhine and Moselle, Jourdan that of the Sambre and Meuse. Pichegru was meditating treachery, and lay idle opposite the Black Forest till the advance of Jourdan from the North to co-operate with him for the purpose of retaking Mayence forced him into action. He took Mannheim, and might have taken Heidelberg, but he wilfully resigned this advantage, and fell back in disorder upon the lines of Weissembourg, where he signed an armistice with the Austrians preparatory to joining them. His retreat had compelled that of Jourdan also. The English meanwhile had engaged in a lukewarm way in an Insurrection of expedition which, had it been carried out with vigour, might have changed the face of affairs. After the great destruction of the Vendéan army at Savenay, the war continued to smoulder both in La Vendée itself and in Brittany. But north of the Loire it assumed a somewhat different character; the open, simple and heroic devotion of the Vendéan peasantry, who had followed their priests, gentry, and leaders of their own rank to battle, was wanting, and the hostilities of Brittany assumed rather the form of brigandage than warfare. The country was infested with small bands, who kept up connection with one another by means of private signals, but who seldom appeared in large numbers, and worked chiefly by night-surprises and by rapid and secret cutting off of detached posts. The chief man of the Chouans, as the Breton insurgents were called, was Cormatin. But certain men of higher rank were also among them; the chief of these was Count Joseph de Puisaye, a man of considerable energy and ability, who had been a member of the National Assembly. De Puisaye saw that irregular warfare could produce but little effect, and desired to obtain assistance from England, where the Government was supposed to be ready to assist any endeavour against the French Republic; an impression kept alive by the rumours, probably much exaggerated, spread by agents who were constantly passing and repassing through the Channel Islands between France and England.

In the autumn of 1794 De Puisaye betook himself to England and laid his plans before Pitt. It was suggested that 10,000 British

Expedition

from England

troops should be joined with the corps of emigrants, and should land in Brittany and seize Rennes, and thence push forward at once over Normandy, Maine and Poitou. It was thought advisable that a prince of the blood should either

planned.