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authority of a master over his slaves does not extend to those whom he voluntarily takes with him into a free State where slavery is prohibited, but is strictly limited to the case of fugitives who have escaped without his will. It was "a triumph of freedom," because it promised practically to nullify the Act of Congress,-it being generally supposed to be impracticable to reclaim fugitive slaves in the free States, except with the aid of State legislation, and State authority. This, in fact, was the very ground upon which Chief Justice Taney and Mr. Justice Daniel differed from the judgment of the Court. The former says, in dissenting from it, —

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According to the opinion just delivered, the State authorities are prohibited from interfering for the purpose of protecting the right of the master, and aiding him in the recovery of his property. I think the States are not prohibited; and that, on the contrary, it is enjoined upon them as a duty, to protect and support the owner, when he is endeavoring to obtain possession of his property, found within their respective territories." "If the State authorities are absolved from all obligation to protect this right, and may stand by and see it violated, without an effort to defend it, the Act of Congress of 1793 scarcely deserves the name of a remedy.” "It is only necessary to state the provisions of this law, in order to show how ineffectual and delusive is the remedy provided by Congress, if State authority is forbidden to come to its aid."

Mr. Justice Daniel, taking the same line of argument, also says,—

"Let it be declared, that the right of arrest and detention, with a view of restoration to the owner, belong solely to the Federal Government, exclusive of the individual right of the

owner to seize his property, and what are to be the consequences. In the first place, whenever the master, attempting to enforce his right of seizure, under the Constitution, shall meet with resistance, the inconsiderable number of Federal officers in a State, and their frequent remoteness from the theatre of action, must, in numerous instances, at once defeat his right of property, and deprive him also of personal protection and security."

Nor were these views contradicted by subsequent experience. From the day of the decision of Prigg v. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Act of 1793 was a dead letter in the free States. The operation of this judgment was seen, for example, in the case of the slave Latimer, which afterwards excited so much interest in Boston, and to the claimants of whom the Massachusetts authorities refused the use of their jails; and also in the subsequent Act passed by the Legislature of Massachusetts, by which it was rendered a penal offence for any State officer or constable to aid in any way in carrying this law into effect, or to confine any person claimed under it in the jails or prisons of the State. Such, indeed, was the difficulty of reclaiming a fugitive slave after this decision, that Congress, by the stringent Act of 1850 now in force, considered it necessary to revise the legislation on this subject.

Again, it was "a triumph of freedom," because, by giving exclusive jurisdiction to Congress, power was put in the hands of the whole people to remodel the law, and establish, through Congress, a legislation in favor of freedom; while, to permit a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction to the States, would not only deprive all the free States of a voice in establishing a uniform rule through

out the country, guarded by the strictest legal processes, but would enable each slave State to authorize recaption, within its own boundaries, under the most odious circumstances, without any legal process, if it chose, and upon the mere primâ facie evidence of slavery, growing out of color. By this decision, the question, as to fugitive slaves, was made a national one, and open for discussion on the floor of Congress. To the North was given a full voice on it.

Again, the best argument against the law was, in his opinion, a naked exposition of it. By claiming an exclusive jurisdiction for Congress, legislation on the subject was submitted to the people, and being made aware of the legal force of the existing law, it was for them to move in its amendment.

A much broader significance has been given to this decision than its circumstances warrant. The only question really before the Court, and passed upon, was whether the Act of Pennsylvania was unconstitutional; and it was held to be so, solely on the ground, that the power of legislation on the subject of fugitive slaves was exclusively vested in Congress. All the rest of the discussion. is incidental to this one question. The constitutionality of the Act of 1793 was a collateral point, which was only examined so far as to answer the objection to its validity, on the ground that it was an exercise of legislative power by Congress over a subject within the exclusive jurisdiction of the States. All that the Court undertake to rule on this point is, that as legislation by Congress was not only constitutional but exclusive, the Act of 1793 could not be impugned on such a ground. No general argument upon the Act of 1793 was made or considered, the

question at issue being solely in respect to the Act of Pennsylvania; all general statements and arguments are, therefore, to be restricted to this view, and not to be taken as having a general bearing.

One prevailing opinion which has created great prejudice against this judgment, is, that it denies the right of a person claimed as a fugitive from service or labor to a trial by jury. This mistake arises from supposing the case to involve the general question as to the constitutionality of the Act of 1793. But in fact no such question was in the case; and the argument that the Act of 1793 was unconstitutional, because it did not provide for

trial by jury according to the requisitions of the sixth article in the amendments to the Constitution, having been suggested to my father on his return from Washington, he replied that this question was not argued by counsel nor considered by the Court, and that he should still consider it an open one.1

As incidental to this view, one passage in this judgment is important, in which my father directly states, that a claim for a fugitive from labor is "a case arising under the Constitution" of the United States, within the express delegation of judicial power given by that instrument. This clearly shows, that in my father's opinion, Congress cannot constitutionally prescribe proceedings for the delivery of fugitives from labor, except by requiring the exercise of a judicial power. It would seem, therefore, to follow directly from this judgment, that an act requiring only a summary proceeding" before a magistrate would not be constitutional.

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1 See Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 2d ed., § 1789.

Thus far I have felt it my duty to place my father's views in respect to this case in their true light. Whether his judgment be well founded in law or not, no one who knew him can doubt that he was influenced by none but the purest motives. He may have been mistaken in his construction of the Constitution and the Act of 1793. He may have been mistaken in supposing this decision to be "a triumph of freedom." But the earnest tone in which that exclamation is known to have fallen from his lips, reveals a confidence on his part that the effects of his judgment would be adverse to slavery.

In these remarks, I would by no means be understood to argue in favor of the Act of 1793, or of the clause in the Constitution, which has legalized slavery in our country, and proved the Pandora's box of nearly all our evils. This, however, is not the place to state my own views, except so far as to prevent incorrect inferences. My only wish has been, to set forth my father's position in this matter, fairly and without personal bias. I am unwilling that it should be inferred, from the decision in this case, that he could willingly, by any act of his, add to the sorrowful ban of that people, who, in a country boasting the largest freedom, are outlawed of their personal and political rights. I am unwilling, because such an inference is untrue. His whole life disproves it. The case of La Jeune Eugénie, and his repeated charges against the slave trade, publicly disprove it; and his private letters in respect to the Missouri compromise, and (as we shall see) to the admission of Texas, are earnest protests against slavery. I appeal to his own words as conclusive evidence of his feelings on this subject. "The existence of slavery," he says, in his charge on the slave