are sensible) I have never given you the least hint of advice about joining yourself in a declared connexion with our party, nor do I now; yet as I love that party very well, and am clear, that you are better able to serve them than any man I know, I wish that things should be so kept, as to leave you mutually very open to one another in all changes and contingencies; and I wish this the rather, because, in order to be very great, as I am anxious that you should be, (always presuming that you are disposed to make a good use of power,) you will certainly want some better support than merely that of the Crown. For I much doubt whether, with all your parts, you are the man formed for acquiring real interiour favour in this court, or in any; I therefore wish you a firm ground in the country; and I do not know so firm and so sound a bottom to build on as our party. Well, I have done with this matter; and you think I ought to have finished it long ago. Now I turn to Ireland.

Observe, that I have not heard a word of any news relative to it, from thence or from London; so that I am only going to state to you my conjectures as to facts, and to speculate again on these conjectures. I have a strong notion that the lateness of our meeting is owing to the previous arrangements intended in Ireland. I suspect they mean, that Ireland should take a sort of lead, and act an efficient part in this war, both with men and money. It will sound well, when we meet, to tell us of the active zeal and loyalty of the people of Ireland, and contrast it with the rebellious spirit of America. It will be a popular topick-the perfect confidence of Ireland in the power of the British parliament. From thence they will argue the little danger, which any dependency of the Crown has to apprehend from the enforcement of that authority. It will be, too, somewhat flattering to the country gentlemen, who might otherwise begin to be sullen, to hold out, that the burthen is not wholly to rest upon them; and it will pique our pride to be told, that Ireland has cheerfully stepped forward; and when a dependant of this kingdom has already engaged itself in another year's war, merely for our dignity, how can we, who are principals in the quarrel, hold off. This scheme of policy seems to me so very obvious, and is likely to be of so much service to the present system, that I cannot conceive it possible they should neglect it, or something like it. They have already put the people of Ireland to the proof. Have they not borne the earl of Buckinghamshire? the person, who was employed to move the fiery committee in the house of lords, in order to stimulate the ministry to this war; who was in the chair; and who moved the resolutions.

It is within a few days of eleven years since I was in Ireland, and then after an absence of two. Those, who have been absent from any scene for even a much shorter time, generally lose the true practical notion of the country, and of what may or may not be done in it. When I knew Ireland, it

men.

was very different from the state of England, where government is a vast deal, the publick something, but individuals comparatively very little. But if Ireland bears any resemblance to what it was some years ago, neither government nor publick opinion can do a great deal; almost the whole is in the hands of a few leading people. The populace of Dublin, and some parts in the north, are in some sort an exception. But the primate, Lord Hillsborough, and Lord Hertford, gave great sway in the latter, and the former may be considerable or not, pretty much as the duke of Leinster pleases. On the whole, the success of government usually depended on the bargain made with a very few The resident lieutenancy may have made some change, and given a strength to government, which formerly, I know, it had not; still, however, I am of opinion, the former state, though in other hands perhaps, and in another manner, still continues. The house you are connected with is grown into a much greater degree of power than it had, though it was very considerable at the period I speak of. If the d. of L. takes a popular part, he is sure of the city of Dublin, and he has a young man attached to him, who stands very forward in parliament, and in profession, and, by what I hear, with more good-will and less envy, than usually attends so rapid a progress. The movement of one or two principal men, if they manage the little popular strength, which is to be found in Dublin and Ulster, may do a great deal, especially when money is to be saved, and taxes to be kept off. I confess I should despair of your succeeding with any of them, if they cannot be satisfied, that every job, which they can look for on account of carrying this measure, would be just as sure to them for their ordinary support of government. They are essential to government; which at this time must not be disturbed, and their neutrality will be purchased at as high a price as their alliance offensive and defensive. Now, as by supporting they may get as much as by betraying their country, it must be a great leaning to turpitude, that can make them take a part in this war. I am satisfied, that if the duke of Leinster and Lord Shannon would act together, this business could not go on; or if either of them took part with Ponsonby, it would have no better success. Hutchinson's situation is much altered since I saw you. To please Tisdall, he had been in a manner laid aside at the castle. It is now to be seen, whether he prefers the gratification of his resentment and his appetite for popularity, both of which are strong enough in him, to the advantages which his independence gives him, of making a new bargain, and accumulating new offices on his heap. Pray do not be asleep in this scene of action; at this time, if I am right, the principal. The protestants of Ireland will be, I think, in general, backward; they form infinitely the greatest part of the landed and the monied interests; and they will not like to pay. The papists are reduced to beasts of burthen; they will give all they have, their shoulders, readily enough, if they are flattered. Surely the state of Ireland

sent business. If all this should prove a dream, however, let it not hinder you from writing to me and telling me so. You will easily refute, in your conversation, the little topicks, which they will set afloat; such as, that Ireland is a boat, and must go with the ship; that if the Americans contended

Beaconsfield, October 8th, 1777.

E. B.

MY DEAR LORD,

I AM afraid, that I ought rather to beg your pardon for troubling you at all in this season of repose, than to apologize for having been so long silent on the approaching business. It comes upon us, not indeed in the most agreeable manner; but it does come upon us: and, I believe, your friends in general are in expectation of finding your lordship resolved in what way you are to meet it. The deliberation is full of difficulties; but the determination is necessary.

The affairs of America seem to be drawing towards a crisis. The Howes are at this time in possession of, or are able to awe, the whole middle coast of America, from Delaware to the western boundary of Massachusets Bay: the naval barrier on the side of Canada is broken; a great tract of country is open for the supply of the troops; the river Hudson opens a way into the heart of the provinces; and nothing can, in all probability, prevent an early and offensive campaign. What the Americans have done is, in their circumstances, truly astonishing; it is, indeed, infinitely more than I expected from them. But having done so much, for some short time I began to entertain an opinion, that they might do more. It is now, however, evident, that they cannot look standing armies in the face. They are inferiour in every thing, even in numbers; I mean, in the number of those, whom they keep in constant duty and in regular pay. There seem, by the best accounts, not to be above 10 or 12,000 men, at most, in their grand army. The rest are militia, and not wonderfully well composed or disciplined. They decline a general engagement, prudently enough, if their object had been to make the war attend upon a treaty of good terms of subjection: but

This Letter, with the two Addresses, which follow it, was written upon occasion of a proposed secession from parliament of the members in both houses, who had opposed the measures of government, in the contest between this country and the colo

when they look further, this will not do. An army, that is obliged at all times, and in all situations, to decline an engagement, may delay their ruin, but can never defend their country. Foreign assistance they have little, or none, nor are likely soon to have more. France, in effect, has no king, nor any minister, accredited enough either with the court or nation, to undertake a design of great magnitude.

In this state of things, I persuade myself, Franklin is come to Paris, to draw from that court a definitive and satisfactory answer concerning the support of the colonies. If he cannot get such an answer, (and I am of opinion, that at present he cannot,) then it is to be presumed, he is authorized to negociate with Lord Stormont on the basis of dependence on the Crown. This I take to be his errand: for I never can believe, that he is come thither as a fugitive from his cause in the hour of its distress, or that he is going to conclude a long life, which has brightened every hour it has continued, with so foul and dishonourable a flight. On this supposition, I thought it not wholly impossible, that the Whig party might be made a sort of mediators of the peace. It is unnatural to suppose, that, in making an accommodation, the Americans should not choose rather to give credit to those, who all along have opposed the measure of ministers, than to throw themselves wholly on the mercy of their bitter, uniform, and systematick enemies. It is indeed the victorious enemy that has the terms to offer; the vanquished party and their friends are, both of them, reduced in their power; and it is certain, that those, who are utterly broken and subdued, have no option. But, as this is hardly yet the case of the Americans, in this middle state of their affairs (much impaired, but not per

nies in North America, from the time of the repeal of the stamp act. It appears, from an endorsement written by Mr. Burke on the manuscript, that he warmly recommended the measure, but (for what reasons is not stated) it was not adopted.

fectly ruined) one would think it must be their interest to provide, if possible, some further security for the terms, which they may obtain from their enemies. If the congress could be brought to declare in favour of those terms, for which 100 members of the house of commons voted last year, with some civility to the party which held out those terms, it would undoubtedly have an effect to revive the cause of our liberties in England, and to give the colonies some sort of mooring and anchorage in this country. It seemed to me, that Franklin might be made to feel the propriety of such a step; and as I have an acquaintance with him, I had a strong desire of taking a turn to Paris. Every thing else failing, one might obtain a better knowledge of the general aspect of affairs abroad, than, I believe, any of us possess at present. The duke of Portland approved the idea. But when I had conversed with the very few of your lordship's friends, who were in town, and considered a little more maturely the constant temper and standing maxims of the party, I laid aside the design; not being desirous of risking the displeasure of those, for whose sake alone I wished to take that fatiguing journey at this severe season of the year.

The duke of Portland has taken with him some heads of deliberation, which were the result of a discourse with his Grace and Mr. Montagu at Burlington House. It seems essential to the cause, that your lordship should meet your friends with some settled plan either of action or inaction. Your friends will certainly require such a plan, and I am sure the state of affairs requires it, whether they call for it or not. As to the measure of a secession with reasons, after rolling the matter in my head a good deal, and turning it a hundred ways, I confess I still think it the most advisable, notwithstanding the serious objections that lie against it, and indeed the extreme uncertainty of all political measures, especially at this time. It provides for your honour. I know of nothing else, that can so well do this: it is something, perhaps all, that can be done in our present situation. Some precaution, in this respect, is not without its motives. That very estimation, for which you have sacrificed every thing else, is in some danger of suffering in the general wreck; and perhaps it is likely to suffer the more, because you have hitherto confided more, than was quite prudent, in the clearness of your intentions, and in the solidity of the popular judgment upon them. The former, indeed, is out of the power of events; the latter is full of levity, and the very creature of fortune. However, such as it is, (and for one I do not think I am inclined to overvalue it,) both our interest and our duty make it necessary for us to attend to it very carefully, so long as we act a part in publick. The measure you take for this purpose may produce no immediate effect; but with regard to the party, and the principles for whose sake the party exists, all hope of their preservation or récovery depends upon your preserving your reputation.

By the conversation of some friends, it seemed

as if they were willing to fall in with this design, because it promised to emancipate them from the servitude of irksome business, and to afford them an opportunity of retiring to ease and tranquillity. If that be their object in the secession and addresses proposed, there surely never were means worse chosen to gain their end; and if this be any part of their project, it were a thousand times better it were never undertaken.-The measure is not only unusual, and as such critical, but it is in its own nature strong and vehement in a high degree. The propriety, therefore, of adopting it depends entirely upon the spirit with which it is supported and followed. To pursue violent measures with languor and irresolution is not very consistent in speculation, and not more reputable or safe in practice. If your lordship's friends do not go to this business with their whole hearts, if they do not feel themselves uneasy without it, if they do not undertake it with a certain degree of zeal, and even with warmth and indignation, it had better be removed wholly out of our thoughts. measure of less strength, and more in the beaten circle of affairs, if supported with spirit and industry, would be, on all accounts, infinitely more eligible. We have to consider what it is, that, in this undertaking, we have against us: we have the weight of king, lords, and commons, in the other scale: we have against us, within a trifle, the whole body of the law: we oppose the more considerable part of the landed and mercantile interests: we contend, in a manner, against the whole church: we set our faces against great armies flushed with victory, and navies, who have tasted of civil spoil, and have a strong appetite for more: our strength, whatever it is, must depend, for a good part of its effect, upon events not very probable. In such a situation, such a step requires not only great magnanimity, but unwearied activity and perseverance, with a good deal too of dexterity and management, to improve every accident in our favour.

A

The delivery of this paper may have very important consequences. It is true, that the court may pass it over in silence, with a real or affected contempt. But this I do not think so likely. If they do take notice of it, the mildest course will be such an address from parliament, as the house of commons made to the king on the London remonstrance in the year 1769. This address will be followed by addresses of a similar tendency, from all parts of the kingdom, in order to overpower you with what they will endeavour to pass as the united voice and sense of the nation. if they intend to proceed further, and to take steps of a more decisive nature, you are then to consider, not what they may legally and justly do, but what a parliament, omnipotent in power, influenced with party rage and personal resentment, operating under the implicit military obedience of court discipline, is capable of. Though they have made some successful experiments on juries, they will hardly trust enough to them to order a prosecution for a supposed libel. They may proceed in two

But

ways, either by an impeachment, in which the Tories may retort on the Whigs (but with better success, though in a worse cause) the proceedings in the case of Sacheverel, or they may, without this form, proceed, as against the bishop of Rochester, by a bill of pains and penalties more or less grievous. The similarity of the cases, or the justice, is (as I said) out of the question. The mode of proceeding has several very ancient, and very recent, precedents. None of these methods is impossible. The court may select three or four of the most distinguished among you for the victims; and therefore nothing is more remote from the tendency of the proposed act, than any idea of retirement or repose. On the contrary, you have all of you, as principals or auxiliaries, a much better and more desperate conflict, in all probability, to undergo than any you have been yet engaged in. The only question is, whether the risk ought to be run for the chance (and it is no more) of recalling the people of England to their ancient principles, and to that personal interest, which formerly they took in all publick affairs? At any rate I am sure it is right, if we take this step, to take it with a full view of the consequences; and with minds and measures in a state of preparation to meet them. It is not becoming, that your boldness should arise from a want of foresight. It is more reputable, and certainly it is more safe too, that it should be grounded on the evident necessity of encountering the dangers, which you foresee.

Your lordship will have the goodness to excuse me, if I state, in strong terms, the difficulties attending a measure, which on the whole I heartily concur in. But as, from my want of importance, I can be, personally, little subject to the most trying part of the consequences, it is as little my desire to urge others to dangers, in which I am myself to have so inconsiderable a share.

If this measure should be thought too great for our strength, or the dispositions of the times, then the point will be to consider, what is to be done in parliament. A weak, irregular, desultory, peevish opposition there will be as much too little as the other may be too big. Our scheme ought to be such, as to have in it a succession of measures; else it is impossible to secure any thing like a regular attendance; opposition will otherwise always carry a disreputable air; neither will it be possible, without that attendance, to persuade the people that we are in earnest. Above all, a motion should be well digested for the first day. There is one thing in particular I wish to recommend to your lordship's consideration; that is, the opening of the doors of the house of commons. Without this, I am clearly convinced, it will be in the power of ministry to make our opposition appear

without doors just in what light they please. To obtain a gallery is the easiest thing in the world, if we are satisfied to cultivate the esteem of our adversaries by the resolution and energy, with which we act against them but if their satisfaction and good humour be any part of our object, the attempt, I admit, is idle.

I had some conversation, before I left town, with the d. of M. He is of opinion, that, if you adhere to your resolution of seceding, you ought not to appear on the first day of the meeting. He thinks it can have no effect, except to break the continuity of your conduct, and thereby to weaken and fritter away the impression of it. It certainly will seem odd to give solemn reasons for a discontinuance of your attendance in parliament, after having two or three times returned to it, and immediately after a vigorous act of opposition. As to trials of the temper of the house, there have been of that sort so many already, that I see no reason for making another, that would not hold equally good for another after that; particularly, as nothing has happened in the least calculated to alter the disposition of the house. If the secession were to be general, such an attendance, followed by such an act, would have force; but being in its nature incomplete and broken, to break it further by retreats and returns to the chase must entirely destroy its effect. I confess I am quite of the d. of M.'s opinion in this point.

I send your lordship a corrected copy of the paper; your lordship will be so good to communicate it, if you should approve of the alterations, to Lord J. C. and Sir G. S. I shewed it to the d. of P. before his Grace left town, and at his, the d. of P.'s desire, I have sent it to the d. of R. The principal alteration is in the pages last but one. It is made to remove a difficulty, which had been suggested to Sir G. S. and which he thought had a good deal in it. I think it much the better for that alteration. Indeed it may want still more corrections, in order to adapt it to the present or probable future state of things.

What shall I say in excuse for this long letter, which frightens me when I look back upon it? Your lordship will take it, and all in it, with your usual incomparable temper, which carries you through so much both from enemies and friends. My most humble respects to Lady R. and believe me, with the highest regard, ever, &c.

E. B.

I hear that Dr. Franklin has had a most ex

traordinary reception at Paris from all ranks of people.

Beaconsfield, Monday night,
Jan. 6, 1777.