"ed to fill. The human body, a compound "of these elements, and the brain particular

ly, must be conceived as an inftrument "mounted in the most exact accord of parts "to parts, and as endowed with the greatest "energetic powers of which body is fufcept"ible. It is thus rendered a fit habitation for "a fubftance fimple and highly active, as is "the foul.

"The foul, as a fuperior being, must have, "additionally, other fuperior attributes, fome "of which may be roufed into action by the

impulfe of an inferior agent the body, "whilft the more eminent (though not, from "the pre-established laws of union, indepen"dant in their operations) are, however, out

of the reach of any immediate and direct "bodily action. Thus will the various men"tal powers be progreffively brought into "action, and man will feel, will perceive, "will think, and will reason, just as the ref"pective operative caufes exert their in"fluence.

"In the fyftem of occafional caufes (where

in all matter is fuppofed to be paffive and "lifelefs, and wherein even the foul itself, though faid to be active, never acts) the

Deity is introduced as the only mover, and "and real agent, but is represented as ever "determined to act by the view of the dif"ferent ftates in which he himself has placed

the external beings. The doctrine of phy "fical influence is, in my opinion, the only

"philofophical notion. Here the two sub"ftances mutually act and re-act upon each "other."

I do not imagine that the more acute im materialifts will think themfelves under any obligation to this defender of their principles, either for giving fpirit fuch inferior quali ties as are not unalliable with the more exalted Species of matter, or for enduing matter with that active power, which is generally thought peculiar to fpirit; because, in fact, this hypothesis entirely confounds the two fubftances, and lays a foundation for the groffeft materialifm. For the moft exalted and refined part of matter cannot be deemed to differ effentially from the groffeft matter. For difference in fize is all that the terms exalted and refined can poffibly fignify when applied to matter. An immaterial foul, therefore, muft be wholly incapable of action and re-action with the most exalted and refined, as well as with the groffeft corporeal fyftem. A foul, capable of this mutual action with body, must have something grofs in itself, and therefore must be degraded from holding that very high and diftinguished rank in the fcale of being, which has been affigned to it by those who confider it as infinitely fuperior to matter.

This writer alfo fays that the active force. which he afcribes to matter muft refide in the fimple elements of it, because, as he fays, "no "force could ever inhere in a fubftance ever "divifible, and were not the elements active "their

F 4

"their compounds never could be fo." But did not this writer know that it is even demonftrable that matter is infinitely divifible, and that therefore, according to his own conceffion, no active force can ever inhere in it? This writer, therefore, acknowledging, as he does, the neceffity of a phyfical influence between the body and the mind, muft neceffarily abandon the notion of two diftinct principles, and adopt that of the uniform compofition of the whole man.

The vulgar, who confider Spirit as a thin aërial fubftance, would be exceedingly puzzled if they were to endeavour to realize the modern idea of a proper immaterial being; fince to them it would feem to have nothing pofitive in its nature, but to be only a negation of properties, though disguised under the pofitive appellation of fpirit. To them it must appear to be the idea of nothing at all, and to be incapable of supporting any properties.

Metaphyficians, however, affirm that we have as clear an idea of spirit, as we have of matter, each being equally the unknown fupport of known properties, matter of extenfion and folidity, and Spirit of sensation and thought. But ftill fince the fubftance is confeffedly unknown to us, it must also be unknown to us what properties it is capable of fupporting; and, therefore, unless there be a real inconsistency in the properties themselves, thofe which have hitherto been afcribed to : both

both fubftances may belong to either of them.

For this reafon Mr. Locke, who maintains the immateriality of the foul, and yet maintains that, for any thing we know to the contrary, matter may have the property of thought fuperadded to it, ought to have concluded that this is really the cafe ; fince, according to the rules of philofophizing, we ought not to multiply caufes without neceffity, which in this cafe he does not pretend to.

I fhall conclude this fection with a quotation from the author of Reflections on the Exiftence of the foul, and of the Existence of God, as represented in the Examen du Fatalifme, vol. i. p. 390. "If," fays he, "the opera"tions afcribed to the mind may refult from "the powers of matter, why should we fuppofe a being that is useless, and which " solves no difficulty? It is easy to see that "the properties of matter do not exclude "those of intelligence, but it cannot be ima"gined how a being, which has no property " befides intelligence, can make use of matster. In reality, how can this fubftance, "which bears no relation to matter, be fen"fible of it, or perceive it? In order to fee "things, it is neceffary that they make an impreffion upon us, that there be fome "relation between us and them, but what " can be this relation ?" I shall only observe upon this paffage, that we can never leave

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the

the road of found philofophy, without giving advantage to atheifts and unbelievers.

SECTION VII.

Of the VEHICLE of the Soul.

MANY

ANY modern metaphyficians, finding fome difficulty in uniting together things fo difcrepant in their nature as a pure immaterial fubftance and fuch grofs matter, as that of which the human body and brain are compofed, have imagined that this connection may be better cemented by means of fome intermediate material fubftance, of a more refined and fubtle nature than that which is the object of the fenfes of fight or touch. Upon the diffolution of the body by death, they fuppofe that this fubtle vehicle of the foul is fet loofe from its connection with it, and flies off, unperceived by any of the fenfes, together with the immaterial foul, from which it is infeparable, into the intermediate state.

This, in fact, is nothing more than taking the dwho of the ancients, or the popular ghost of all countries, which was all the thinking principle that they had any idea of, and making it a kind of body to fomething of which the ancients and the vulgar had no idea. But this modern vehicle of the foul is altogether a creature of imagination and hypothefis, and in reality without explaining

any