line" consists of seven specific charges against it. If, as it may be presumed from his preface, the noble author's correspondent was his brother, lord Castlereagh, then at the head of the war department, the "outline" was an after-thought, and not the first impression of that minister. Lord Castlereagh was so delighted with the first intelligence of the convention of Cintra, that he gave vent to his joy in the middle of the night by firing the tower guns. But when the popular outcry against it became resistless, he attempted to shield himself, his colleagues, and the favourite commander, by offering up as a victim the unfortunate sir Hugh Dalrymple, to whom the king's displeasure was formally communicated.

Sir John Moore had succeeded sir Harry Burrard in the chief command of the British troops in Portugal. On the 6th of October he received orders from England to advance, with 25,000 men, into Spain, where he should be joined by 10,000 more, actually on their way from England to Corrunna, under the command of sir David Baird. It was left to his discretion whether he should enter Spain by sea or land. He chose the latter, set out on the 26th of October upon his fatal, but not inglorious, expedition, reached the frontier at Almeida on the 8th, and occupied Salamanca with his advanced posts on the 13th of November. Supposing this direct route impassable by gun carriages and cavalry, he sent his artillery and cavalry with an escort by the circuitous route of Elvas, Badajos, Merida, and Talavera, to fall into and rejoin him by the great road of Madrid and Valladolid. This

division of his force, and the additional march of 150 leagues, has been severely judged by French military writers; not, however, as the fault of sir John Moore, but as part of the system of slow and safe movements adopted by the British generals.* Sir John Moore ought, perhaps, to have staked the lives and efforts of his men with less caution and humanity. The French general gave more to hazard and drew more recklessly upon the stamina of human effort and endurance. "Wherever two men can pass abreast there is a passage for an army," said Napoleon to general Macdonald during the famous passage of the latter over the Alps.

But before sir John Moore had yet reached Salamanca, or crossed the Spanish frontier, the hour had gone by and the fate of his expedition was decided. It is necessary to glance back for a moment to the sagacious, rapid, astonishing, and characteristic movements of the French emperor.

In the autumn of 1808 Napoleon saw the full extent and force of the Spanish insurrection: “ Godoy and Murat," said he "have deceived me: I should have made war not upon the Spaniards but upon their king." + He directed 80,000 veteran troops from their German cantonments upon the Pyrenees, with the resolution of placing himself at their head. It did not escape him that England might organise another German coalition whilst he was engaged in subjugating the Spaniards. He accordingly appointed a meeting with the emperor of Russia at Erfurth, and summoned the princes of

* Victoires, Conquêtes, &c.

+ Mém. Mil.

In

the German confederation to the rendezvous. the midst of court festivities, and the parade of dependent princes in his train, Napoleon admitted the emperor of Russia alone on the footing of equality, obtained from him a secret pledge to support the title of Joseph to the throne of Spain, was at Paris on the 18th of October, and beyond the Pyrenees at Vittoria on the 5th of November, advanced rapidly upon Burgos, directing in person the centre of his army, defeated and scattered the Spanish armies of Blake, Belvedere, and Castanos, on his way, had his head-quarters at the Retiro on the 3d of December, summoned Madrid three times in vain, brought his cannon to bear upon the town, with a view to strike terror rather than destroy, took possession of it on the 4th, and attempted to conciliate the people by strict discipline, and a general amnesty. The supreme junta had, in the mean time, taken flight to Badajos.

Sir John Moore halted at Salamanca. His situation was one of the most discouraging. He found the course of operations dictated to him by the ministry ill chosen, the Spanish armies with which he was to co-operate dispersed, the Spanish junta ignorant, incapable, and perverse, and Napoleon with his lieutenants bearing upon him with an overwhelming force. His opinion wavered. This, in a great emergency, is more fatal than resolute error.

He determined to fall back upon Portugal, and sent the necessary orders to sir David Baird, in Gallicia. Officers in his own army, of more conceit than capacity or experience, presumed to censure the determination of the commander-in-chief. The

Spanish Cunta teased him. Mr. Frere, the accredited British minister, full of pedant pride in the success of some literary puerilities, like the rhetorician who harangued Hannibal on the art of war, dictated military movements to a general of reputation, who had been a soldier from a boy; and even sent him an impertinent communication by a French intrigrant, named Charmilly. Sir John Moore ordered Charmilly from his presence. He should also have rebuked Mr. Frere to his proper level, and not only rebuked but punished the murmuring insubordination, which seized even his personal staffs, and impaired the confidence and discipline of the men.*

Intelligence reached him that Madrid was imitating the resistance of Zaragoza; the junta and Mr. Frere urged upon him the enthusiasm of the Spaniards, and the necessity of operating to relieve "the heroic capital;" he abandoned his intention of a retrograde movement, and formed the design of advancing upon Valladolid, so as to menace the enemy's communications. An intercepted despatch fortunately discovered to him an error which would have proved fatal, and the real position of the enemy. Madrid had held out, as already stated, but a single day! A French corps was advancing by Talavera upon Badajos, under Lefebvre, to cut off his retreat upon Portugal; another under Soult was marching to intercept the route to Corunna; and Napoleon himself was advancing upon Valladolid with the corps of Ney, and the cavalry of the imperial guard under Bessieres, to manœuvre according to circum

* See Lord Londonderry's Narrative of the War.

stances, with the hope of making the British lay down their arms. Moore, thus formidably pressed, marched upon Toro, formed a junction with Baird on the 21st of December, was at the head of 30,000 fighting men, and concerted with the Spanish general, Romana, an attack upon the corps of Soult. Lord Paget distinguished himself, in passing, by a brilliant affair of cavalry at Sagahun. The British troops supposed themselves approaching a decisive battle, and looked with confidence to the result. Napoleon, on the other hand, who was aware of the British movement against Soult, announced in an order of the day, " that the hour was at last arrived when the English leopard should fly before the French eagles," and had his head-quarters on the 25th at Tordesillas.

Intelligence had in the mean time reached sir J. Moore, that Soult, reinforced by the corps of Junot, which had capitulated in Portugal, was advancing upon Astorga, whilst Napoleon himself was moving upon the same point by the great road of Madrid, with the corps of Ney and cavalry of Bessieres. To risk a battle under such circumstances could only have been folly or despair. Dividing his force, he retreated by two routes upon Benevente, where he arrived on the 26th; his rear-guard separated from the advanced guard of the French only by the river Esla. The British had broken down the bridge in their rear. General Lefebvre Desnouettes forded the river at the head of three squadrons of the chasseurs of the imperial guard, attacked the British pickets, whom he thought unsupported, soon found himself enveloped by the British cavalry under lord