formation, for he knew not. Was it probable, Conway asked, that a place of that high importance should be neglected? And he showed them the contradictions in their own reasoning; for they pretended that it was a measure calculated to disembarrass the duke by drawing off the troops of France to its own coast; and yet all the hope of the enterprise depended on the French being taken unprepared. Pitt was too sanguine to desist for a little confutation; the instructions were drawn, the transports prepared.' The generals, when their representations against the plan failed, demanded specific orders: not obtaining these, they drew up queries, 'hoping that if the ministry could not answer them, they should be justified in not performing what they foresaw was impracticable. But neither in this did they receive satisfaction.'

was a minister to execute daringly; there wanted some ladders high enough. Pitt said, in case they failed, men of deeper cast to deliberate wisely;' and of late they might go to Bourdeaux. Lord Anson informed years,' says Horace Walpole, 'we had dealt exceed-him how far that city lay up the river;—and it was iningly scantily in intelligence.' The expedition was proposed to the cabinet and determined on with little or no opposition to what was perceived to be a favourite plan of Mr. Pitt's. 'Objections to a genius,' Horace Walpole observes, 'are but spurs. The minister would not lose time in taking advice-the secret might evaporate, and its fairest chances for success lay in the improbability that the French should suspect an attempt on one of the most important and strongest towns in France.' The command was offered to Lord George Sackville; he being too sagacious not to perceive that the scheme was impracticable, excused himself on the plea of the Duke of Cumberland's dislike to him. General Conway was then proposed; the king said he was too young, and insisted on joining Sir John Mordaunt with him. These generals were summoned to town from the camp in Dorsetshire; they were to have ten old battalions, a strong fleet was to be ready in a fortnight to convoy them, and they were to attempt Rochefort, or any other place on the coast to which they might find an opening.

The fleet under Sir Edward Hawke consisted of sixteen sail of the line, two frigates, five sloops, two bombs, two fire-ships, and a number of transports, having on board about seven thousand troops. The expedition was detained by those impediments which commonly arise, says Charnock, when two distinct authorities are employed to effect one end and purpose. In this opinion-that a conjoint expedition is rarely well conducted-both Howe and Nelson are known to have concurred. But the failure in this case was not owing to any want of co-operation: the cause of failure was in the design itself: the ablest of our naval biographers has said of this expedition, that if it brought no increase of reputation to the commanders, still less did it justify the wisdom of those who planned it.* Smollett says that Europe beheld the preparations with astonishment; that the destination of the armament was kept in the most profound secrecy, and filled France with very serious alarms; that the troops were eager to signalise themselves; but that the superstitious drew unfavourable presages from the dilatoriness of the embarkation. In fact, so many months elapsed before the expedition sailed, that the enemy discovered its object, and that part of the French coast was accordingly well prepared for it.

This expedition is remarkable for having been the first of Mr. Pitt's military measures; for the persons engaged in it, whose names afterwards became celebrated; for the distinguished part borne in it by Captain Howe; and for the extraordinary interest which it excited in the public. On the operations of this fleet,' said one writer, 'the last hope of this unfortunate nation seemed to be fixed.' The dignity of the plan,' said another, 'laid by a ministry in vogue,—the great opinion of the chief commander,—and the immensity of the armament, to the supply of which the ordnance stores were almost exhausted,-made every true Briton rejoice.' But both Mordaunt and Conway saw the difficulties, and the ignorance of those who foresaw none. Mordaunt had lost, from ill health, that 'sort of alacrity in daring by which he had formerly been distinguished.' Moreover, Horace Walpole says, 'he affected not Mr. Pitt; and, from not loving the projector, was more careless than he should have been of the success of the project-presuming that if it should appear impracticable, the original The measure had been settled in July, but it was mover would bear the blame.' "Conway, who could the 8th of September before the fleet sailed from Spitnot help foreseeing that from the superiority of his head. A detachment from it under Admiral Knowles talents to those of Mordaunt, the good conduct of the was ordered to proceed with the transports to Basque expedition would be expected from him, asked if they Roads, and endeavour to get possession of the Isle of would venture ten of our best battalions on so rash a Aix, as the prelude to an attempt on Rochefort. In hazard, and whether, if they should perish, it would this fleet Howe commanded the Magnanime, one of the not draw the French hither, where we had few other finest and most favourite ships in the class of 74's. veteran troops? He asked also if the height of the The fleet appeared before the Isle of Oleron, on the ramparts which were to be scaled was known? 20th; but it was the 23d before they got in. Two Ligonier, who was present, replied, no; but they were * Locker's Memoirs of Celebrated Naval Commannever above twenty-five feet, and they should have ders.

French ships of the line that were at anchor off the | dignity of soul that kept him too much above familiarity, Isle of Aix, on seeing the British squadron under he missed that affection from his brother officers which weigh, slipped their cables and ran into the Charente. his unsullied virtues and humanity deserved; for he About the middle of the day, as the ships ap- wanted the extrinsic of merit. Added to these little proached the island, the batteries opened their fire of failings, he had a natural indecision in his temper, shot and shells. The Magnanime had been ordered to weighing with too much minuteness, and too much lead, and Captain Howe stood on direct for the fort, with that steady resolution that never forsook him, fluctuation, whatever depended on his own judgment.' reserving his fire until he advanced within forty yards Cornwallis was a man of a very different complexion; of the fort, when he brought up with a spring on his as cool as Conway, and as brave, he was indifferent to cable, and opened so tremendous and well-directed a everything but to being in the right: he held fame fire, that in about half an hour the enemy were completely driven from their guns and surrendered. In cheap, and smiled at reproach. General Howard was the fort were mounted twenty-eight pieces of cannon, one of those sort of characters who are only to be and eight large mortars; and on the tower were two distinguished by having no peculiarity of character. handsome and highly-finished brass twelve-pounders, Under these was Wolfe-'a young officer who had conwhich Sir John Mordaunt presented to Captain Howe, tracted reputation from his intelligence and discipline, in testimony of his steady bravery and brilliant service and from the perfection to which he had brought his on that day, requesting him to place them as a trophy, and, at the same time, an useful ornament to the Mag- own regiment. The world could not expect more from nanime's quarter-deck.'-pp. 31, 32. him than he thought himself capable of performing. He looked on danger as the favourable moment that would call forth his talents. Hawke, continues Walpole, was 'a man of steady courage, of fair appearance, and who even did not want a plausible kind of sense; but he was really weak, and childishly abandoned to the guidance of a Scotch secretary. The next was Knowles, a vain man, of more parade than real bravery. Howe, brother of the lord of that name, was the third on the naval list. He was undaunted as a rock, and as silent-the characteristics of his whole race. He and Wolfe soon contracted a friendship like the union of a cannon and gunpowder.'

Hawke then directed Rear-Admiral Broderick and other officers to sound and reconnoitre the shore of the main, and make their report to him, in order to secure a safe landing. After maturely considering it, he was of opinion that the troops might land. Conway proposed that they should make themselves masters of Fouras, a little fort on the shore; when well established, they might examine what farther damage could be done to the enemy. Much time was wasted in discussing this proposal. Mordaunt seemed incapable of forming any opinion, and said he was ready to take any officer's advice. A council of war was called. It appeared that Basque Roads, the country, and the state of the enemy's troops and garrison, were entirely unknown to them. This only had been ascertained, that no man-of-war could lie within two miles of the landing, to assist it or to secure a retreat; that if the wind came to the west, as usual at that season, all communication with the fleet would be cut off a danger against which they had been expressly instructed to guard; that there were sand-hills on the shore equivalent to an intrenchment, from behind which a small body might prevent a descent of two thousand men, the most which the boats could contain at a time; that more troops than were sufficient to oppose a landing had been seen by the captain who reconnoitred the coast; and, to crown all, that they had not brought artillery sufficient for a regular attack.

Horace Walpole, who has given a fuller account than any other historian of the expedition, describes the personal characters of the commanders as having greatly influenced the proceedings; and this he did with the more satisfaction, he said, 'as their fault flowed from no want of courage; on the contrary, they possessed among them most of the various shades of that qualification.' Conway was one of his most intimate friends. Of him, he says, 'Cold in his deportment, and with a

The opinion expressed of Wolfe in this remarkable passage exhibits Horace Walpole's censorious disposition more truly than it characterizes that thoughtful and high-minded soldier. It so happens that, upon the very point for which he is there invidiously noticed, he has stated his own feelings in a letter to his mother. The extract will be read with interest, not only on that account, but for the presentiment with which it concludes:

"The officers in the army in general,' says he, 'are persons of so little application to business, and have hear that a man of common industry is in repute been so ill educated, that it must not surprise you to amongst 'em. I reckon it as a very great misfortune to the country that I, your son, who have, I know, but a very moderate capacity, and a certain degree of diligence a little above the ordinary run, should be thought, as I generally am, one of the best officers of my rank in the service. I am not at all vain of the distinction. The comparison would do a man of genius very little honour, and does not illustrate me by any means; and the consequence will be very fatal to me in the end; able performances, and I shall be induced, in support for as I rise in rank, people will expect some considerof an ill-gotten reputation, to be lavish of my life, and shall probably meet that fate which is the ordinary effect of such a conduct.'-Wolfe's MSS.

Both land and sea officers concurred in thinking it

impracticable to surprise Rochefort, and they would at | says, 'As to the expedition, it has been conducted so once have returned to England if Conway had not per- ill that I am ashamed to have been of the party. The suaded them that it was necessary to do something public could not do better than to dismiss six or eight before they returned. In this they all agreed except of us from their service: no zeal, no ardour, no care or Cornwallis, who had seen no attainable object, or none concern for the good and honour of our country.' A worth attaining, from the beginning to the end of the general outcry was of course raised upon the failure of plan; yet rather than stand alone in a vote for retreating, an expedition from which so much had been expected; he was induced to acquiesce. What then should they but, to the credit of the ministers, they made no attempt do? Conway again proposed an attack on Fouras, as to divert public attention from the errors of the plan by they might at least hope from thence to burn the ships casting reproach upon the commanders. Mr. Pitt even and the magazines on the Charente. Nobody approved prevented the city from addressing against it.' Walthat scheme; yet after three or four days had been pole says, he only took the more sensible though not wasted in discussion, his importunity prevailed, and less severe style of punishing the miscarriage, by raisall the generals, to show that want of spirit had not ing Wolfe at once over the heads of a great number of operated in their councils, resolved to be present. The officers. Wolfe himself says of this in one of his letfirst division embarked; but it was moonlight,-the ters, (21st October, 1757,) 'The king has been pleased night was clear, and the wind turned against them. to give me the rank of colonel, which at this time is Walpole says, Howe himself told them it was not safe more to be prized than at any other, because it carries at that time; and Wolfe pronounced it would be bloody with it a favourable appearance as to my conduct upon work. They were therefore ordered back from the this late expedition, and an acceptance of my good inboats. Still Conway persisted for an attempt on Fouras, tentions.' and Mordaunt offered to undertake it if he would take Disheartening as the result of this expedition was, the advice wholly on himself. Both shrunk from the and though it had cast a general gloom over the naresponsibility. Conway at last said, if the general tion, it rather provoked the spirit of the Government would call Wolfe and any other man, he would abide than depressed it. Certain intelligence had been reby their opinion, whether they advised him to advise ceived that preparations on a great scale for invading the attack or to desist from proposing it. In truth, Jersey and Guernsey were making at St. Maloes. Mr. says Walpole, it was a contest to be pitied rather than Pitt's were upon a greater scale, and more in earnest. blamed; both saw the rashness of the project, in which This too was a conjoint expedition. The land force they were willing to sacrifice themselves and their sol- consisted of about 13,000 men, under Charles Duke diers. Mordaunt, from esteem of Conway's abilities, of Marlborough. Horace Walpole significantly obhoped to be excused if he executed what the latter ad- serves, that the French were not to be conquered vised, and the latter was too happy in not being comby every Duke of Marlborough. Howe, he says, manding officer to take that charge on himself in a was destined to lead the fleet, and upon this Hawke hopeless bravado. At length they agreed to be deter-struck his flag, but being persuaded to resume it, acmined by the opinions of Cornwallis and Howard; they companied Lord Anson, who took the command himconcurred with the general, and Conway then sub-self. A fleet of seventeen sail of the line and several mitted, but desired they would observe that he acquiesced against his own judgment. It was then determined to return, Hawke having repeatedly pressed the generals to come to some decision, as he could not

frigates sailed under Anson to blockade Brest, where it was understood that a naval armament of considerable force was in a forward state. On the same day, the 1st of June, 'a day destined in future times to be

venture at that season to keep the great ships much propitious to his name,' Howe also put to sea with a longer at sea. Wolfe and Howe had borne the dila-squadron consisting of the Essex, 64, four 50-gun toriness of the chief commanders with indignation; yet seeing the minute lost, they made no objection to a

retreat.

Wolfe's letter to his father, dated Rode de Barques, 30th September, 1757, says, 'By the Viper sloop I have the displeasure to inform you that our operations here are at an end. We lost the lucky moment in war, and were not able to recover it. The whole of this expedition has not cost the nation ten men, nor has any man been able to distinguish himself in the service of his country except Mr. Howe, who was an example to us all.' In a subsequent letter (17th October, 1757,) he

ships, nine frigates, eleven sloops, bombs, and firehundred sail of transports. He left his favourite ship, ships, thirty store-ships, cutters, and tenders, and a the Magnanime, on this occasion, and hoisted his broad pendant in the Essex, as better adapted for the shallow water on the coast of France. The Duke and his staff were on board the Essex. Lord George Sackville was second in command, 'an officer of experience and reputation, who had in the civil departments of government exhibited proofs of extraordinary genius, and uncommon application.' According to Walpole, Marlborough and his troops remarked that he was 'not among the first to court danger, and Howe had con

ceived and expressed strong aversion to him. They ing. He therefore wisely ordered the troops to strike agreed so ill, that one day Lord George putting their tents, and they were re-embarked in time. several questions to Mr. Howe, and receiving no answer, said, 'Mr. Howe, don't you hear me? I have asked you several questions.' Howe replied, 'I don't love questions.'' This should not be taken for more than it is worth. Lord George Sackville was not a man to ask impertinent or frivolous questions, nor was Howe one to return an uncivil and offensive an

be effected, and then march to the town, and attack the works in the rear. Here about 3000 of the enemy, horse and foot, were posted behind the sand-banks, to dispute the landing: but the guards and grenadiers, in flat-bottomed boats, effected it, under cover of a smart fire from the frigates and smaller vessels. General Drury then attacked the French, and drove them from their post with great slaughter, though with little loss on his own part. The horse and artillery landed the following morning without opposition, and the army took possession of Cherburg, the garrison abandoning the place on their approach.

nearly proved fatal to him, for the enemy plied them with cannon shot, one of which dropped close to the feet of the Prince. Bligh understood from intelligence, in which the commodore had full confidence, that at St. Briac, which is within a mile of St. Lunaire, there had often been, in time of peace, as many as three hundred vessels, though of no great burthen. The troops were landed on the 4th, and found not more than twenty there: these they destroyed, and some batteries also. It was then proposed to attack St. Maloes, that town being situated upon a bank of sand, almost surrounded by the sea, and having no water but what was convey"These operations terminated in the complete destruc- ed in pipes, the general thought that by cutting the tion of the basins, and two piers forming the entrance pipes and bombarding the town, it would be obliged to into the harbour; of the harbour itself, so as to leave it surrender. But the troops were not numerous enough in a state incapable of receiving ships of war of any size; the demolition of all the batteries, forts, and maga- to invest it on both sides of the Rance; they reconzines there, as well as those along the coast; the burn-noitred therefore Point St. Dinar, and the whole westing of all the ships in the harbour, which amounted to about thirty sail: thus effectually completing the king's instructions as to Cherburg. The quantity of iron cannon and mortars was immense, all of which were destroyed. Twenty-two brass ordnance, and three The weather proved so bad that on the 6th, the day brass mortars, with about one hundred pieces of can-after this reconnoissance, Howe declared the fleet could non, were brought away. The different kinds of ammunition-shells, shot, and powder-were destroyed or thrown into the sea.'-pp. 47, 48.

A contribution of about 3000l. was exacted, the stores and artillery were shipped, the light horses conveyed on board the transports, by means of platforms laid in the flat-bottomed vessels; an entrenchment was thrown up sufficient to protect the last division that should leave the shore; and as it was now ascertained that the enemy's force had been increased to a formidable amount, the troops were re-embarked on the 16th, in good time, without the slightest molestation.

ern bank opposite the town, and found it practicable to invest it on the western side, by placing ships at St. Dinar, if the weather did not oppose.

not remain on that part of the coast. The ships, he said, must go to the Bay of St. Cas, about three leagues to the westward, and the general, if he found it expedient, might, by remaining some time ashore at Matignon, about a league from St. Cas, alarm the country, create a diversion, and thus contribute to the recalling of troops from Germany. Walpole says, Howe 'contented himself with setting the troops on shore, and the weather proving very tempestuous, he left them there, with directions to come to him at St. Cas, by land. What he left them there to do, or why General Bligh Granville was to have been the next point of attack, suffered himself to be left there, no man living could according to the general's instructions; that intention, ever tell or guess.' The general's instructions were to however, was abandoned, because it was known that continue his operations as vigorously and as long as there were 10,000 troops in Normandy, who could should be practicable. But there was no opportunity easily advance to that neighbourhood. The design for acting vigorously where there was no definite obagainst Morlaix was also relinquished, because advices ject. And when Walpole says that 'the troops, as if were received from England that a large body of troops landed on some new-discovered coast of America, roved had assembled at Brest, and in the vicinity. Both the about the country for some days, till they heard that commodore and general therefore agreed in thinking the Duc d'Aguillon, with a considerable force, was they should best fulfil their instructions by landing in within a few miles,' he expresses himself with no the bay of St. Lunaire, and marching against St. undue contempt. The project of attacking St. Maloes Maloes, which is about two leagues to the eastward of had been given up, that place having been found 'to be that place. In proceeding thither the ships and trans- above insult either from the land forces or the shipports were driven by contrary winds into Weymouth ping.' They forded some rivers, where some of the roads, and though they weighed from thence the fol- men lost their firelocks, and were with difficulty saved lowing day, it was the 3d of September before they by being hauled out with long poles. They were fired could come to anchor in St. Lunaire Bay. Howe ac- on by the peasants, and burnt some houses in consecompanied the general on shore, who went to recon-quence; and on the fourth night of this purportless and noitre the position which he meant to take up. Prince hopeless enterprise, Bligh-having learnt that regiments Edward, when he first joined the Essex, had requested had arrived from different parts, even from Brest, and the commodore, that on all such occasions he might be that an army equal or superior to his own was encampat his side; accordingly he was of the party, and it had ed within two leagues of him-sent, with the unani