individual to possess a certain amount of knowledge. Having formed such a society, every one is bound by its provisions, so long as he remains a member of it; and the enforcing its provisions upon the individual, is no more than obliging him to do what he, for a sufficient consideration, voluntarily contracted to do. And, society may rightfully enforce this provision in either of two ways: it may withhold, from every man who neglects to acquire this knowledge, the benefits of citizenship; or it may grant these benefits to every one, and oblige every one to possess the assigned amount of knowledge. In this case, there is no violation of reciprocity; for the same requirements are made upon all, and every one receives his full equivalent, in the results of the same law upon others. More than this, the individual could not justly require. He could not justly demand to be admitted to rights which presuppose certain intellectual at. tainments; and which can only be, with safety to others, enjoyed by those who have made these attainments; unless he be willing to conform to the condition necessary to the enjoyment.

3. I have thus far considered man only in his relations to the present life. So far as I have gone, I have endeavored to show that, provided the individual interfere not with the rights of others, he has a right to use his own body and mind, as he thinks will best promote his own happiness; that is, as he will. But, if he have this right, within these limits, to pursue his present happiness, how much more incontrovertible must be his right to use his body and mind in such manner as will best promote his eternal happiness! And besides, if, for the sake of his own happiness, he has a right to the unmolested enjoyment of whatever God has given him, how much more is he entitled to the same unmolested enjoyment, for the sake of obeying God, and fulfilling the highest obligation of which he is susceptible!

We say, then, that every man, provided he does not inter

fere with the rights of his neighbor, has a right, so far as his neighbor is concerned, to worship God, or not to worship him-to worship him in any manner that he will; and that, for the abuse of this liberty, he is accountable only to God.

If it be said, that, by so doing, a man may ruin his own soul, the answer is obvious; for this ruin, the individual himself, and not society, is responsible. And, moreover, as religion consists in the temper of heart, which force cannot affect,—and not in external observance, which is all that force can affect,—no application of force can change our relations to God, or prevent the ruin in question. All application of force must then be gratuitous mischief.

To sum up what has been said—all men are created with an equal right to employ their faculties, of body or of mind, in such manner as will promote their own happiness, either here or hereafter; or, which is the same thing, every man has a right to use his own powers, of body or mind, in such manner as he will; provided he do not use them in such manner as to interfere with the rights of his neighbor.

The exceptions to this law are easily defined.

1. The first exception is in the case of infancy.

By the law of nature, a parent is under obligation to support his child, and is responsible for his actions. He has, therefore, a right to control the actions of the child, so long as this responsibility exists. He is under obligations to render that child a suitable member of the community; and this obligation he could not discharge, unless the physical and intellectual liberty of the child were placed under his power.

2. As the parent has supported the child during infancy, he has, probably, by the law of nature, a right to his services

during youth, or for so long a period as may be sufficient to insure an adequate remuneration. When, however, this remuneration is received, the right of the parent over the child ceases for ever.

3. This right he may, if he sees fit, transfer to another, as in the case of apprenticeship. But he can transfer the right for no longer time than he holds it. He can, therefore, negotiate it away for no period beyond the child's minority.

4. A man may transfer his right over his own labor for a limited time, and for a satisfactory equivalent. But, this transfer proceeds upon the principle that the original right vests in himself, and it is, therefore, no violation of it. He has, however, no right to transfer the services of any other person except his child; nor of his child, except under the limitations above specified.

In strict accordance with these remarks is the memorable sentence in the commencement of the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." That the equality here spoken of is not of the means of happiness, but in the right to use them as any one wills, is too evident to need illustration.

SECTION II.

MODES IN WHICH PERSONAL LIBERTY MAY BE VIOLATED.

Personal liberty may be violated in two ways: 1. By the individual. 2. By society.

PART FIRST. Of the violation of personal liberty by the individual. The most common violation of personal liberty under this head is in the case of Domestic Slavery.

Domestic slavery proceeds upon the principle that the master has a right to control the actions, physical and intellectual, of the slave, for his own, that is, the master's, individual benefit; and, of course, that the happiness of the master, when it comes in competition with the happiness of the slave, extinguishes in the latter the right to pursue it. It supposes, at best, that the relation between master and slave is not that which exists between man and man, but is a modification at least of that which exists between man and the brutes.

Now, this manifestly supposes that the two classes of beings are created with dissimilar rights: that the master possesses rights which have never been conceded by the slave; and that the slave has no rights at all over the means of happiness which God has given him, whenever these means of happiness can be rendered available to the service of the master. It supposes that the Creator intended one human being to govern the physical, intellectual, and moral actions of as many other human beings as by purchase he can bring within his physical power; and, that one human being may thus acquire a right to sacrifice the happiness of any number of other human beings, for the purpose of promoting his own.

Slavery thus violates the personal liberty of man as a physical, intellectual, and moral being.

1. It purports to give to the master a right to control the physical labor of the slave, not for the sake of the happiness of the slave, but for the sake of the happiness of the master. It subjects the amount of labor, and the kind of labor, and the remuneration for labor, entirely to the will

of the one party, to the entire exclusion of the will of the other party.

2. But if this right in the master over the slave be conceded, there are of course conceded all other rights necessary to insure its possession. Hence, inasmuch as the slave can be held in this condition only while he remains in the lowest state of mental imbecility, it supposes the master to have the right to control his intellectual developement, just as far as may be necessary to secure entire subjection. Thus, it supposes the slave to have no right to use his intellect for the production of his own happiness; but, only to use it in such manner as may conduce to his master's profit.

3. And, moreover, inasmuch as the acquisition of the knowledge of his duty to God could not be freely made without the acquisition of other knowledge, which might, if universally diffused, endanger the control of the master, slavery supposes the master to have the right to determine how much knowledge of his duty a slave shall obtain, the manner in which he shall obtain it, and the manner in which he shall discharge that duty after he shall have obtained a knowledge of it. It thus subjects the duty of man to God entirely to the will of man; and this for the sake of pecuniary profit. It renders the eternal happiness of the one party subservient to the temporal happiness of the other. And this principle is commonly carried into effect in slave-holding countries.

If argument were necessary to show that such a system as this must be at variance with the ordinance of God, it might be easily drawn from the effects which it produces both upon morals and upon national wealth.

1. Its effects must be disastrous upon the morals of both parties. By presenting objects on whom passion may be satiated without resistance and without redress, it cultivates