of the best achievements were made, however, by some of the children in the fourth, or lowest, grade tested. Thus, 5 per cent of the boys in grade 4A reached or exceeded the ability reached by the highest 25 per cent of all the boys in the test.

These data show by objective evidence that children do the same type of reflective thinking and problem-solving as adults do. For an extended defense of this point of view see the article by Professor John Dewey entitled "Reasoning in Early Childhood," in the Teachers College Record, January, 1914 (4: 9-15).

Arguments for contrary opinion refuted. Mistakes in reasoning not evidence of lack of reasoning. In order to make the whole situation concerning reasoning abilities at different ages somewhat clearer, we shall consider some of the points commonly made in connection with the ordinary opinion that young children do not reason. One reason why persons hold this opinion is because children make mistakes in their reasoning. These mistakes, however, are not evidence of lack of reasoning. Even the best reasoners make mistakes, and some of the errors made by large numbers of adults appear as ludicrous to those who are better informed as do the mistakes of children. Thus, in the seventeenth century there was common belief in the efficacy of a sympathetic powder or salve which was supposed to cure a wound through being rubbed on the weapon instead of on the wound. As a matter of fact, those who used the powder or salve often found that their wounds got well; but that their reasoning in attributing the cure to the salve or powder was fallacious becomes evident on reading the directions accompanying it. These were, "Rub the salve on the weapon and keep the wound clean and cool." The medical practices of the past were full of such errors, yet some of the physicians who believed in them were well-educated men and skilled reasoners. Hence, the fact that children make mistakes in reasoning is not proof that they cannot reason. It

simply shows, as in the case of adults, that they have insufficient information or have failed to discover the essential element in the problem which they are considering.

Reasoning of children confined to problems within their grasp. Another reason for underestimating the reasoning activities of children is a survival from the educational practices that prevailed during the period of religious dominance in elementary education, especially before the nineteenth century. During this period the material of instruction consisted largely of religious discussions, a long catechism being considered the most important. Since children could not understand or reason with the theological abstractions contained in the catechism, it was assumed that they could not reason at all. Rousseau (in 1762) made the proper psychological correction to this opinion when he asserted that, although children could not reason about the abstractions of theology, they could reason effectively about matters within the range of their experience and understanding.

Children use symbolic images in reasoning. Some authorities, instead of abiding by the objective evidence of the reasoning done by children (such as Bonser's study), endeavor to show that children's reasoning is of a different type from that of adults, by saying that children use concrete images as the mental stuff for their thinking, while adults in logical reasoning use symbols, words, etc. without attendant concrete images. For all practical purposes this is simply a quibble, since the problems solved and the objective results produced by children are of exactly the same types as those of adults, and statements concerning the nature of their mental processes must be indirect inferences or guesses. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the asserted difference between the mental stuff used in the reasoning of children and that used by ordinary adults can be established in the way mentioned, that is, in terms of the presence and absence of concrete imagery. In the first place, children in school begin very early to use

symbols in such a way that the concrete imagery is relatively unimportant. For example, consider problems II, B, 1 and 3 in Bonser's test printed above on page 327. In solving these problems the essential thinking by the children may be and must be carried on, to a very large extent, in terms of mathematical symbols and abstract terms in fact, to just as large an extent as would be the case with an ordinary adult who solved the same problems.

Adults may have concrete imagery in logical reasoning. - Moreover, an adult may be working with a problem in connection with which abstract symbols and generalized ideas would seem to be the important thought-stuff, and yet have concrete images of particular situations constantly coming to mind. For example, I was recently asked by a normal-school president to examine and criticize his two-year course of study for high-school graduates. It happened that I had just made a study of normal-school catalogues and had tabulated and codified the requirements and practices in twenty-five representative institutions. On this basis I had drawn up a statement of what seemed to me to be the essential elements in a two-year normal-school course, and I had this clearly in mind as the logical basis for criticizing the course submitted to me for evaluation. On the other hand, I had spent five years as a teacher in a normal school in Ohio. In fulfilling the normal-school president's request I found that instead of thinking purely in terms of the generalized normal-school investigation that I had just made, I was continually having in mind concrete images of courses of study, faculty meetings, committee meetings, etc. at the Ohio normal school, where we had discussed the same general problems as applied to a specific situation. In other words, the essential ideas and meanings in my reasoning about normal-school administration were the abstract tabulations and generalized statements reached in my general survey, but running along with these in my thinking were the unnecessary and relatively

useless pictures of former colleagues sitting around tables and desks. Thus it would appear that even adults who are carrying on a highly generalized type of reflective thinking or reasoning may have more or less concrete imagery accompanying it. Hence we do not find that the logical reasoning of ordinary adults necessarily differs from that of children by the absence of concrete imagery.

Adolescence brings no new intellectual processes.—Finally, it is sometimes assumed that there is some great change at adolescence in the type of intellectual processes carried on. It is argued that, since there are such profound physical, instinctive, and emotional changes associated with the maturing of the sex functions, there must be similar innovations in the intellectual life. There is, however, no scientific evidence to indicate that any such change in the general character of the intellectual processes does take place. As students grow from the primary grades to high-school graduation no new types of intellectual processes appear and no sudden changes take place in the general character of any of the types that are present. Sensory discrimination, or sense perception, is present all the time and increases gradually in efficiency. Images are present at all ages from six to eighteen. In the prolonged thinking of any individual, at any age, concerning almost any new topic, the concrete images tend to become subordinated to symbolic images or imaged symbols (usually words) and feelings of meaning as the thinker becomes better informed about the topic and his ideas about it become more general and abstract.

Adolescence does bring new social problems and economic responsibilities. Similarly, reasoning is going on at all ages of school experience. Adolescence commonly brings with it larger social interests and larger economic responsibilities, which provide opportunities for thinking about many larger problems than those which presented themselves during the years from six to fourteen. But these larger problems at

adolescence are thought out by the same types of mental processes as children have been using in their studies and games and employments during the period from six to fourteen. Hence, as Dewey says, in reflective thinking

the only way to achieve traits of carefulness, thoroughness, and continuity (traits that are, as we have seen, the elements of the "logical") is by exercising these traits from the beginning and by seeing to it that conditions call for their exercise. (3: 65)

Same general principles of reflective thinking apply at all ages. In view of these facts we may conclude that the general principles concerning training in reflective thinking which were discussed in Chapter IX apply at all stages of schooling, from the kindergarten to college graduation. Hence adolescent training calls for no peculiar principles of instruction in connection with reasoning, but simply requires an intelligent application of these general principles.

Same point of view applied to training in enjoyment and expression. In taking up the two remaining types of learning (namely, acquiring habits of enjoyment, and skill in expression) we shall maintain the same general position as we have in the cases of motor skill, association of symbols and meanings, and reflective thinking; that is, the later years of the school period (from fourteen to eighteen) are characterized by the same general methods of developing habits of enjoyment and expression as are the earlier years (from six to fourteen), although the content of the experiences which play a part in the enjoyment or expression may be different and the directions which the interests of the students take may vary.

Training in enjoyment based on persistent instincts and emotions. At the basis of many of the forms of enjoyment are found certain fundamental instinctive and emotional tendencies that are present in all of the years of the school period. The instinctive enjoyment of rhythm is one of the