ogy, and acquired some taste for Italian culture, which he afterward tried to spread in his domains.

Upon his return from his travels he entered (1604) the imperial army which was then fighting in Hungary against the Turks and the Protestant Hungarians, and proved himself a brave soldier. The most important event of his youth was his marriage in 1609 with Lucretia Nekesch von Landeck, a very rich Moravian widow, who was considerably older than himself. At her death in 1614 he inherited her extensive property in Moravia, which, together with a large estate left him by his uncle, made him one of the wealthiest noblemen in Bohemia. He now possessed the necessary means for playing a prominent rôle at the Austrian court and availed himself of every opportunity of serving the Habsburg princes. When in 1617 Archduke Ferdinand of Styria (afterward Emperor Ferdinand II) waged war against Venice, Wallenstein hastened to his assistance with troops raised at his own expense, and distinguished himself as a brave and efficient officer. At the outbreak of the Bohemian revolution in 1618 he at once declared himself in favor of the imperial cause and took up arms in behalf of Ferdinand. Sickness prevented him from taking part in the battle of the White Hill (Nov. 8, 1620), but he did good service in several smaller engagements of the war, especially against Bethlen Gabor and in the subjection of Bohemia to imperial rule. For his fidelity to the cause of Austria he was appointed commandant of Prague, one of the most responsible positions in Bohemia.

Wallenstein's military achievements from 1620 to 1625 were comparatively insignificant. During these years he devoted his chief energies to the extension and wise administration of his private possessions. The complete success of the imperial arms placed Bohemia entirely at the mercy of the emperor. All those who had in any way participated in the rebellion were severely punished. The leaders who had not escaped in time were executed, hundreds of wealthy and distinguished families were exiled and their estates confiscated. The Jesuits were recalled, the Protestant clergy expelled, and the inhabitants forced to conform to the Catholic church. The lands of the Protestant nobles were in part bestowed by the emperor upon his faithful officers, but most of the confiscated estates were sold at auction. Wallenstein availed himself of this opportunity, and being favored by the court, was able with his vast wealth to buy at nominal prices immense tracts of these

confiscated lands. He thus extended his estates in northeastern Bohemia until they finally covered some sixty square miles. These estates were formed into a territory called Friedland. In 1622 he was made an Imperial Count, and in 1623 he was raised to the rank of Prince of Friedland. In 1623 he married Isabella Katharina of Harrach, daughter of Ferdinand's most influential minister, Count Karl of Harrach, and thus strengthened his position at court. In 1625 he was created Hereditary Duke of Friedland and was thus made a Prince of the Empire with the right to administer justice, coin money, confer titles, etc.

The phenomenal progress of the imperial arms did not succeed in crushing Protestantism in Germany. In 1624 the Protestant party was slowly reorganizing its forces to make another mighty effort to assert its rights and recover its position in the empire. In 1625 a formidable coalition of German Protestant princes was constituted by the help of England, and Christian IV of Denmark was placed at its head. The army of the League, which had thus far fought the battles of the emperor, was not strong enough to cope successfully with the powerful armies of the Protestant coalition. Moreover, the interests of the Catholic League were in many respects opposed to the aggressions of the House of Habsburg. The League represented the authority of the Catholic princes of the empire, and its armies could not be depended upon, in case the imperial policy should ever antagonize or endanger the power of the princes. What the emperor now needed was an army independent of the League, subject only to his orders and to be used not simply for the defence of Catholicism, but also for the furtherance of his dynastic ambitions. But the imperial treasury was empty, for Ferdinand was very incompetent in the management of his finances, and besides, no general in the empire seemed able to effect the organization of such an army. When the cause of the emperor seemed desperate, Wallenstein saw that his opportunity had come, and offered to raise and equip an imperial army of twenty thousand men at his own expense. The maintenance of this army was to be no burden upon the imperial treasury, for the troops were to be supported by forced contributions, levied upon the provinces in which they were quartered. The larger and stronger the army, the more easily could these contributions be extorted, for the presence of an overwhelming imperial force would awe the people to submission. Wallenstein's proposal implied nothing less than government by mil

itary force. Naturally the emperor hesitated. It was a revolutionary proposition which involved the violation of a fundamental principle of the empire. If he accepted it, it would evoke the bitterest opposition on the part of the princes, and if he refused it, his cause seemed hopeless. Finally, after considerable hesitation the emperor yielded, and on Apr. 7, 1625, Wallenstein received the commission to recruit an imperial army of twenty-four thousand men. His enormous wealth and well-known generosity enabled him to accomplish this task easily. Recruits from Germany and all parts of Europe flocked to his standard, attracted by prospects of rich booty and the hope of rapid promotion. In a short time the size of his army far exceeded the promised number.

With this army, which was really his own, Wallenstein marched northward to cooperate with Tilly against Christian IV and Mansfeld, the Protestant leaders, but nothing of any consequence was accomplished by him in 1625. Before exposing his raw troops to the vicissitudes of war, he wished to win their confidence and organize them into a thoroughly disciplined army. He had a keen eye for military capacity, and had remarkable powers of organization. He made his soldiers feel that individual worth regardless of ancestry or religion were to him of prime consideration, and he rapidly advanced and munificently rewarded all who had rendered efficient service. In his army he had men of illustrious birth as well as soldiers of humble ancestry, but he did not discriminate between them so long as they served him well. Strict submission to the general's will was demanded of all alike.

Active operations were begun in 1626. Wallenstein's army had meanwhile steadily increased, so that together with Tilly's forces it numbered seventy thousand soldiers, while the army of the Protestant coalition contained about sixty thousand. Wallenstein's military career from 1626 to 1628 was an almost unbroken series of victories. His characteristics as a general can only be touched upon here. As a tactician he was by no means so inventive as his later rival Gustavus Adolphus, but he applied the old tactics of the Spanish school with great skill and thoroughness. He was very careful not to expose his soldiers to unnecessary danger, and generally avoided battle until his force outnumbered that of his adversary. He never won a really great battle, but his military manœuvres were so cautiously and carefully planned that he succeeded repeatedly in driving the enemy from the field without serious

loss to his own army.

He defeated Mansfeld at the Bridge

of Dessau, Apr. 25, 1626, and pursued him into Hungary. Meanwhile Tilly defeated Christian IV at Lutter, Aug. 27, 1626. In 1627 Wallenstein and Tilly coöperated in their movements, and after clearing Silesia of the remnants of Mansfeld's army, they succeeded in completely crushing the Danish army and in forcing Christian IV to flee for refuge to his islands. The Dukes of Mecklenburg were deprived of their duchy because they had rendered assistance to the Danish king, and in 1628 the emperor gave the duchy to Wallenstein as security for the large sums of money which he had advanced and which still remained unpaid. In 1629 he was formally and permanently invested with this duchy. This act of the emperor by which the territory of a sovereign prince of the empire was bestowed upon a successful soldier aroused the bitterest opposition on the part of the princes, who regarded it as a dangerous aggression of imperial power. If by the exercise of arbitrary power the emperor could dispossess a prince of the empire of his hereditary estates, there was no guarantee for the permanence of the princely authority in the realm. In return for his conquest of Silesia, Wallenstein received the Duchy of Sagan for a trifling consideration.

When Denmark and the whole of northern Germany had been subdued, Wallenstein turned his attention to the towns on the Baltic. He had long regarded with anxiety the rapid development of Sweden as a naval power, which might in the course of time become a source of the greatest danger to the supremacy of Austria. To obviate this danger he sought to make the House of Habsburg as supreme upon the sea as it was on the land. With this end in view he took possession of several Hanseatic coast towns, in order, by the creation of a fleet, to crush the naval power of Sweden and Denmark, and, if possible, that of the Netherlands and of England. To accomplish this purpose he laid siege to Stralsund in 1628. But the town, assisted by the Danes and Swedes, stoutly resisted all his efforts, so that he finally was compelled to raise the siege. The lack of a sufficient fleet was the real cause of his failure. The successful resistance of Stralsund forced Wallenstein to abandon all ideas of making Austria a great naval power. With the exception of this check Wallenstein was everywhere successful, so that on May 22, 1629, the Peace of Lübeck was finally concluded between the emperor and Christian IV. According to the provisions of this peace, Christian

15 was forced to resign his claims to all the bishoprics held by bis famby in the empire, but his kingdom: was restored to him on condition that he should never interiere in the affairs of Lower Saxony.

Shortly before the Feace of Libeck. Maximilian of Bavaric and other Catholic princes prevailed upon the emperer to take advantage of the noptiess condition cf Protestantism by signing the Edict of Restitution. March 20, 1030. This edict, which was destined to prolong the war for nineteen years, provised that all church property which had fallen into the hands of the Protestants since the treaty of Passau (1532) and the Peace of Augsburg (1355 was to be returned to the original Catholic owners or their successors. 1: imnited nothing less than a determined purpose of the emperor to crush Protestantism. Wadenstein's statesmanship was well shown by his decided opposition to this edict. He san clear that no imperial army could put down the war so long as the edict remained in force. His interests in the war were largely polit ical and not religious. His aim then was to establish a strong usited empire, able to repe, foreign interference o; invasion, and to enforce law and authority at home. The emperor was to be made as absolute a monarch in Germany as were the xings of Spain and France in their own lands. The authority of the princes was to be crushed so that the emperor might hold undivided sway in the land. The basis of imperial unity was to be religious equality. The princes were naturally the most determined opponents of Wallenstein, and if his ideal of a strongly centralized empire was to be at all realized, an army had to be maintained in the field powerful enough to compel the submission of the princes. For lack of other means this army was to be supported through heavy contributions and assessments. Wallenstein's political aims could only be at tained for the time being through a harsh military despotism,

The antagonism of the princes to Wallenstein began to as sert itself shortly after he had assumed command of the army, and grew in proportion as the size of the army increased and the forced contributions became more onerous and exasperating. Wallenstein's pride and the deliberate scorn with which he treated the princes intensified their hatred. He boldly asserted that he saw no reason why the electors and the refractory princes should be treated more leniently than the rebellious nobles of Bohemia. A foreigner upon German soil and a successful soldier of fortune, he showed no respect for the