on the fairness and fulness of discussion, than on the number or even on the class of the voters;-though the more varied the classes, the more you evade special prejudices. Let me imagine that by lot you could blindly select in every town and county, one out of ten of the present voters, and set that one-tenth to vote instead of all;-my belief is, that (omitting the greater facility given to bribery by lessening the constituencies) you would get, as nearly as possible, the same Parliament as by the existing process. Why do we regard a jury of twelve men as a sufficient protection for life and property to each of us? Because we believe that when twelve persons, duly sworn and duly informed by a judge, pronounce a man guilty, his guilt is nearly as certain as if he were condemned by twelve hundred or twelve thousand. But if the twelve were under no solemn bond to religious truth, and had no formal instruction from a trained judge, we should cease to trust our tribunal, whatever its numbers. Surely we are familiar with the thought that the forms and conscientious spirit of every judicial institution are its main excellence: the jury are taken at random, and are few. Equally true is it of political voting, that its agreement with wisdom and justice depends more upon the method of previous deliberation, than upon the number of those who vote.

en

I am presuming that the object sought in wishing for a vote, is the promotion of some just or good object. But many persons have another reason for wishing to be " franchised," as it is called,—namely, that they think it will add to their personal consequence. I do not blame this feeling in itself, though it has nothing very commendable. It is like the ordinary ambition of a vulgar statesman, who wishes to be prime minister merely because it will be a great distinction to him, and not because he has some great and good scheme to carry, or some important law or policy to execute. The only ambition which we honour is that which is aiming at public good. Every class in the country may fairly claim to have its representatives in Parliament, as a general safeguard, to expound its peculiar wishes, or perhaps its hardships; and on all grounds I feel it desirable that the intelligent artizan should be represented. If this could be done by giving to them twenty or more special representatives, I should be glad. To desire this as a protection, is one thing; to desire it for the sake of power,

without an eye to any particular measures, is another thing entirely. I believe it is no good fortune, but a danger and a calamity, for a class of men to have power put in their hands for which they have no uses. Such a class is in the position of a child on the throne. We see what the French peasants did with their voting power, when the doctrinaire Republicans of Paris set up Universal Suffrage, and faneied themselves triumphant wise men. The peasants ask the priests how they shall vote; and do as they are bid. A Napoleon is elected, under promise to restore the Pope; and events soon show that the country has had the liberty only of electing its lord and master.

When power has been desired only for the sake of power, what are its holders to do with it when it has been attained? One possible result I could excellently illustrate out of Roman history; but it suffices to point to the English Reform Act. The victorious party quarrels from within, and breaks itself up. In fact, the English Liberal party did desire many important enactments, and carried them in the first two years after victory; but for this, the quarrel would have come earlier. In general, when a new class has suddenly obtained power for which it has no use, it is open either to flattery or to bribes. An orator who will minister to their vanity, their envy, their suspicions, or their vengeance, gains an inordinate power with them,— just as do flatterers with weak despotic princes. As they are seldom able to judge what things are possible, the unscrupulous man who will promise any thing, can always take the wind out of the sails of another who is thoughtful and conscientious in his promises.

I said a little while ago, that at present I would rather see power over Foreign affairs in the hands of the intelligent working classes, than in any one other class: but if high power were given to them at once, by some violent revolution, they would not be the same ten years hence as now;-for, meanwhile, they would have been beset by flatterers. Power easily corrupts all men, and especially those new to power; and flatterers are the chief ministers of corruption. But besides this, the poorer classes are open to bribery. The bribe may even take a flattering form, and be half hidden, so as to salve the conscience;-as, when a rich man praises shop-goods, and gives a large order to get a vote.

I beg of you not think that I impute to working

men any greater depravity than that human weakness which besets all parties. Every party in power has base men in it: the head has often great difficulty in controlling the tail. When a prime minister is desiring to study the public good, many of his supporters are chiefly eager for private advantage to themselves, and crave and beseech that this or that evil job may be perpetrated to gratify them. Perhaps it is only by help of his opponents that he can keep his own tail in control. On the whole, I wish to insist that, unless a party which is seeking to get more power is already agreed upon great and necessary measures which it desires to promote, there is no prima facie reason for expecting that it will use power well. On the other

hand, if for the public good, and for its own good as part of the nation, it desires certain measures, its obvious policy is, not to claim increase of power for itself, but to claim those measures. Hereby it will still the jealousy of other classes, who dread unlimited change and convulsion, from the disappointment of vague and vast expectations. mean such as those of the Socialists of Paris, who, in 1848, when Louis Philippe was driven from the throne in February, and a republic was established, expected some millennium of comfort or prosperity from work which the new government was to give them; and when this soon showed itself to be impossible, were easily led on into violent attempts at a farther revolution in June.

A party which promulgates the measures for which it seeks power, conciliates its fellow-citizens in several ways. First, it shows its own self-knowledge and self-control, and that it is not carried away by wild, indefinite, impossible expectations, which, when they take possession of a multitude, are of all delusions most dangerous. Next, it begins a deliberation, in which it may either convince or be convinced and if it have right on its side, it will more quickly win other classes to approve than by a vague claim of power. At the same time, it will exercise and win power by the very process, and will prepare the way to a formal admission of its right to vote. If I desire a particular measure, -say, that an excise tax or an income tax be altered,-or, that help be given to Poland,-or, that the institutions of Ireland be improved, as soon as the thing is carried, I do not care whether it was from my suggesting it in this room or in a newspaper, or at the hustings. Have I less a sense

of power if my arguments prevail where I have no legal vote, than if they prevail in conjunction with my vote? Certainly those who are convinced by the temperate reasoning of non-electors, are not likely to have any jealous objection to their admittance to equality of voting.

No

But here I come to the point. I want to know, to whom it is proposed to give the Parliamentary suffrage, and on what principle? The exercise of political power pre-supposes political intelligence and social independence: those who have not these qualities cannot use it aright. Now, I see that the artizans of the towns have both these qualities; and though it would be unjust to allow other classes, which have the suffrage at present, to be swamped by the superior numbers of the artizans, I see every propriety in admitting the artizans to a substantial share of power. What is more, I believe they do and will exercise power on which I shall touch again presently. But if I am told that they are to be admitted on the ground of "Manhood Suffrage," this means that the peasants also are to vote. We have seen in France what came of that. thing is more dangerous in politics than to shut one's eyes to facts, under the influence of some abstract notion, like Manhood Suffrage. Want of political intelligence or social independence in certain classes, is as visible and certain a fact, as the colour of the skin; and there is no liberality in affecting not to see it. There is no wisdom and no kindness in resolving to impose on millions of men a duty and a responsibility to which they are obviously incompetent. I should be glad if the peasants could have representatives of their own, equally as the artizans; but I know that at present it is as impossible in England as in France. At the time of the great Reform Bill, the Marquis of Chandos proposed a celebrated clause to give the franchise to farmers who were £50 tenants-at-will; and Mr. Hume, with the Radicals, supported him, on the general principle that it was "extending the suffrage." Thus the ministry was forced to yield; but the farmers have seldom been anything but tools in the landlords' hands; and the Chandos clause has proved a strength to Toryism, as was intended, though Mr. Hume shut his eyes against it. The peasants have less chance of social independence than the farmers. Let the law give votes to the peasants, and it virtually gives them to the squire and to the clergyman, one

or other of whom will be obeyed. If any of you think that by an increase in the political power of the clergy our law and its administration will be made less narrowminded, and the Church itself more large-hearted; or if any think the power of landlords not yet to rest on a sufficiently broad basis, and not to reach far enough, then let him desire the suffrage for the peasants. But if you believe that the clergy and the squires, however estimable in many social ways, are already somewhat too powerful in the state, I feel assured that you ought to judge universal suffrage ruinous to your own cause. And this is why I insist, that if artizans deserve the suffrage, it is not because of their "manhood"—that is, because they are so many years old, so many feet high, or of so many pounds' weight in male flesh and blood-but because they have minds and hearts, and have exercised their minds in certain directions, and can understand a political argument, and can take a part in deliberation, without which all voting is “a delusion, a mockery, and a snare.'

But let me suppose that Lord John Russell's Reform Act had been carried, or even something beyond it, which effectually gave parliamentary suffrage to the workmen of the towns, and practically left the counties as they are;-what difference do you think this would make in the legislation of Parliament, or in the action of the executive government? It would not give a greater number of representatives to Manchester or to London. The large constituencies in the large towns already get representatives as democratic (if that is the thing desired) as you would get under the new system. Whether under universal suffrage Birmingham could improve upon Mr. Bright, many of you will doubt with me. What you want, I suppose, is more Mr. Brights in Parliament: and that cannot be had without a re-distribution of the seats, so that the great towns may not be outvoted by the little ones. what Mr. Bright himself declared to be of more vital importance than any mere extension of the suffrage; and I confess that I had thought it very extraordinary in him to let drop that subject so suddenly, until by accident I learned something about it from head-quarters. His committee, on reviewing the statistics of England, discovered that, whether population or wealth be made the basis on which parliamentary seats are given to the constituencies,

This is