corvette,' who made off, towards the shore. The Harrier immediately wore in pursuit of her, but could not come up with her.

The prizes proved to be the Dutch Republican frigate Pallas, of thirty-six guns; the Victoria, a two decked ship, of about eight hundred tons, and the Batavian ship of about five hundred tons; the two last in the company's service, armed and richly laden with the produce of the Moluccas.

The vessels employed as packets from their superior sailing, and from their being ordered, if possible, to avoid an enemy, seldom engage; when they do, however, they generally fight well. This year the Windsor Castle packet, with the mails for Barbadoes and the Leeward islands, was attacked by a French privateer; the packet of course at first endeavoured to escape, but finding that impracticable, the mail was made ready to sink, and preparations were also made for resistance. As soon as the privateer came close, she hailed the packet, desiring her in very opprobious terms to strike her colours: on refusing to do so, she ran alongside, grappled, and attempted to board; in this she was disappointed, and trying to get clear, her main yard was locked in the rigging of the packet. Great exertions were continued on both sides, till about three o'clock, when the packet got one of her six pounders caronades to bear upon the privateer, loaded with double grape, cannister, and one hundred musket balls: this was fired at the moment the enemy was making a second desperate attempt to board, and killed and wounded a very great number of her men: Soon after this Captain Rogers of the packet, resolved in his turn to board the privateer, which he did with five men, and succeeded in driving the enemy from his quarters, and about four o'clock she surrendered. She mounted six six-pounders, and one long eighteen pounder; and had on board ninety-two men, of which twenty-one were found

dead, and thirty-three wounded; on board of the packet three were killed, and ten severely wounded; her crew consisted only of twenty-eight men and boys.

At the commencement of the year 1808, the power of Buonaparte over by far the greatest part of the continent of Europe seemed so firmly established that the friends of its independence, tranquillity, and happiness, looked with despondency for the most faint and remote prospect, that it would be again restored to those blessings. If we commence our review of the continent, with the northern states, the Emperor of Russia, though he was by the remote situation, immense extent, and great though scattered resources of his empire, as well as by the sterility of its soil, and the extreme coldness of its climate, in many parts, most effectually protected from the grasping and insatiable ambition of Buonaparte; yet even he, after the peace of Tilsit, seemed to have given himself up entirely to the sway and direction of the Emperor of the French. No greater proof of his devotion to his new ally could be shewn than his agreeing to co-operate with his absurd and self-destructive measures for the annihilation of the commerce of Britain; these measures were sure to prove more destructive to the several nations on the continent who adopted them, than to Britain, against whose resources and power they were directed; and Russia, in a most especial manner, whose very nobles, from the rude state of society in which the empire exists, are obliged to be merchants and manufacturers of the raw produce of their estates, was sure to suffer by the anti-commercial decrees of Buonaparte. Notwithstanding this, however, the Emperor Alexander at the beginning of the year 1808, seemed entirely and permanently devoted to the foolish and mad schemes of Buonaparte. Russia, therefore, may fairly be looked upon at this time, as the tool of France.

If from Russia we turn our eyes to the other northern powers, Denmark, at all times little disposed, either from

inclination, policy, or weakness, to go against the schemes of Buonaparte, had been thrown entirely into his arms, by our expedition against Copenhagen. In relating the particulars of that event, we did not enter into any exami, nation of its justice or lawfulness; but we may remark, that it had the undoubted effect of stirring up among all classes of Danish subjects, as well as in the breast of the Danish sovereign and prince, a strong animosity against the English and the English government. Nor can we wonder at this; should not we have felt the same, under the same circumstances? Undoubtedly we should, and if pos sible, in a much stronger degree. Sweden still retained her animosity againt France, or rather the King of Sweden retained it; but he was totally unable to cope with Buonaparte, and as the Emperor of Russia was now be come the ally of the latter, he was exposed to his formi dable hostility.

If from the northern states of Europe we direct our attention to the middle states, we shall behold amongst them the power of France still more strongly established. Prussia was completely broken down in resources, and dispirited by the defeat of Jena. Her sovereign was compelled to submit to all the insults and indignities, which Buonaparte choose to put upon him:-he had no redress. The Emperor Alexander, formerly his ally, was now the ally of France, and had no scruple to receive from France, but, part of the territories of Prussia. Saxony and Bavaria were devoted to France; among the smaller states, Buonaparte ruled with unlimited sway; while Austria stripped of the Netherlands and of her Italian dominions, as well as of a considerable part of her power in Germany itself, and embarrassed in her domestic resources and finances, was glad of repose, and seemed determined to remain quiet, if Buonaparte would permit her to remain so. Holland could no longer be looked upon as a separate and independent state, for though she still retained the name,

she had long lost the powers and privileges of one; she was in fact a part of France.

Let us now turn our eyes to France; for a very long time much longer indeed than circumstances warranted, many people flattered and persuaded themselves that the Bourbons might be restored, and would be restored, principally by the efforts of their party in France. These hopes and prospects, however, were now almost entirely given up, even by those who formerly had been the most sanguine; the French people indeed had been tired out by the instability of the governments which ruled over them, till the reign of Buonaparte, but he had put down all their revolutionary governments. He seemed to have given the French internal tranquillity and repose; this circumstance of itself was sufficient to render him popular with the great mass of the nation. But he had other claims to popularity. The almost innate love of the French for military glory which had been strengthened during the Revolution, had been most proudly and fully gratified by the character and exploits of Buonaparte. He had already brought them nearer to the summit of their wishes and hopes, of becoming emphatically the GREAT NATION, than any of their preceding monarchs; hence he was popular with this vain-glorious nation;-but he had other holds on their liking. According to the system of the revolution, which Buonaparte carefully followed, every man who entered the army, had a good chance, if he con ducted himself well, of rising to the highest rank, honour and emolument in it; there was no exclusion on account of birth or religion; rising in the army did not depend on intrigue or favour, but in almost every instance on individual merit; and Buonaparte was the first to perceive and reward this merit. Hence, it is no wonder he was so extremely popular: and that the horrors of the conscription and of almost perpetual war should be forgotten, or little felt, in the remembrance, that he had freed them from

civil and internal commotion, that he had given stability to their government; made them the conquerors of nearly the whole of Europe, and that under the system which he adopted, the sons torn from them by the conscription might become instruments in still farther exalting the glory of the great nation, and if they did, were sure of rising to the highest rank in the army.

There were several other circumstances that conduced to the popularity of Buonaparte, but these were the chief. At the commencement of the year 1808, they existed and operated with the greatest force; for at that period France was perfectly tranquil at home, and she was completely victorious abroad.

Of the continent of Europe, we have now to survey the southern states; and who would have expected that the first symptoms of effectual resistance to Buonaparte, would have proceeded from any of them; that any of them contained the germ of the renovated independence and tranquillity of Europe. Italy was completely at the disposal of Buonaparte; his brother was king of Naples; he himself was king of the northern parts of that fair portion of Europe. The Pope was under his nod; the Prince Regent of Portugal had left his European dominions, and fled to the Brazils, leaving Portugal entirely at the mercy of the French. In Spain his power seemed more firmly established than in any other part of Europe; by the weakness of the king, the treachery of his minister, the dreadful state of poverty and dilapidation in which the resources of the kingdom were, and the apathy of the people, it seemed as if Buonaparte had actually, already made Spain an integral part of France. Who would have believed that Spain under these circumstances, would have dared to resist Buonaparte; who would have believed, that if she did venture to resist him, her resistance would have been successful; who would have believed that Spain would have indirectly roused Europe to effectual resist