Librarian of Parliament, Canada. Author of a treatise on Parliamentary Government OTTAWA 1878. Exchange Library Univ. of Wester Ontaric 9-21-29 A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNOR. There are few questions to which at the present time public attention is directed, in any part of the Queen's dominions, of greater moment, or of more practical importance, than to determine what are the proper functions of a Constitutional Governor, under the Crown of Great Britain. There is, no doubt, a general impression abroad, amongst persons who have not bestowed much thought upon the matter, that the Governor of a British colony, or province, is little else than an ornamental appendage to our political system; necessary, to fulfil certain ceremonial duties; useful, to represent the community at large upon public occasions, or as the mouthpiece of public sentiment; and of unquestionable service to society, in the discharge of a dignified and liberal hospitality, to be freely extended to whoever may be a suitable recipient of vice-regal favour, without distinction of creed or party. But if this were all that we had a right to expect from a Governor, it would be quite insufficient to justify the pre-eminence which is attached to his office, as a Representative of the Crown. Without underrating for a moment the incalculable advantages which society and the state derive from the fulfilment of the duties above enumerated, by men in exalted positions,-assisted by the ladies of their household-such ceremonial observances and festivities might, without much loss of dignity or efficiency, be assigned to Cabinet ministers, and other prominent officers of government, of adequate rank and fortune. The Governor of a British dependency, however, within the limits prescribed by his Commission, is essentially a political officer: and the necessity for his office must be estimated according to the gravity and importance of the duties allotted to him in the body politic. If his duties in that relation are mainly formal, and his political functions of small account, the continuance of the office will be apt to be regarded as an expensive luxury, which cannot be justified by an economical people, or endured in an age which is intolerant of shams. But if, on the other hand, a Constitutional Governor is actually invested with an authority which is eminently capable of being employed for the public good and if he fills a place of trust, wherein he is competent, upon fitting occasions, to interpose to guard and protect the political liberties of those over whom he presides,-then it becomes the interest as well as the duty of all good citizens to respect his office, and to strengthen and uphold him in the exercise of its lawful prerogatives. The gradual but vital change which the present generation has witnessed, in the relations of Executive authority in the self-governing Colonies of the British Empire, to the people, in their local legislatures, has led to the impression that no political duties remain to be fulfilled by a Constitutional Governor; save only such as are of a formal and ceremonial kind. This idea has been fostered by the assumption that the Sovereign herself, whose Commission the Governor holds, has ceased to be anything but a cipher in the state, without any measure of political power. That, in fact, the Cabinet of the day is an oligarchy, exercising an uncontrolled power in the administration of public affairs; subject only to the necessity of obtaining a majority in the popular branch of the legislature to approve their policy, and to justify their continuance in office. Such a form of Government, however theoretically defensible in the abstract, in the estimation of some political thinkers, is not that of the British Constitution. The unsoundness of such an idea, and its contrariety to existing constitutional practice, in the Mother Country, will be readily apparent to those who take the trouble to refer to the opinions expressed by leading statesmen in Great Britain, on this subject, within the past thirty years Brougham, Grey, Russell, Derby, Gladstone and Disraeli, representative men of diverse parties, have each taken opportunity to testify to the vital and influential position which appertains to the Sovereign, in a Parliamentary Government. The recent publication of Martin's Life of the Prince Consort, written under Her Majesty's own auspices, has contributed largely to our knowledge of the present practical operation of British Institutions. Apart from the attractive picture which it presents to us of the Prince himself, as a 5 zealous and accomplished fellow-labourer with the Queen, in fulfilling the arduous duties of royalty, this book is exceedingly instructive, in the glimpses it affords of the inner workings of the state-machine. We are all familiar with the true doctrine of Constitutional Monarchy. We know that personal government by royal prerogative has given place to parliamentary government; and that under our parliamentary system the personal will of the Sovereign can only find public expression through official channels, or in the performance of acts of state, which have been advised or approved by responsible ministers. But we must not lose sight of the fact, that what has been termed the Impersonality of the Crown only extends to direct acts of government: that the Sovereign is no mere automaton, or ornamental appendage to the body politic,-but is a personage whose consent is necessary to every act of state, and who possesses full discretionary powers to deliberate and determine upon every recommendation which is tendered for the royal sanction by the ministers of the Crown As every important act, that is to say, everything which is not ordinary official routine, but which involves a distinct policy, or would commit the Crown to a definite action, or line of conduct, which had not previously received the royal approbation,-should first be sanctioned by the Sovereign, the Crown is thereby enabled to exercise a beneficial influence, and an active supervision over the government of the empire: and an opportunity is afforded to the Sovereign for exercising that "constitutional criticism" in all affairs of state, which is the undoubted right and duty of the Crown, and which, in its operation, Lord Grey and Mr. Disraeli, amongst living statesmen, have concurred in declaring to be most salutary and efficacious. Commenting upon the exercise of these constitutional powers, Prince Albert (in a memorandum which is given in Martin's Life of the Prince, vol. 2. p. 159,) remarks that the Sovereign" should be, if possible, the best informed person in the empire, as to the progress of political events, and the current of political opinion, both at home and abroad." "Ministers change, and when they go out of office lose the means of access to the best information which they had formerly at command. The Sovereign remains, and to him this information is always open. The most patriotic Minister has to think of his party. His judgment, therefore, is often insensibly warped by party considerations. Not so the constitutional Sovereign, who is exposed to no such disturbing agency. As the permanent head of the |