upon himself places the private possessions of the freeman at his disposal. The peculiar conservancy of the peace, and command over the means of internal communication enable him to impose tolls on land- and water-carriage: he is thus also empowered to demand the services of the freemen to receive and conduct travelling strangers, heralds or ambassadors from one royal vill to another; to demand the aid of their carts and horses to carry forage, provisions or building-materials to his royal residence. Treasure-trove is his, because where there is no owner, the state claims the accidental advantage, and the king is the representative of the state. It is part of his dignity that he may command the aid of the freemen in his hunting and fishing; and hence that he may compel them to keep his hawks and hounds, and harbour or feed his huntsmen. As head of the church he has an important influence in the election of bishops, even in the establishment of new sees, or the abolition of old established ones. His authority it is that appoints the duke, the geréfa, perhaps even the members of the Witena-gemót. Above all, he has the right to divest himself of a portion of these attributes, and confer them upon those whom he pleases, in different districts.

The complete description of the rights of Royalty, in all their detail, will find a place in the Second Book of this work; they can only be noticed cursorily here, inasmuch as they appertain, in strictness, to a period in which the monarchical spirit, and the institutions proper thereto, had become firmly

settled, and applied to every part of our social scheme. But whatever extension they may have attained in process of time, they have their origin in the rights permitted to the king, even in the remotest periods of which we read.

There cannot be the least doubt that many of them were usurpations, gradual developments of an old and simple principle; and it is only in periods of advanced civilization that we find them alluded to. Nevertheless we must admit that even at the earliest recorded time in our history, the kings were not only wealthy but powerful far beyond any of their fellow-countrymen. All intercourse with foreign nations, whether warlike or peaceful, tends to this result, because treaties and grave affairs of state can best be negotiated and managed by single persons a popular council may be very properly consulted as to the final acceptance or rejection of terms; but the settlement of them can obviously not be beneficially conducted by so unwieldy a multitude. Moreover contracting parties on either side will prefer having to do with as small a number of negotiators as possible, if it be only for the greater dispatch of business. Accordingly Tacitus shows us, on more than one occasion, the Senate in communication with the princes, not the populations of Germany': and this must naturally be the case where the aristocracy, to whose body the

66

1 "Angandestrii, principis Cattorum, lectas in Senatu literas." Annal. ii. 88. Maroboduum.... per dona et legationes petivisse foedus." Annal. ii. 45. "Misitque legatos ad Tiberium oraturos auxilia." Ibid.

king belongs, have the right of taking the initiative in public business'.

But although we find a great difference in the social position, wealth and power of the king, and those of the noble and freeman, we are not to imagine that he could at any time exercise his royal prerogatives entirely at his royal pleasure2: held in check by the universal love of liberty, by the rights of his fellow nobles, and the defensive alliances of the freemen", he enjoyed indeed a rank, a splendour and an influence which placed him at the head of his people, a limited monarchy, but happier than a capricious autocracy: and the historian who had groaned over the vices and tyranny of Tiberius, Nero and Domitian, could give the noble boon of his testimony to the eternal memory of the barbarous Arminius.

1 "De minoribus rebus principes consultant; de maioribus omnes : ita tamen, ut ea quoque, quorum penes plebem arbitrium est, apud principes pertractentur. . . . . Mox rex vel princeps, prout aetas cuique, prout nobilitas, prout decus bellorum, prout facundia est, audiuntur, auctoritate suadendi magis quam iubendi potestate." Mor. Germ. xi.

2 "Nec regibus infinita, nec libera potestas." Mor. Germ. vii. "Auctore Verrito et Malorige, qui nationem eam regebant, in quantum Germani regnantur." Tac. Annal. xiii. 54.

3 "Ceterum Arminius, abscedentibus Romanis et pulso Maroboduo, regnum adfectans, libertatem popularium adversam habuit, petitusque armis, cum varia fortuna certaret, dolo propinquorum cecidit." Tac. Annal. ii. 88.

VOL. I.

Σ

162

CHAPTER VII.

THE NOBLE BY SERVICE.

I HAVE called the right to entertain a Comitatus, or body of household retainers, a very jewel in the crown it was so because it formed, in process of time, the foundation of all the extended powers which became the attributes of royalty, and finally succeeded in establishing, upon the downfall of the old dynasts or nobles by birth, a new order of nobles by service, whose root was in the crown itself. A close investigation of its gradual rise, progress and ultimate development, will show that the natural basis of the Comitatus is in the superior wealth and large possessions of the prince.

In all ages of the world, and under all conditions of society, one profound problem has presented itself for solution; viz. how to reconcile the established divisions of property with the necessities of increasing population. Experience teaches us that under almost any circumstances of social being, a body of men possessed of sufficient food and clothing have been found to increase and multiply with a rapidity far too great to be balanced by the number of natural or violent deaths: and it follows therefore that in every nation which has established

a settled number of households upon several estates, each capable of supporting but one household in comfort, the means of providing for a surplus population must very soon become an object of general difficulty. If the paternal estate be reserved for the support of one son, if the paternal weapons descend to him, to be used in the feuds of his house or the service of the state, what is to become of the other sons who are excluded from the benefits of the succession ? In a few instances we may imagine natural affection to have induced a painful, and ultimately unsuccessful, struggle to keep the family together here and there cases may have occurred in which a community was fortunate enough from its position, to possess the means of creating new estates to suit the new demand: and conquest, or the forcible partition of a neighbouring territory, may have supplied a provision for the new generation. Tacitus indeed tells us that " numerum liberorum finire aut quemquam ex agnatis necare, flagitium habetur: " yet tradition contradicts this, and speaks of the exposure of children immediately after birth, leaving it to the will of the father to save the life of the child or not. And similarly the tales of the North record the solemn and voluntary expatriation of a certain proportion of the people, designated by lot, at certain intervals of time. However, in the natural course of things,

3

1 Mor. Germ. xix.

2 Grimm, Rechtsalt. p. 455. Cumque, ut dixi, sive parum compluta humo, seu nimium torrida, torpentibus satis, ac parce fructificantibus campis, inediae languor defectam escis regionem attereret, nullumque, parum suppetentibus ali