prepare their minds to become his obedient subjects; leaving the world, and the philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their natural reason. Whether the earth's or sun's motion make the day, and night; or whether the exorbitant actions of men, proceed from passion, or from the devil, so we worship him not, it is all one, as to our odedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it is the usual phrase of all that cure by words only, as Christ did, and enchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a devil or not. For is not Christ also said (Matt. viii. 26) to have rebuked the winds? Is not He said also (Luke iv. 39) to rebuke a fever? Yet this does not argue that a fever is a devil. And whereas many of the devils are said to confess Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those madmen confessed Him. And whereas our Saviour (Matt. xii. 43) speaketh of an unclean spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandereth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none, and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himself; it is manifestly a parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a belief that demoniacs were any other thing but madmen.

he was.

There is yet another fault in the discourses of some men; which may also be numbered amongst the sorts of madness; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the name of absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the schoolmen; or in questions of abstruse philosophy. The common sort of men seldom speak insignificantly, and are therefore by those other egregious persons counted idiots." But to be assured their words are without anything correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some examples; which if any man require, let him take a schoolman in his hands and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point, as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; transubstantiation; free-will, &c., into any of the modern tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latin, such as they were acquainted withal, that lived when the Latin tongue was vulgar. What is the meaning of these words, "The first cause does not necessarily inflow anything into the second, by force of the essential subordination of the second causes, by which it may help it to work?" They are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of Suarez' first book, "Of the concourse, motion, and help of God." When men write whole volumes of such stuff, are they not mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question of transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken; they that say, the whiteness, roundness, magnitude, quality, corruptibility, all which are incorporeal, &c., go out of the wafer, into the body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those "nesses," "tudes," and "ties," to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by spirits, they mean always things, that being incorporeal, are nevertheless movable from one place to another. So that this kind of absurdity, may rightly be numbered amongst the many time that guided by clear thoughts of their puting, or writing thus, but lucid intervals. and defects intellectual.

sorts of madness; and all the worldly lust, they forbear disAnd thus much of the virtues

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Several Subjects of Knowledge.

THERE are of "knowledge" two kinds; whereof one is "knowledge of fact: the other "knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another." The former is nothing else but sense and memory, and is "absolute knowledge; " as when we see a fact doing, or remember it done : and this is the knowledge required in a witness. The latter is called "science," and is "conditional;" as when we know that, "if the figure shown be a circle, then any straight line through the centre shall divide it into two equal parts." And this is the knowledge required in a philosopher, that is to say, of him that pretends to reasoning.

The register of "knowledge of fact" is called "history." Whereof there be two sorts: one called "natural history;" which is the history of such facts, or effects of Nature, as have no dependence on man's "will;" such as are the histories of "metals," plants,' animals," "regions," and the like. The other is "civil history;" which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in commonwealths.

66

46

The registers of science, are such "books" as contain the "demonstrations" of consequences of one affirmation to another; and are commonly called "books of philosophy;" whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the matter; and may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following table (pp. 46, 47).

CHAPTER X.

Of Power, Worth, Dignity, Honour, and Worthiness.

THE " power of a man," to take it universally, is his present means; or "instruto obtain some future apparent good and is either "original mental.' "Natural power," is the eminence of the faculties of body or mind; as extraordinary strength, form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality, nobility. "Instrumental" are those powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and instruments to acquire more as riches, reputation, friends, and the secret working of God, which men call good luck. For the nature of power is in this point like to fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more haste.

The greatest of human powers, is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a commonwealth or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is power; to have friends, is power: for they are strengths united.

Also riches joined with liberality, is power; because it procureth friends, and servants; without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to envy, as a prey.

Consequences
from
accidents of
politic bo-
dies; which

the 1. Of consequences from the institution of COMMONWEALTHS, to the rights and duties of the body politic or sovereign.

is called po 2.
LITICS, and

CIVIL PHI

LOSOPHY.

Of consequences from the same, to the duty and right of the subjects.

/Consequences from quantity, and motion indeterminate; (PHILOSOwhich being the principles or first foundation of philosophy,

is called Philosophia Prima

PHIA PRIMA. GEOMETRY.

Mathematics.

ARITHME

By Number

TIC.

Consequences from the light of the stars. Out of this, and Scrothe motion of the sun, is made the science of

Consequences from the influences of the stars

SGRAPHY.

ASTROLOGY.

Reputation of power, is power; because it draweth with it the adherence of those that need protection.

So is reputation of love of a man's country, called popularity, for the same reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is power; because it is a means to have the assistance and service of many.

Good success is power; because it maketh reputation of wisdom, or good fortune; which makes men either fear him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is increase of power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war, is power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of ourselves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is power, not in all places, but only in those commonwealths where it has privileges: for in such privileges, consisteth their power. Eloquence is power, because it is seeming prudence.

Form is power; because being a promise of good, it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers.

The sciences are small power; because not eminent; and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.

Arts of public use, as fortification, making of engines, and other instruments of war; because they confer to defence and victory, are power: and though the true mother of them be science, namely the mathematics; yet, because they are brought into the light by the hand of the artificer, they be esteemed, the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother, as his issue.

The "value," or "worth" of a man, is as of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another. An able conductor of soldiers, is of great price in time of war present, or imminent; but in peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt judge, is much worth in time of peace; but not so much in war. as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. For let a man, as most men do, rate themselves at the highest value they can; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

And

The manifestation of the value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called honouring, and dishonouring. To value a man at a high rate, is to "honour" him; at a low rate, is to "dishonour" him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself.

The public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the commonwealth, is that which men commonly call "dignity." And this value of him by the commonwealth, is understood, by offices of command, judicature, public employment; or by names and titles, introduced for distinction of such value.

To pray to another, for aid of any kind, is "to honour;" because a sign we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the aid is, the more is the honour.

To obey, is to honour, because no man obeys them whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to "dishonour."

To give great gifts to a man, is to honour him; because it is buying of protection, and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts, is to