self, and of his fellow-men, as being by nature, even worse than the brutes; a kind of devils incarnate !— And what is all this for; They must pardon me, when I state, what appears most likely to be the truth, but what, at the same time, I could wish to see proved false; viz. It has been with a view of raising themselves, and a few of their peculiar friends, in the estimation of the world, many of whom are their deluded followers, as a kind of demi-gods; or, at least, a superior order of beings to the remainder of the human race! And what gives them this superior excellence? It is not because they are so much better members of society than others; possessing more moral virtue, &c. (for, as far as this is the case, we are happy to give them credit,) but because they vainly imagine that they have been miraculously or supernaturally wrought upon by the spirit of God, which has changed them from an original state of sin and pollution (into which they and the whole human race had fallen, by reason of Adam's transgression) to a state of holiness! Of this original sin and corruption we shall consider presently. That the above is nothing more than the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy, (Luke, xii. 1,) will more fully appear as we* proceed.

on any other hypothesis. He considers this passage of Solomon (Eccl. vii. 29.) unanswerable. Although Solomon was perplexed in solving all the difficulties in relation to this subject, yet he was free from all uncertainty, and all doubt upon this point, viz.

That God makes man, mankind, all men in all ages, past, present, and future, RIGHT; they all possess that rectitude of nature, which if rightly improved, will enable them to know and fulfil the will and pleasure of their Creator. This, (continues my friend being the true interpretation of this cardinal passage, all other passages in the Old Testament, should be explained in conformity to it."

* The reason I frequently make use of the plural pronoun we, is, I consider the reader with me, and as assisting me, in this investigation.

Dr. Adam Clarke, in his late notes on the Bible, as well as many others, has laboured hard to show, not only the superior understanding and excellence of our first parents before their disobedience, but also the change which took place in their nature, in this respect, in consequence of transgression. How he has succeeded will best appear by carefully perusing his notes; and for this purpose they are recommended to the reader. "They seem," says he, (i. e. our first parents,) in a moment not only to have lost sound judgment, but also reflection: a short time before Adam was so wise that he could name all the creatures brought before him, according to their respective nature and qualities: now he does not know that first principle concerning the Divine Nature, that it knows all things; and that it is omnipresent, therefore he endeavours to hide himself among the trees, from the eye of the all-seeing God!" Now is there any evidence that Adam possessed this knowledge of God before he sinned?-or that he could not name creatures, after he sinned as well, and as correctly, as he did before? I can only say, if there be any evidence of either of these facts, it has entirely eluded my search. No, so far from obtaining this evidence from reading the Doctor's learned and ingenious notes, they more clearly evince, to my understanding, the truth of the maxim, that great men are not always wise! But to proceed.

Under this article it will be proper to take notice and consider the present condition of mankind, as standing in relation to their father Adam, This will bring us to consider more fully what is called original sin; i. e. the sin which human nature is supposed to lay under in consequence of Adam's transgression.

What befell Adam, by reason of his sin or transgression, so far as we have been able to discover,

was nothing more than what now befalls every son or daughter of Adam in passing from a state of innocence (in which state we shall consider all men until they are proved otherwise) to a state of sin and disobedience. The question now is, whether this sin could, by imputation, or in any other proper sense, descend to his posterity, so as to render them, in any sense, chargeable with it? As far as any thing is incumbent on us, by way of argument, we do not hesitate to say, No! and shall rest on this ground until the positive of the question be proved. However, although it seems very unreasonable to call upon any one to prove a negative, yet, having the evidence immediately at command, in this case, we do not hesitate much to attempt to show that the contrary is true. What mean ye, that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel. Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth, it shall die. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." (Ezek. xviii. 2, 3, 4, 20.) This is proof in point, and as direct as words can possibly express. Now, if the son does not, and shall not, bear the iniquity of the father, how can, or how could, the iniquity of Adam descend to his posterity? The idea is as unreasonable as it is unscriptural.If we are in any sense guilty or accountable for Adam's transgression, why not, in like manner, accountable for the sin of all our ancestors, from Adam down to our own parents? and so we come into the world loaded with sin and guilt, of which, however,

F

we are totally ignorant and unconscious? work orthodoxy has made of common sense!

O what

But, supposing all mankind are corrupted, contaminated, or polluted by Adam's sin, and they are now born into the world in this degraded or degenerated state, this must be considered our misfortune, and not our fault. For if Adam could not be blamed for his original state, we can no more be blamed for our original state than he; and the first state of which we have any knowledge is as much our original state, as the first state of which Adam had any knowledge was his original state. Whatever we may suppose the state of man either is, or was before he had any consciousness of it, or of which he has now no recollection, it is nothing to him; neither is he in any sense accountable for it. If he is born into the world ever so rich, it is no thanks to him; if he be ever so poor, it is not his fault. If he is well made and endowed with good sense, he is indebted to the Giver of every good gift for the favour; if he be ever so ugly or deformed, and deprived of almost every sense, he cannot help it. And so it is with every gift or every privation of nature. Every human being can say, with equal propriety, by the grace of God I am what I am; and this is as true in nature, i. e, originally or constitutionally, as it is in grace, i. e. by any special gifts bestowed on man after his having come to the years of understanding. "Who maketh us to differ? and what have we that we have not received? and if we have received it, why should we boast as though we had not received it ?" (1 Cor. iv. 7.)

From these considerations, I conclude that man is born into the world totally destitute of a moral or religious character, as pure, in every moral or religious sense, as a clean piece of white paper; without a single impression, but capable of receiving many; and also susceptible of blots and stains. This brings me to consider,

3. Of the natural and moral faculties of man.

It is by no means my intention to go into a metaphysical discussion of this subject, as that would be very foreign from our present purpose, but only to offer some general remarks.

Every one will perceive, at once, that the natural faculties or senses of man are all limited. The senses of hearing, seeing, feeling, tasting and smelling, howeverfree to act, are all limited within a certain sphere. Sound, which does not come in contact with the organ of hearing, can no more be heard by us, than by persons totally deaf. So with the organ of sight; we see only those objects which we term in sight; and these remarks will apply to every other natural sense. These propositions are all self evident; and therefore require no proof.

Now if we consider the moral faculties of man. however free we may suppose them to be, they are no more free than the natural faculties, and are as much limited.

The faculties of loving or hating, believing or disbelieving, choosing or refusing, however free, are all limited (i. e. in finite beings) by the very nature of things. We have no more power to love that which does not appear to us lovely, than we have to hear that which is not within hearing, or to see that which is out of sight. Just so with believing or disbelieving, choosing or refusing. We can no more believe without evidence, or disbelieve when the evidence has come to our understanding, than we can see an object which does not exist, or prevent seeing_one when it passes immediately before our eyes. However free we are in all our volitions of choosing and refusing, yet we have no more power to choose a minor object in preference to a major, or refuse a major object rather than the minor, when each are left equally to our choice, than we can taste aloes like honey, or smell the most disagreeable odour with the