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HEADQUARTERS, U. S. FORCES, Near Matamoras, May 9th, 1846, 5 P. M. SIR: Your humane communication has just been received, and, after the consideration due to its importance, I must respectfully decline to surrender my forces to you.

The exact purport of your dispatch I cannot feel confident that I understood, as my interpreter is not skilled in your language; but if I have understood you correctly, you have my reply above.

E. S. HAWKINS, Commanding U. S. forces opposite Matamoras.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, Gen. M. ARISTA, Commanding Division of the North.

STORMING OF MONTEREY-GEN. TAYLOR'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, Camp near Monterey, Oct. 9th, 1846. SIR: I have now the honor to submit a detailed report of the recent operations before Monterey, resulting in the capitulation of that city.

The information received on the route from Seralvo, and particularly the continual appearance in our front of the Mexican cavalry, which had a slight skirmish with our advance at the village of Ramas, induced the belief, as we approached Monterey, that the enemy would defend that place. Upon reaching the neighborhood of the city on the morning of the 19th of September, this belief was fully confirmed. It was ascertained that he occupied the town in force; that a large work had been constructed commanding all the northern approaches; and that the Bishop's Palace, and some heights in its vicinity near the Saltillo road, had also been fortified, and occupied with troops and artillery. It was known, from information previously received, that the eastern approaches were commanded by several small works in the lower edge of the city.

The configuration of the heights and gorges in the direction of the Saltillo road as visible from the point attained by our advance on the morning of the 19th, led me to suspect that it was practicable to turn all the works in that direction, and thus cut off the enemy's line of communication. After establishing my camp at the "Walnut Springs," three miles from Monterey, the nearest suitable position, it was, accordingly, my first care to order a close reconnoissance of the ground in question, which was executed on the evening of the 19th, by the engineer officers under the direction of Major Mansfield. A reconnoissance of the eastern approaches was at the same time made by Captain Williams, Topographical Engineers. The examination made by Major Mansfield proved the entire practicability of throwing forward a column to the Saltillo road, and thus turning the position of the enemy. Deeming this to be an operation of essential importance, orders were given to Brevet-Brigadier General Worth, commanding the second division, to march with his command on the 20th; to turn the hill of the Bishop's Palace: to occupy a position on the Saltillo road, and to carry the enemy's detached works in that quarter, where practicable. The first regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, under command of Colonel Hays, was associated with the second division on this service. Captain Sanders, Engineers, and Lieutenant Meade, Topographical Engineers, were also ordered to report to General Worth for duty with his column.

At two o'clock P. M. on the 20th, the 2d division took up its march. It was soon discovered, by officers who were reconnoitering the town, and communicated to General Worth, that its movement had been perceived, and that the enemy was throwing reinforcements towards the Bishop's Palace, and the height which commands it. To divert his attention as far as practicable, the first divi

sion, under Brigadier-General Twiggs, and field division of volunteers, under Major-General Butler, were displayed in front of the town until dark. Arrangements were made at the same time to place in battery, during the night, at a suitable distance from the enemy's main work, the citadel, two 24-pounder howitzers, and a 10-inch mortar, with a view to open a fire on the following day, when I proposed to make a diversion in favor of General Worth's movement. The 4th infantry covered this battery during the night. General Worth had in the meantime reached and occupied, for the night, a defensive position just without range of a battery above the Bishop's Palace, having made a reconnoissance as far as the Saltillo road.

Before proceeding to report the operations of the 21st and the following days, I beg leave to state that I shall mention in detail only those which were conducted against the eastern extremity of the city, or elsewhere, under my immediate direction, referring you for the particulars of General Worth's operations, which were entirely detached, to his own full report transmitted herewith.

Early on the morning of the 21st, I received a note from General Worth, written at half past nine o'clock the night before, suggesting what I had already intended, a strong diversion against the centre and left of the town, to favor his enterprise against the heights in rear. The infantry and artillery of the 1st division, and the field division of volunteers, were ordered under arms, and took the direction of the city, leaving one company of each regiment as a camp guard. The 2d dragoons, under Lieutenant-Colonel May, and Colonel Woods' regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, under the immediate direction of General Henderson, were directed to the right to support General Worth, if necessary, and to make an impression, if practicable, upon the upper quarter of the city. Upon approaching the mortar battery, the 1st and 3d regiments of infantry, and battalion of Baltimore and Washington volunteers, with Captain Bragg's field battery-the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Garland-were directed towards the lower part of the town, with orders to make a strong demonstration, and carry one of the enemy's advanced works, if it could be done without too heavy loss. Major Mansfield, Engineers, and Captain Williams and Lieutenant Pope, Topographical Engineers, accompanied this column, Major Mansfield being charged with its direction, and the designation of points of attack.

In the meantime, the mortar, served by Captain Ramsay, of the ordnance, and the howitzer battery under Captain Webster, 1st artillery, had opened their fire upon the citadel, which was deliberately sustained, and answered from the work. General Butler's division had now taken up a position in rear of this battery, when the discharges of artillery, mingled finally with a rapid fire of small arms, showed that Lieutenant Garland's command had become warmly engaged. I now deemed it necessary to support this attack, and accordingly ordered the 4th infantry, and three regiments of General Butler's division, to march at once, by the left flank, in the direction of the advanced work at the lower extremity of the town, leaving one regiment (1st Kentucky) to cover the mortar and howitzer battery. By some mistake, two companies of the 4th infantry did not receive this order, and, consequently, did not join the advance companies until some time afterwards.

Lieutenant-Colonel Garland's command had approached the town in a direction to the right of the advanced work (No. 1), at the north-eastern angle of the city, and the engineer officer, covered by skirmishers, had succeeded in entering the suburbs and gaining cover. The remainder of this command now advanced and entered the town under a heavy fire of artillery from the citadel and the works on the left, and of musketry from the houses and small works in front. A movement to the right was attempted, with a view to gain the rear of No. 1, and carry that work, but the troops were so much exposed to a fire which

they could not effectually return, and had already sustained such severe loss, particularly in officers, that it was deemed best to withdraw them to a more secure position. Captain Backus, 1st infantry, however, with a portion of his own and other companies, had gained the roof of a tannery, which looked directly into the gorge of No. 1, and from which he poured a most destructive fire into that work and upon the strong building in its rear, This fire happily coincided in point of time with the advance of a portion of the volunteer division upon No. 1, and contributed largely to the fall of that strong and important work.

The three regiments of the volunteer division, under the immediate command of Major-General Butler, had in the meantime advanced in the direction of No. 1. The leading brigade, under Brigadier-General Quitman, continued its advance upon that work, preceded by three companies of the 4th infantry, while General Butler, with the 1st Ohio regiment, entered the town to the right. The companies of the 4th infantry had advanced within short range of the work, when they were received by a fire that almost in one moment struck down onethird of the officers and men, and rendered it necessary to retire and effect a conjunction with the two other companies then advancing. General Quitman's brigade, though suffering most severely, particularly in the Tennessee regiment, continued its advance, and finally carried the work in handsome style, as well as the strong building in its rear. Five pieces of artillery, a considerable supply of ammunition, and thirty prisoners, including three officers, fell into our hands.

Major-General Butler, with the 1st Ohio regiment, after entering the edge of the town, discovered that nothing was to be accomplished in his front, and at this point, yielding to the suggestions of several officers, I ordered a retrograde movement; but learning almost immediately from one of my staff that the battery No. 1 was in our possession, the order was countermanded, and I determined to hold the battery and defences already gained. General Butler, with the 1st Ohio regiment, then entered the town at a point further to the left, and marched in the direction of the battery No. 2. While making an examination with a view to ascertain the possibility of carrying this second work by storm, the general was wounded and soon after compelled to quit the field. As the strength of No. 2, and the heavy musketry fire flanking the approach, rendered it impossible to carry it without great loss, the 1st Ohio regiment was withdrawn from the town.

Fragments of the various regiments engaged were now under cover of the captured battery and some buildings in its front, and on the right. The field battery of Captains Bragg and Ridgely was also partially covered by the battery. An incessant fire was kept on this position from battery No. 2, and other works on its right, and from the citadel on all our approaches. General Twiggs, though quite unwell, joined me at this point, and was instrumental in causing the artillery captured from the enemy to be placed in battery, and served by Captain Ridgely, against No. 2, until the arrival of Captain Webster's howitzer battery, which took its place. In the meantime, I directed such men as could be collected of the 1st, 3d, and 4th regiments and Baltimore battalion, to enter the town, penetrating to the right, and carry the 2d battery if possible. This command, under Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, advanced beyond the bridge "Purisima," when, finding it impracticable to gain the rear of the 2d battery, a portion of it sustained themselves for some time in that advanced position; but as no permanent impression could be made at that point, and the main object of the general operation had been effected, the command, including a section of Captain Ridgely's battery, which had joined it, was withdrawn to battery No. 1. During the absence of this column, a demonstration of cavalry was reported in the direction of the citadel. Captain Bragg, who was at hand, immediately galloped with his battery to a suitable position, from which a few discharges effectually dispersed the enemy. Captain Miller, 1st infantry, was dispatched

with a mixed command to support the battery on this service. The enemy's lancers had previously charged upon the Ohio and a part of the Mississippi regiments, near some fields at a distance from the edge of the town, and had been repulsed with considerable loss. A demonstration of cavalry on the opposite side of the river was also dispersed in the course of the afternoon by Captain Ridgely's battery, and the squadrons returned to the city. At the approach of evening all the troops that had been engaged were ordered back to the camp, except Captain Ridgely's battery and the regular infantry of the 1st division, who were detailed as a guard for the works during the night, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Garland. One battalion of the 1st Kentucky regiment was ordered to reinforce this command. Intrenching tools were procured, and additional strength was given to the works, and protection to the men, by working-parties during the night, under the direction of Lieutenant Scarritt, Engineers.

The main object proposed in the morning had been effected. A powerful diversion had been made to favour the operations of the 2d division, one of the enemy's advanced works had been carried, and we now had a strong foothold in the town. But this had not been accomplished without a very heavy loss, embracing some of our most gallant and accomplished officers. Captain Williams, Topographical Engineers; Lieutenants Terrett and Dilworth, 1st infantry; Lieutenant Woods, 2d infantry; Captains Morris and Field, Brevet-Major Barbour, Lieutenants Irwin and Hazlitt, 3d infantry; Lieutenant Hoskins, 4th infantry; Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Baltimore battalion; Captain Allen and Lieutenant Putuam, Tennessee regiment, and Lieutenant Hett, Ohio regiment, were killed, or have since died of wounds received in this engagement, while the number and rank of the officers wounded gives additional proof of the obstinacy of the contest, and the good conduct of our troops. The number of killed and wounded incident to the operations in the lower part of the city on the 21st is 394.

Early in the morning of this day (21st), the advance of the 2d division had encountered the enemy in force, and after a brief but sharp conflict repulsed him with heavy loss. General Worth then succeeded in gaining a position on the Saltillo road, thus cutting the enemy's line of communication. From this position the two heights south of the Saltillo road were carried in succession, and the guns taken in one of them turned upon the Bishop's Palace. These important successes were fortunately obtained with comparatively small loss: Captain McKavett, 8th infantry, being the only officer killed.

The 22d day of September passed without any active operations in the lower part of the city. The citadel and other works continued to fire at parties exposed to their range, and at the work now occupied by our troops. The guard left in it the preceding night, except Captain Ridgely's company, was relieved at mid-day by General Quitman's brigade. Captain Bragg's battery was thrown under cover in front of the town, to repel any demonstration of cavalry in that quarter. At dawn of day the height above the Bishop's Palace was carried, and soon after meridian the Palace itself was taken, and its guns turned upon the fugitive garrison. The object for which the 2d division was detached had thus been completely accomplished, and I felt confident that with a strong force occupying the road and heights in his rear, and a good position below the city in our possession, the enemy could not possibly maintain the town.

"During the night of the 22d the enemy evacuated nearly all his defences in the lower part of the city. This was reported to me early in the morning of the 23d, by General Quitman, who had already meditated an assault upon those works. I immediately sent instructions to that officer, leaving it to his discretion to enter the city, covering his men by the houses and walls, and advance carefully so far as he might deem prudent.

After ordering the remainder of the troops as a reserve, under the orders of

Brigadier-General Twiggs, I repaired to the abandoned works, and discovered that a portion of General Quitman's brigade had entered the town, and were successfully forcing their way towards the principal plaza. I then ordered up the 2d regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, who entered the city, dismounted, and, under the immediate orders of General Henderson, co-operated with General Quitman's brigade. Captain Bragg's battery was also ordered up, supported by the 3d infantry, and after firing for some time at the cathedral, a portion of it was likewise thrown into the city. Our troops advanced from house to house, and from square to square, until they reached a street but one square in rear of the principal plaza, in and near which the enemy's force was mainly concentrated. This advance was conducted vigorously, but with due caution, and although destructive to the enemy, was attended with but small loss on our part. Captain Ridgely, in the meantime, had served a captured piece in battery No. 1 against the city, until the advance of our men rendered it imprudent to fire in the direction of the cathedral. I was now satisfied that we could operate successfully in the city, and that the enemy had retired from the lower portion of it to make a stand behind his barricades. As General Quitman's brigade had been on duty the previous night, I determined to withdraw the troops to the evacuated works, and concert with General Worth a combined attack upon the town. The troops accordingly fell back deliberately, in good order, and resumed their original positions, General Quitman's brigade being relieved after nightfall by that of General Hamer. On my return to camp, met an officer with the intelligence that General Worth, induced by the firing in the lower part of the city, was about making an attack at the upper extremity which had also been evacuated by the enemy to a considerable distance. I regretted that this information had not reached me before leaving the city, but still deemed it inexpedient to change my orders, and accordingly returned to camp. A note from General Worth, written at 11 o'clock P. M., informed me that he had advanced to within a short distance of the principal plaza, and that the mortar (which had been sent to his division in the morning) was doing good execution within effective range of the enemy's position.

Desiring to make no further attempt upon the city without complete concert as to the lines and modes of approach, I instructed that officer to suspend his advance until I could have an interview with him on the following morning, at his head-quarters.

Early in the morning of the 24th I received, through Colonel Moreno, a communication from General Ampudia, proposing to evacuate the town; which, with the answer, was forwarded with my first dispatch. I arranged with Colonel Moreno a cessation of fire until twelve o'clock, at which hour I would receive the answer of the Mexican general at General Worth's head-quarters, to which I soon repaired. In the meantime, General Ampudia had signified to General Worth his desire for a personal interview with me, to which I acceded, and which finally resulted in a capitulation, placing the town and the material of war, with certain exceptions, in our possession. A copy of that capitulation was transmitted with my first dispatch.

Upon occupying the city it was discovered to be of great strength in itself, and to have its approaches carefully and strongly fortified. The town and works were armed with forty-two pieces of cannon, well supplied with ammunition, and manned with a force of at least 7000 troops of the line, and from 2000 to 3000 irregulars. The force under my orders before Monterey, as exhibited by the accompanying return, was 425 officers, and 6220 men. Our artillery consisted of one ten inch mortar, two twenty-four pounder howitzers, and four light field batteries of four guns each-the mortar being the only piece suitable to the operations of a seige.

Our loss is twelve officers and 108 men killed; thirty-one officers and 337

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