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witness, but afterwards went to the office, broke the jug, and threw the notes into the stove. He stated that a letter produced to the coroner's jury (from Coolidge to Mathews, requesting the latter to call at his office on Thursday night), he had withdrawn “from the bag” on Friday night and destroyed. He told the witness there was a bottle at the office that had contained prussic acid, which ought to be destroyed, and that the bottle which had come from Boston should be filled up, for some of it had been used. He also desired that the brandy bottle should be rinsed, and the water in the sink thrown out. He requested the witness to take the watch from his sleigh, and throw it into the river. Witness slept with the prisoner the two or three following nights, and when he did not, believes that Mr. Baker did. The witness admitted that when before the grand jury, he did not state anything about the money, the watch, or washing out the stains from the floor. He had partly disclosed to his father the facts stated to-day, and also to Mr. Baker. General Simons, his father, had encouraged him to testify in the case.
In consequence of this variance in Flint's testimony, the counsel for the prisoner endeavored to invalidate it; the jury, however, after a deliberation of twenty-four hours, returned a verdict of guilty, and the prisoner was sentenced to be hanged, after the expiration of a year, spent in hard labor. The law of Maine, by a seeming compromise between those who would abolish, and those who would retain capital punishments, has thus postponed the execution of the sentence of death, that the person convicted may profit by subsequent evidence, so as, if not to establish his innocence, to raise sufficient doubts of his guilt to obtain a pardon; or he may effect his escape by force or artifice, or finally escape ignominious punishment by disease or suicide.
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY.
We have been permitted to make the following extract from the Hon. John C. Spencer's examination of Judge Upshur's review of the constitution of the United States. We hope hereafter to give entire both these able papers.
By the very terms of this compact (the constitution), this right of each State to interpret it for itself, has been expressly waived in favor of the federal judiciary. No language which I could employ would so clearly state this position as that of M. de Tocqueville. The “attributes of the federal government, he says, “were, therefore, carefully enumerated, and all that was not included among them, was declared to constitute a part of the
privileges of the several governments of the States. Thus the government of the States remained the rule, and that of the confederation became the exception. But as it was foreseen that in practice questions might arise as to the exact limits of this exceptional authority, and that it would be dangerous to submit those questions to the decision of the ordinary courts of justice established in the States by the States themselves, a high federal court was created, which was destined, among other functions, to maintain the balance of power which had been established by the constitution between the two rival governments.” “To suppose,” he remarks in another place, “that a State can subsist, when its fundamental laws may be subjected to four-and-twenty different interpretations at the same time, is to advance a proposition alike contrary to reason and to experience. The object of the erection of a federal tribunal, was to prevent the courts of the States from deciding questions affecting the national interests in their own department, and so to form a uniform body of jurisprudence for the interpretation of the laws of the Union." The supreme court of the United States was, therefore, invested with the right of determining all questions of jurisdiction. And to effect this purpose, can language be more clear and explicit than that of the second section of the third article?“The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority, to controversies to which the United States shall be a party,” &c.
If it extends to them, it must be for the purpose of deciding them, not for the purpose of referring them to some other power or tribunal. It has already been shown, it is supposed, that this description necessarily comprises every case that can possibly arise, involving the exercise of the federal power. Every such case must be founded on a claim that it springs from the authority given by the constitution, and then the courts must decide whether it “arises under the constitution.” If it does not, it must be dismissed. If it does, the courts must entertain and decide it. And it is somewhat extraordinary that this very power is conceded by Mr. Upshur in a previous part of his remarks: “So far, therefore, as the federal constitution has provided for the subject at all, the supreme court is beyond question, the final judge, or arbiter; and this, too, whether the jurisdiction which it exercises be legitimate or usurped.” These are his words, and they afford a complete and perfect answer to the qualification he makes of the right of each State to interpret the constitution for itself, “unless it has clearly waived that right in favor of another power.” If, then, the federal constitution has provided for the subject in the way he states, and if the States have assented
to that provision by adopting the constitution, have they not “waived the right of interpreting it in favor of another power?”
But Mr. Upshur says that it is not waived, and this, he says, is apparent from the fact “that, if the judiciary be the sole judges of the extent of their own powers, their powers are universal, and the enumeration in the constitution is idle and useless.” Now, with deference be it said, this is very inconclusive. The liability of any power to abuse to gross perversion, does not, in sound minds, tend in the least to prove its non-existence. The same remark which Mr. Upshur makes in reference to the judiciary, is still more applicable to the States. If they are “the sole judges of their own powers, their powers are universal,” and the grant of authority to the federal government, or the judiciary, is “idle and useless.” The question, however, still remains, whether the power has been granted? The object of all political compacts and constitutions is to produce and preserve peace, and to prevent wars by providing a mode of final settlement peaceably by an independent tribunal. Every umpire may err; may enlarge its jurisdiction, and take cognizance of what is not submitted to it. In the formation of a constitution, the question is open, whether it is better to incur this hazard than the opposite one, of having nothing finally settled ? And this was the very question which the framers of our constitution considered, and debated, and decided, and this decision having been ratified by the States, as well as by the people of the United States, it is too late to seek to evade it, by questioning its wisdom. Mr. Upshur, however, persists in falling back on principles anterior to the constitution, instead of looking to that instrument alone; and he urges that the federal government is the creature of the States; that it is a mere agent, with limited powers, and then asks—“Shall the agent be permitted to judge of the extent of his own powers without reference to his constituents?” To a certain extent, he is compelled to do this, in the very act of exercising them, “but this is always in subordination to the authority by whom his powers were conferred.” Besides, the fallacy, as it is believed to be, that the federal government is the creature of the States as distinguished from the people of the States, there is a fundamental error in considering the judiciary as an agent to exercise certain political powers--as a mere attorney, in fact, to perform certain delegated functions, and as being subordinate to the States, by whom it is intended to be implied the judicial power was conferred. It is conceived that its functions are of a character entirely different.
As its very name imports, it is to adjudge, not execute, nor legislate. It is the means by which disputes and controversies are to be terminated, without a resort to force. It is the contrivance of civilization, to prevent a recurrence to the law of nature. It is the last and strongest link which unites the ends of the chain of civil government, and renders that complete, which, without it, would not deserve the name of civil government. So far from partaking of the nature of agents, or being subordinate to the authority which conferred their power, the judiciary are, by the constitution, rendered wholly independent of their constituents, who cannot revoke or annul the authority once granted; and instead of being subordinate, they are by the same instrument placed above those who created them, and administer the law to them and to all others. Even controversies between states are subjects of their jurisdiction. What becomes, then, of this idea of their being agents, and bound to make “reference to their constituents” to determine the extent of their powers?
MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE.-REFORM. During the present year, very important improvements have been made in the matter of medical reform, and for the purpose of presenting their original scope and extent, we give below a summary of the proceedings of the National Medical Convention, also of the Pennsylvania State Convention, and of the New York Academy of Medicine. The subject is one of deep interest to the community.
The American Medical Association.—The third annual meeting of this body was held at Baltimore, May 2d, 1818. Two hundred and forty-seven delegates were present, representing the following states, viz: New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, Georgia, Missouri, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio; also delegates from the medical corps of the army and navy.
The adulteration of drugs, the use and abuse of chloroform, and the measures necessary to remedy the evils in the preparation of medicines and in the practice of the profession, were prominent subjects of discussion.
The officers elected for the ensuing year, are: Dr. A. H. Stevens, of New York, President; Dr. Samuel Jackson, of Philadelphia, Dr. John C. Warren, of Boston, Dr. Paul T. Eve, of Augusta, Georgia, and Dr. Wm. M. Awl, of Columbus, Ohio, Vice Presidents; Dr. Alfred Stillé, of Philadelphia, and Dr. H. J. Bowditch, of Boston, Secretaries, and Dr. Isaac Hays, of Philadelphia, Treasurer.
The report on education stated that the annual number of physicians created by the inedical schools throughout the Union, is fifteen hundred, a number exceeding the demand.
We are indebted to Dr. R. H. Townsend, who was present at the meeting, for a copy of the following recommendation, adopted, and addressed to the medical schools in the United States.
“ The association, desirous of promoting the health and welfare of the people of their common country, do most respectfully recommend to the professors of all the schools in the United States, a more uniform and more elevated standard of requirements for the degree of medicine; that they will make daily or weekly examinations as the best means of ensuring the attendance of the class upon the lectures, and that they will introduce into the board of examiners in such colleges, as do not already possess such a check, a sufficient number of gentlemen of the profession, not engaged in teaching, to ensure that the requirements will be honestly enforced in every case.”
On the 11th of April last, the State Medical Convention of Pennsylvania, assembled at Harrisburg.
The constitution of “the State Medical Society” was adopted. The objects of the society are declared to be “the advancement of medical knowledge, the elevation of professional character, protection of the interests of its members, and the promotion of the health of the community.” One of the sections declares that “any physician who shall procure a patent for a surgical instrument or remedy, or who sells or deals in patent medicines or nostrums without understanding or knowing their composition, shall be disqualified from being a member of the society.”
The attendance at the convention was very large and respectable, and Dr. Samuel Humes, of Lancaster, was elected President of the state society.
At the annual meeting of the “ New York Academy of Medicine," recently held in that city, the great subject of Medical Reform was the prominent topic of discussion. The able and learned Dr. John W. Francis delivered the anniversary discourse, from which we make the following extracts, setting forth the main design of the institution:
• A remarkable characteristic of our Republic is Association, and ibis powerful agent we find brought to our cognizance by numerous examples; our social system abounds in il; and we are compelled 10 yield to its inherent operation, Though, perhaps, remotely connected with jis proximate designs. This principle of a-socjalion, however, has for the most part been applied more especially io sell-improvement, and the augmentation of knowledge, to eleemosynary and charitable designs, or to fiscal experiments. It is on the broad plaiform of the first of these three objects, that we are here assembled.- In the present instance, an organization has been formed, the distinctive feature of which is, that it is the mevitable result of the wants of the profession itself, and of the community at large. An Academy of Medicine in this city was a moral necessity; it was demanded by the daily increasing perversion of a noble science, by the sullied