No. 4---University Series. ON THE Hypothesis of Evolution: PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL. BY PROF. EDWARD D. COPE. NEW HAVEN, CONN.: CHARLES C. CHATFIELD & CO. ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF EVOLUTION: PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL. "Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God shall man live." There is apparently considerable repugnance in the minds of many excellent people to the acceptance, or even consideration, of the hypothesis of development, or that of the gradual creation by descent, with modification from the simplest beginnings, of the different forms of the organic world. This objection probably results from two considerations: first, that the human species is certainly involved, and man's descent from an ape asserted; and, secondly, that the scheme in general seems to conflict with that presented by the Mosaic account of the Creation, which is regarded as communicated to its author, by an infallible inspiration. As the truth of the hypothesis is held to be infinitely probable by a majority of the exponents of the natural sciences at the present day, and is held as absolutely demonstrated by another portion, it behooves those interested to restrain their condemnation, and on the other hand to examine its evidences, and look any consequent necessary modification of our metaphysical or theological views squarely in the face. The following pages state a few of the former; if they suggest some of the latter, it is hoped that they may be such as any logical mind would deduce from the premises. That they will coincide with the spirit of the most advanced Christianity, I have no doubt; and that they will add an appeal through the reason to that direct influence of the Divine Spirit which should control the motives of human action, seems an unavoidable conclusion. I. PHYSICAL EVOLUTION. It is well known that a species is usually represented by a great number of individuals, distinguished from all other similar associations by more or less numerous points of structure, color, size, etc., and by habits and instincts also, to a certain extent; that the individuals of such associations reproduce their like, and cannot be produced by individuals of associations or species which present differences of structure, color, etc., as defined by naturalists; that the individuals of any such series or species are incapable of reproducing with those of any other species, with some exceptions; and that in the latter cases the offspring are usually entirely infertile. The hypothesis of Cuvier assumes that each species was created by Divine power as we now find it at some definite point of geologic time. The paleontologist holding this view sees, in accordance therewith, a succession of creations and destructions marking the history of life on our planet from its commencement. The development hypothesis states that all existing species have been derived from species of preëxistent geological periods, as offspring or by direct descent; that there have been no total destructions of life in past time, but only a transfer of it from place to place, owing to changes of circumstance; that the types of structure become simpler and more similar to each other as we trace them from later to earlier periods; and that finally we reach the simplest forms consistent with one or several original parent types of the great divisions into which living beings naturally fall. It is evident, therefore, that the hypothesis does not include change of species by hybridization, nor allow the descent of living species from any other living species both these propositions are errors of misapprehension or misrepresentation. : In order to understand the history of creation of a complex being, it is necessary to analyze it and ascer tain of what it consists. In analyzing the construction of an animal or plant we readily arrange its characters into those which it possesses in common with other animals or plants, and those in which it resembles none other the latter are its individual characters, constituting its individuality. Next we find a large body of characters, generally of a very obvious kind, which it possesses in common with a generally large number of individuals, which, taken collectively, all men are accustomed to call a species; these characters we consequently name specific. Thirdly, we find characters, generally in parts of the body which are of importance in the activities of the animal, or which lie in near relation to its mechanical construction in details, which are shared by a still larger number of individuals than those which were similar in specific characters. In other words, it is common to a large number of species. This |