ment-indeed which nominally makes it has been to succeed for the last quarter of a century, it is pleasing to contemplate. We quote from Mr. Brougham's speech. "It was laid down as a rule by the late Lord Chancellor Eldon, from which no consideration, his lordship was used to say, should induce him to depart, that however unfit a magistrate might be for his office, either from private misconduct or party feeling, he never would strike him off the list, until he had been convicted of some offence by the verdict of a Court of Record. Upon this principle he always acted."-Which principle, being interpreted, signifies, that unless a magistrate committed murder, highway-robbery, burglary, larceny, or some similar trifle, he was by the worthy exChancellor retained in the commission, “however unfit he might be for his office! Really the country has every day fresh reason of gratitude that the little Latin preposition we have placed in italics should be applicable to the title Chancellor as applied to the noble earl.

We may as well notice here, as it refers to non-responsibility, that of the Quarter Sessions, in reality though not quite in name. It is our purpose to speak at the close of this article of that court especially. We have mentioned this very point both in our article of October last, and in our list in the diary last month; but, as our readers cannot carry our Magazine in their heads or their pockets, we must repeat it here.

In cases of appeal, whether from convictions or otherwise, unless the Quarter Sessions think fit to allow it, no review can be had of their proceedings, however erroneous, except they appear on the face of the proceedings. It rests purely in their discretion whether they will grant a case or not; and in exercising this discretion, injustice constantly takes place. It is generally considered that where the question is a mere question of fact, a case should not be granted,— and in reality it scarcely ever is,-but that where it is a question of law, it should. Now we cannot see any foundation of sound reason for this distinction. It must be obvious that as much injury may arise from an erroneous decision with regard to matter of fact, as with regard to matter of law. The means of redress, then, ought to be equally applicable to the one as to the other: and it would surely be much better that the tribunal which decides should not have the sole power of saying, which it does always, whether its own proceedings are erroneous or not. The reluctance to submit a case, even on points of law, to the King's Bench is becoming daily more manifest, and has arisen from the frequent animadversions of the judges upon decisions which they have reviewed, and which it is natural enough that the justices desire to avoid.-Now supposing it were enacted that in all cases of appeal to the Quarter Sessions, it should be lawful for any party to such appeal, on entering into sufficient security to pay the costs of the subsequent proceedings, should the decision be against him, to be entitled to have a case drawn up and submitted to the consideration of the King's Bench. The whole mischief would be remedied, and the necessity of giving security for costs would prevent the too frivolous use of such a power.-The Court of King's Bench, in these cases, should be empowered to act as on motion for a new trial in a civil case, and if the conclusion drawn

by the justices was such as the evidence did not support, to direct a rehearing of the appeal. It is particularly to be wished that in cases of conviction by magistrates this should be so. The appeal is, I am afraid, often almost from the same to the same, particularly in those counties where the conviction relates to some matter which is of general interest in the county, in which a considerable proportion of the magistrates must have a strong feeling against the prisoner.

Lastly, as regards responsibility, the indirect, but still powerfully operating, one of public opinion is absent. Here, again, we will borrow Mr. Brougham's forcible words and high authority, to give weight to our own opinion. The judges of the very highest courts in the kingdom have, besides various others from which the magistracy are exempt, this strong motive of restraint-the country justices, not. "In the King's Bench," says Mr. Brougham, "the name of the judge who pronounces the judgment is known, and the venerable magistrate stands before the country in his own proper person, always placed at the bar of public opinion. Here it is Lord Tenterden-it is Mr. Justice Bailey, by their names: in the other case, it is merely the Quarter Sessions, which, as Swift says, is nobody's name. The individual magistrates composing it are not thought of; their names are not even published. It is a fluctuating body. If the same individuals always sat in the court, there might be some approach to responsibility. At present there is none; and where there is no responsibility, injustice will occasionally be committed, as long as men are men. It would be some correction of the evil if the number of magistrates was fixed; if their names were always known in connection with their acts; and if they were more easily removable on proof of their misconduct."

Certainly; let the mode of entitling every proceeding in the court of Quarter Sessions the act of the magistrates of such a county in that court assembled be annihilated. Let the names be promulgated ;A. B., esq., chairman, and those of the other justices present, being on the face of the record. This would also collaterally work another. benefit; namely, it would soon render it necessary that the magistrates who take part in the decision should remain present during the whole case, and not, as now often happens, vote, like the Duke of Newcastle in the Queen's business, having heard the evidence, only on one side; -or, without arriving at this ducal perfection, only part on each. Such is the present formidable state of responsibility that the justices labour under! And a bill announced by Mr. Peel as one having the object to condense and alter the present numberless evil, obsolete, and contradictory statutes on this subject, into an amended. code, contains no provisions on this point, except such as are calculated to encrease,-no, that is not possible as to degree, but to extend, as to prevalence, the absence of all restraint. One would really think that Mr. Hobhouse, the framer of the bill, was a re-incarnation of the spirit of the Baron of Bradwardine, in whom every idea was made subservient to that of descent. The "land and beeves" are to insure to their owner power and protection in exercising it however he may please. Some of the minor enactments, to which the bill then proceeds, are. salutary enough; such as that the warrant of a justice shall have force "throughout that part of the United Kingdom called England, with

out any indorsement or other authority from a justice of the place where the same shall be served or executed." We rejoice to see that not even the city of London is excepted. All exclusive jurisdictions, in any thing but merely local regulation, are most hurtful; they do nothing but impede generalization, and afford a sanctuary for thieves for a time sufficient to enable them to effect their escape. The city may keep its mummeries of Lord Mayor's day and Easter Monday; but when, as happens every day, their privileges, obsolete in reason, but alas still active in effect, interfere with the general administration of justice and prevention of crime, they ought to be annulled without apology or delay. Without delay, because the public interests demand it; without apology, because the city authorities have already shewn the most stiff-necked obstinacy against the smallest compromise, for concession was not then asked; civil words have proved futile-the strong hand of power should now be used.

There are other facilities afforded to the circulation of warrantsprovided either the crime was committed in the district of the justice who issues it, or that there is probable cause for believing the offender to be within it. There are also improvements as to apprehending and securing accused parties.

The next enactment of importance is, that the Petty Sessions shall be regularly held. Of this we approve in itself, as well as that certain matters should be adjudged nowhere else; but we confess we do think many of the details very faulty. In the first place, we cannot consider the mode of the Sessions being fixed at all ingenious. They are to be appointed, for next year, at a meeting held for the purpose in December, by the justices for the division, to be held " on certain days, not less than one day in every lunar month, nor more than one day in every week;" and, permanently, at the last Sessions in the year, for the following. Now, really, we think it is impossible for the justices to know what temporary causes may render advisable many or few Sessions six months or a year in advance. They are to have the power of adjournment, but that has reference merely to cases already begun. No new ones would be admitted at the adjourned Session. It would be much better that they should be appointed for the next three months at every Quarter Sessions.

Again, why should the cases arising in each division of a county be heard only in that division? It really might have been hoped that the absurd distinctions of hundreds would have been wholly done away, and that every man might have had recourse to that place which which was nearest and most commodious for his purposes. But if the proposed arrangement is to take effect, in nine cases out of ten, on the borders of hundreds, parties will have to travel for miles, when by stepping across the boundary of the hundred they might be accommomodated at once.

We think, on the whole, that the principle of the regular recurrence of Petty Sessions is good; but without meaning any disrespect to Mr. Hobhouse, we must say, that a very great number of the detailed regulations are by no means calculated to add to either dispatch of business, or the convenience of the parties or of the justices. It is our object in this article, to adhere as much as possible to general principles, comprehensible to all commonly clear-headed people, and to

abstain from the technical minutiæ so likely to scare all but professional readers. If it were not for this, we would prove beyond all doubt the allegation we have just made: indeed we should, nevertheless, had we not reason to know that those who have most power with the bill will have the objections stated to them before it passes, from a quarter not to be suspected of prejudice, some highly respectable magistrates, namely, who are by no manner of means prejudiced against those of their calling, and who understand its practice thoroughly.

Before we proceed to what, after all, is one of the very most important parts of the subject, the Quarter Sessions, we shall lay before our readers a fact or two we have derived from the magistrates to whom we have just alluded, which go far to support our principle of opposition to public officers being paid by fees instead of salaries. We have gathered from them that the present system is liable to great abuse; and that it has frequently been a benefit to the magistrate and not to the clerk, who is often, in fact, neither more nor less than nominal, the fees being actually received by the justice, and the clerk paid a certain sum per year, the residue, whatever it was, going into the justice's pocket!

In very populous districts there is great temptation to adopt such a plan; and the result is, where it does take place, to bring the administration of justice into contempt. The real way would be to annihilate fees altogether, which always are productive of abuse, and institute a scale of salaries, proportioned as nearly as possible to the quantity of business each clerk has to perform, but in no instance exceeding or falling beneath a fixed sum. Nor would it be difficult to arrange whence the stipend should be raised. If it arose partly out of the money levied under convictions, and partly out of the county rate, it should seem not to be improperly paid. The amount paid by each parish would probably not exceed that now paid by it to the clerks in the shape of fees.

And these facts are immediately derived from gentlemen who have undeniable means of knowing, and who are not, in the very least de gree, bitten with the mania of innovation. Quite the reverse.

We shall notice only two more clauses, in which that preposterous spirit in favour of the justices is openly avowed, and enforced with great partiality. We repeat, and ever shall, that persons who need extraneous protection in the execution of their duty" are not fit to exercise it.

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And for the protection of justices of the peace and others in the execution of their duty, be it enacted, that if any action, of any form whatever, shall be brought against any justice or constable, for any thing done in the execution of his office, or against any other person acting by the order or in aid of such justice or constable, he or they may plead the general issue, and give the special matter in evidence thereupon, and if judgment, by verdict or otherwise, shall in such action be given for the defendant or defendants, he or they shall recover full costs as between attorney and client; and every such action shall be laid in the county where the fact arose, and not elsewhere, and shall be commenced within six calendar months after the fact committed, and not otherwise; and no process at the suit of a subject shall be sued out against any justice of the peace for any thing by him done in the execution of his office, until notice in writing of such intended process shall have been delivered to him, or left at the usual place of his abode, by the attorney or

agent for the party who intends to sue out the same, at least one calendar month before suing out the same; in which notice shall be clearly and explicitly contained the cause of action which such party hath or claimeth to have against such justice, and at the foot of the notice shall be written the name of such attorney or agent, together with the place of his abode, who shall be entitled to have the fee of twenty shillings for preparing and serving such notice, and no more."

Now this clause gives a dozen with one hand, and takes away at least ten with the other. There is a nominal redress, which the arrangements of detail render it almost impossible to reach. The whole enactment is phrased so as to shew that its real object is to shield the justices, not to relieve the people. Why should not the rules of pleading be left untouched, instead of the most dangerous privilege, of pleading the general issue, being given? We must just explain what effect this produces. The general issue is the defendant meeting the plaintiff's complaint by merely giving it the lie.-"You contracted with me to do so and so."-"I did not." You have done me such or such an injury."-"I have not." Now, in general, no more is allowed to be proved under this general denial, than the direct negative; but, if the defendant be permitted to "give special matter in evidence" upon this plea, he may bring forward a subtle and circuitous defence which the plaintiff, perhaps, (nay, it may be presumed probably, or there is no protection in the clause,) never heard a word of before, and consequently cannot be prepared to meet. Is this fair play?

Next, there is the former story-and this is another instance from that before cited-of the difference of costs: for, in the subsequent clause, which supposes for a moment the exceedingly improbable contingency of the plaintiff gaining the action, it is provided that he shall only have "his costs of suit;" which omission of the words, "as between attorney and client," causes it to enact that it shall only as between party and party." Is this fair play?

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Again, the action must be brought in the county; where, in ninetynine cases out of a hundred, the plaintiff is a man weak and powerless, in comparison with the defendant. In many cases is the venue* moved on the application of the defendant, and in nearly all the plaintiff is allowed to choose his own. London is always admitted; unless it be made appear that it is very remote, and maliciously chosen to inconvenience the defendant. But here influence would seem to be hoped for, else where the protection, the avowed object of the clause? Is this fair play?

Lastly, all this arrangement about the notice, and being bound by its contents, is just so much gratuity to the magistrate, which no other defendant in a court of justice possesses. It may be urged that it is no unfair advantage. It is an advantage, and therefore unfair. Every thing should be as between A. and B. in any every-day case. But that this was not meant is manifest from the whole spirit, and in many places from the very wording, of the clause. In no point does it grant fair play.

The second clause, to which we have the same objection, is the following:

And be it enacted, That in all actions against any justice or justices of

* The locality where the action is brought.