obftinacy of Atticus in thefe commotions of Rome, was a great means of his peace, liberty, safety, and disengagement from parties and therefore, when Pompey (who was a great man, popular and beneficent) endeavoured to place great gifts and offices upon him, he warily and prudently declined them; and by that means, when Pompey folicited him to appear of his party against Cæfar, and to go with him to the wars, he was in a condition to refufe it, and accordingly excufed himself from that engagement, and fate ftill at Rome; when at the fame time thofe perfons whom Pompey had obliged with great offices and large donatives, were fain to come to him, upon his fummons, and engage with him in that great conteft between him and Cæfar, and fall with him; for although they would have been gladly excufed from this undertaking, yet they durft not decline it, being under this unhappy dilemma, that if Pompey preyailed, they should have loft his favour, and thofe honours and offices that they enjoyed by his bounty; if Cæfar prevailed, yet being perfons fo greatly obliged by Pompey, they would have been fufpected and oppreffed by, Cæfar, or at least neglected by him, as perfons that were really of the Pompeian_faction, though they declined the present engagement. But howfoever their reputation would have fuffered, and they would have been accounted a fort of ungrateful people, that after all fuch obligations as they had received from Pompey, fhould ungratefully defert their benefactor, when danger or difficulty appeared.

But on the other fide, this prudent obftinacy of Atticus, fairly excufed his declining of Pompey's engagement, without the leaft imputation of ingratitude, and was yet of fingular advantage to him when Cæfar returned victor, who highly honoured him at his return to Rome, and much advanced the reputation of his prudence and difcretion, that fo wifely refufed fuch an engagement in Pompey's faction, that in the fuccefs might otherwife have ruined him; and fo wifely refused all thofe great obligations that Pompey would have put upon him, that, had they been received, would, in all probability, have engaged him in his faction. Thus our author tells us, Nullum enim à Pompeio habebat ornamentum, ut cæteri qui per eum aut honores aut divitias ceperant ; quorum partim invitiffimi Caftra funt fequuti, partim fumma cum ejus offenfa domi remanferunt.

1 "For he would receive of him no eminent bounty, as others, who by his means obtained honours or wealth, part of whom, even against their wills, followed him to the field, and part staid at home, not without his great offence."

213

And

And there was another reafon of his modeft refufal of public honours and offices from those who had the power of conferring of them, and that had a favourable refpect for him; for he made ufe of their favours for a better and nobler end, namely, to rescue and relieve men that were, or might be oppreffed, or in extremity, in the collifion of factions: this ufe indeed he made of their favours, as he had opportunity. And had he taken refpects from them for his own advancement or wealth, thofe rewards and gratuities would have precluded his opportunity of interceffion for others. He therefore prudently declined the collation of bounties, offices, or honours to himfelf, from thofe that had the opportunity and will to confer them upon him, and reserved their refpects for the good or deliverance of others, whom the inconftancy and change of affairs rendered obnoxious to those that were in present power.

CHA P. IX.

THE FOURTH EXPEDIENT OF ATTICUS REFUSING OFFICES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH, BY THE SUFFRAGES OF THE SENATE OR PEOPLE.

I

COME to the fourth thing which Atticus induftriously avoided, namely, public offices.

Some offices in Rome were in the power of particular perfons; as principally, their legati provinciarum, lieutenants of provinces, which were in the gift of thefe public minifters, whether confuls, tribunes, or others, to whom the government of provinces were allotted. Thefe fubftitutes had very honourable and profitable employments, commanding in affairs of peace and war in thefe provinces in the abfence of the chief, and also of a great authority while they were prefent.

Other offices were elective or conftitutive by the fenate or people, as confuls, tribunes, pretors, ediles, cenfors, &c.

In the former chapter, I have fhewn his declining the reception of offices from the hands of private perfons; and now I fhall fhew his avoiding of fuch public offices as were of public choice or donation.

Offices in Rome were rarely offered, but fought; they were beneficial and honourable employments, and wanted

not

:

not competitors; but Atticus was fo far from feeking offices, that he would not take them when offered, but induftriously declined them when the citizens would have elected him pretor, he refufed it; and he made this handfome advantage hereof, that when his brother-in-law Quintus, being afterwards elected pretor, and had a province affigned him, and offered Atticus to be his legate, he told him that he had formerly refufed the office that Quintus now had, and therefore it was not decent for him to take a fubftitution from him.

This therefore was Atticus's principle; he would do all the good offices he could, either for particular perfons, or for the commonwealth, in the ftation and capacity of a private perfon; thus he did for the republic of Athens, while he lived there; and thus he did in Rome: but neither in the one city nor the other, could he be drawn to undertake any public office or employment. The reasons whereof fhall be hereafter fhewn.

Firft, touching public offices and employments in general, certainly the generality of men are ftrangely mistaken. It feems a wonder to me, to fee the folly and vanity of men, that fo fondly hunt after great offices and employments: heretofore, in the ftate of Greece efpecially, men better underftood themfelves and their intereft, and peace, and happinefs, than voluntarily to engage themfelves in offices and great employments, infomuch that there were then compulfory laws to enforce men to undertake not only inferior and petty offices that were of burden and charge, but greater offices that had honour and profit annexed to them; which though they are more honourable, and more profitable, yet they are more dangerous and hazardous; and the truth is, that it hath been the fkill and art of the wifer fort of mankind to annex to fuch great employments thofe blandifhments of honour, efteem, and profit, to invite men to the undertaking of them; as phyficians gild their bitter pills, that they may be the cafier fwallowed. The plain truth is, offices and places of great import and truft, are neceffary for the good of others, and for the prefervation and order of kingdoms, ftates, and commonwealths, and therefore the wifdom of thofe kingdoms and states is to be commended, that annex to them thofe enfigns of honour and honourable fupplies for their fupport, to invite and encourage men to undertake them; yea, and further, where thofe invitations will not ferve to draw men of worth and ability to undertake them, thofe ftates are to be commended that enact laws to compel

214

compel fuch men to undertake them. But it is most certain that any man that ambitiously hunts after them, nay, that man that doth not induftriously decline them, if poffibly he may, understands not himself, nor his own peace, happiness, or contentment; which will appear, if these things be confidered.

1. A man that undertakes a public office or employment, doth neceffarily draw upon himself much envy; and the reason is, because the generality of mankind have a good opinion of themfelves, and think they deferve those offices and einployments that others enjoy, and they think alfo very well of the offices and employments themfelves, look upon them as goodly, fine, gaudy bufineffes, and are fond of the honour and wealth that is annexed unto them, and they would fain be at them, and think those that do enjoy them ftand in their way, and therefore they envy, and malign them, and envy is a bufy active humour, and reftlefs, until it unhorse those upon whom it fallens, or break itself in the attempt.

For it is ordinarily true, whofocver poffeffeth that which many defire, hath as many enemies and enviers as he hath rivals and competitors: and as many competitors as there are ambitious or covetous men in the world. And befides this, all great offices have commonly fomewhat of power annexed to them. And although focie ies of men can never fubfitt in order without fome power be over them, yet particular perfons commonly hate and envy any power in any but themselves.

2. A man that undertakes a public employment, is under a powerful temptation to lofe and give up all that quiet, and reft, and tranquillity that a private station yields; and if not all, yet a great part of his liberty, and divefts himself of himfelf; and do what he can, he muft in a great measure give himself up to others, as the price of that honour, preeminence, and power which he enjoys; which is too dear a purchase for any wife and confiderate man that can well avoid it.

3. There is no man fo wife, fo dexterous in bufinéfs of public employment, fo attentive to it, nor fo fortunate in it, but hath his defects, incogitancies and inadvertencies, or at leaft misfortunes in it; and thefe deficiencies in a private ftation, are lefs erceived and obferved, and the confequences of them are narrow, and most commonly within the confines of a man's felf or his family: but in a man of public employment, firft, thefe defects

are

are more eafily obferved and feen; as his person and ftation is confpicuous, fo his defects are easily seen by any by-ftanders.

2. As they are eafily feen, fo they are diligently watched and obferved; he wants not fuch fpectators as make it their. bufinefs to be diligent fearchers and obfervers of them.

3. When thofe defects at any time appear, though perchance they are but few and fmall, yet they are the objects of moft severe cenfure and animadverfion.

If a private man's wifdom, goodness, or prudence, do ad plurimum overbalance his follies or inadvertencies, the man paffeth for a wife and good man; but a little folly in a man in a great employment, fhall cloud and overfhadow in the public efteem all his wifdom and goodness, though this be far the greater.

4 But that which is worst of all, the errors, mistakes, mifcarriages, or inadvertencies of a private man, hurts none but himself or his narrow relations; but even finall errors, or mistakes, or follies, in a man of public employment, and in the exercife thereof, may be of a vaft and comprehenfive concern, and the ill confequences thereof oftentimes irreparable. An error of a judge in his judgment, may mislead or undo thousands an error in counsel in a counfellor, may ruin a ftate or kingdom; an error in conduct in a general, may deftroy an army and furely every wife man will, as much as he may, keep himself out of thefe hazardous confequences, fince every wife man knows that his is not without his mixtures of folly and weakness.

;

4. Again, let a man in public employments manage them with all the integrity and wifdom imaginable, yet the race is not always to the fwift, nor the battle to the strong; there may be, there will be oftentimes fuch disappointments and crofs events, that will bring ill fuccefs to the best and wifeft endeavours, and then, notwithstanding all his wifdom and fidelity, the ill fuccefs fhall be attributed to his want of integrity, courage, or wifdom. Every fool will be ready to fay, if the counfel had been thus, the event had been otherwife; and the people fhall either perfuade themfelves, or be perfuaded by others, that the man was either falfe or foolish in his employment; yea, and the state wherein he lived, either to humour the people, or to hold up their credit, and an expectation of better fuccefs when others are employed, will be ready to make a politic facrifice of such a minister of ftate, whofe fault was not to be falfe, or a fool, but only to be unfortunate.

6. Again,