part of those bloody and terrible tragedies were in earnest acted, and yet retain his wealth, honour, and innocence, and an awful efteem and respect from all parties. But of this, and the feveral honeft methods whereby he preserved himself, his wealth, and honour, together with his innoeence and esteem, more fhall be faid in its due place. In the mean time I fhall, in the next chapter, make a fhort digreffion to fhew the nature and reafons of these great factions in the Roman empire.

CHA P. II.

TOUCHING FACTIONS IN GENERAL, AND THE REASONS OF THESE GREAT FACTIONS IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE, AND WHY THEY HAPPENED MORE AT THIS TIME THAN FOR MANY HUNDREDS OF YEARS BEFORE.

THE Roman ftate, in its firft inftitution, feemed to be principally monarchical, yet aided with a fenate, confifting at firft of one hundred, and afterwards of three hundred perfons, called patres or patricii. After the expulfion of their kings they fell into a commonwealth, confifting of their fenate, and two confuls yearly elected, who had a power in fome things regal. Afterwards, there growing contefts between the confuls and patricii, of the one part, and the reft of the people, of the other part, the conftitution of their commonwealth was much altered by the admiffion of a popular power of the tribunes elected by the people; fo that now their commonwealth began to be mixed, partly of an ariftocracy, refiding in the fenate, and fomewhat analogical to a qualified and elective monarchy, refiding in the confuls, and fomewhat of a democracy, refiding in the tribunitia poteftas, in the tribunes elective by the people.

Thus this mixed republic grew great and powerful, and continued many years in great ftrength and peace, only fometimes there arofe jars and contefts between the power of the fenate and people, which nevertheless feldom broke out into wars, but fometimes by the prudent intervention of fome wife fenators in credit among the people, fometimes by feasonable conceffions from the fenate to them, fometimes by the occurrence of fome foreign war, thefe

differ

differences were often allayed or diverted without any great detriment to the public.

+

But Marius being a rough, fierce, and bold perfon, a man of wit and courage, a good foldier, fuccefsful, ambitious, and that could not endure any opponent or rival, began that fire in the commonwealth of Rome, that fearce ever left burning till the commonwealth of Rome was at laft neceffarily refolved into the monarchy of Auguftus, And all thofe civil difcords and wars, all thofe rapines and violences, thofe murders and banishinents, that in the fpace of about fifty years after the fixth confulate of Marius, filled the city and empire of Rome, were the fuccefs of that faction that he began, and of that breach that he first made in the texture and contignation of that goodly ftructure of the conimonwealth of Rome, and the præludia to the monarchy of Auguftus as the only cure thercof.

Now inasmuch as the frame of the Roman commonwealth confifted of the confuls, the fenate, and the tribunes, and had fo ftood for many years; and though in all that time, there had been men of fpirit, and ambitious enough to trouble a ftate, and there wanted not frequent brawls between the nobility and commonalty of Rome, in all this time, which might have as well given opportunity to troublefone fpirits, and to have given fire to the ambition and difcontents of perfons, and thereby have raised civil wars, and put the ftate of Rome into blood; it will be feafonable for us to enquire what the reafon might be why that commonwealth was no fooner engaged in civil wars; or if at any time fome fuch thing happened (as fome fuch there fometimes were, though not fo great or dangerous) they were foon extinguifhed, and things quickly reduced into a peaceable ftate; and yet in the time of Marius fuch a civil war begun as never left the commonwealth of Rome, till it had in a great meafure changed its government; and how it came to pafs that the factions in Rome were fo deeply radicated that the commonwealth could not be cured of it, till it grew into an empire, under the government of Augufius Cæfar.

But before I come to the difcuffion of that enquiry, it will be convenient, for the application of what follows in this difcourfe, to premife fomething touching factions in general, what they are, and what are fo truly denominated.

And I muft premife, that the eftablished government of kingdoms, ftates, or commonwealths, are of various frames

and

and conftitutions; and thofe things may be lawful according to the conftitution of one tate, which are neither lawful or tolerable according to the conftitution of another. state.

And therefore what I am about to fay concerning factions in a ftate, muft be understood with relation to that or the like state or government whereof I write, viz. the ftate of Rome, as it ftood in thofe times when these troubles broke out and this I mention to prevent mifapplications and misinterpretation of what I am writing

By a faction in a commonwealth, I do not mean that government which is by law or custom fettled; and therefore where the fettled government is monarchical, I do not take the adhering to the king, a faction; or where the government is aristocratical, or by a fenate, as it was fometimes in Rome, or mixed, partly ariftocratical, and partly popular, as it was after the fettling of the tribunitia poteftas that established government, or the adherence to it, was no faction; but it is fo far from it, that the abherence to the government legally eftablifhed, whether it be monarchical aristocratical, democratical, or mixed, is the duty of every good fubject and citizen

But that which I call a faction in a ftate, is one of thefe enfuing kinds :

1. When a party of men fhall confpire and unite themfelves against the eftablished government, to fubvert or alter it; and this is the greatest faction, crimen læfæ majeftatis.

2. When a party of men fhall unite and confederate themselves together to gain either fomething to themselves or to others, by force or fraud, against the will and confent of that power that by law is entrusted with the conceffion or denial thereof.

3. When any perfon entrusted by the fovereign power, with a particular power or authority, fhall endeavour by force or fraud to extend that power wherewith he is entrufted beyond the bounds of it; as if in the ftate of Rome the tribunes fhould, by ftirring up the people, or by force, or fecret confederacy enroach upon the power of the fenate or confuls, or è converfo: for though by the conftitution of the government they were invefted with a juft and real power, yet when by violence or fraud they accroach a larger power, this accroachment is an act done by them as private perfons, and without the bounds and limits of their authority, and therefore in fuch an enterprize, they are no more excufed from a faction by their authority that they

had,

had, than if they were without any fuch authority; because they herein act beyond the bounds, and without the warrant of that authority, and confequently as private perfons.

4. When two or more great and eminent perfons or parties, and it may be of a confiderable intereft in a state or government, engage one against another, at first, it maybe privately, and as opportunity grows, it may be, more openly and visibly crofling each other, accufing publicly each other; each foliciting others to be of their party; at length using difcriminations of denominations, or habits or figns, and poffibly in a little time public affronts and rencounters, and at last it may be open hoftility; and all this while the true real governors of that ftate, whether monarch or fenate, fit ftill and look on, it may be out of fear of being oppreffed by the power of both or either party; it may be out of refpect to fome of the heads of either party; it may be out of policy, to fuffer either party to worry and weaken and ruin one another, hoping thereby to preserve the government; or it may be out of a weak and tame, and inconfiderate opinion, contenting themselves with the name or external face, title and enfigns of government, and the profeffed refpects of either party, but not daring to interpofe any acts of real authority to fupprefs or remedy those growing mifchiefs, fearing they fhould not be able to carry it through in refpect of the potency of parties; and fo the true governors ftand by and look on, contenting themselves with the compliments and profeffion of fubjection by both parties, till at last one party getting the better of the other, lays by the difguife of pretended fubjection, and gives the law to his lawful governors, and makes them do what he pleafes, or fuffer what it inflicts. And this commonly is the mifchief that attends a government that out of any the beforementioned refpects, fuffer factions to grow fo great that at laft they become masterlefs, and either by conjunction of both parties, or prevalence of one, give the law to their lawful governors.

5. When fome particular perfons that are or are not in any authority in a ftate or commonwealth, design some matter either for themfelves or against any other, and to effect that defign, do by fecret means or power, or fraud, or otherwife, draw over the power of that ftate wherein they live, to be their engines and inftruments under the countenance and fignature of their authority, to effect their defign.

For though the authority of the ftate is engaged therein,

yet

1

yet that being obtained by the force, fraud or evil engine, and to ferve the particular intereft or end of a party, and not acting according to the true and native freedom and integrity of their inftitution, excufeth not this from being really a faction, though fometimes it be fpecioufly gilded over with the countenance of public authority: for inftance, fuppofe Marius and Sylla, two great leading men in Rome, had a jealoufy and animofity one against the other, and Marius defires that Sylla be deprived of the province allotted to him, and that it be conferred on him: on the other fide, perchance Sylla hath the like defign against Marius; Marius folicits, by bribes or menaces, as many of the fenate as he can prevail with, to take his part, and Sylla doth the like for his part: the fenate is near divided: Sylla procures fome of the fenators of Marius' part to be fent away about fome other employments, and thereby Marius is over-voted and deprived of his province; then Marius makes in with the tribunes, folicits the people to be of his party, and a tumult is thereby raised in the behalf of Marius, and thereby, and by thofe friends of Marius that are of the fenate, the former decree is repealed, and then Marius is reftored to his own province, and also obtains Sylla's pro

vince.

The next day, Sylla, who is potent in the army, complains of the wrong done him, and engageth the army for him; whe.eby again both tribunes and fenate are overpowered; and the fenators of Marius' part withdraw themfelves for fear of the army, and now Sylla carries it both with the tribunes and fenate, and re-obtains his own and Marius' province, and perchance Marius fent into exile, though here be the concurrence of the governors in thefe viciffitudes.

Yet these are nevertheless but feveral factions. And this was most commonly the difcipline of the feveral factions of Rome; or if they that could get to have more interest or power with the people, or with the army, or could make the more bold and daring part of the fenate, though lefs in number, to over-rule the greater part; or if they were exceffively loved, or exceffively feared, or were fubtle and crafty, to fit either the people or the fenate to their defigns, thefe were fure to have a countenance of authority quickly for what they did; fo that in the viciffitudes of factions, and of their prevalence, they never wanted a Senatus-confultum, or a Plebifcitum to warrant whatsoever they did. And in the mean time, the favourers of the adverse party,

VOL. I.

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for