disaffected nor democratical, and whose views extended no farther than a change of hands, declared, that he "always had been, and always would be, against a standing army of any kind; it was to him a terrible thing, whether under the denomination of parliamentary or any other, a standing army is still a standing army, whatever name it be called by; they are a body of men distinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws; blind obedience and an entire submission to the orders of their commanding officer is their only principle. The nations around us are already enslaved, and have been enslaved by those very means; by means of their standing armies they have every one lost their liberties; it is indeed impossible that the liberties of the people can be preserved in any country where a numerous standing army is kept up.

This wholesome jealousy, though it did not prevent what was indeed for many reasons not to be dispensed with, the establishment of a regular force, kept it within bounds, which possibly the administration, if left to itself, would have gladly overleaped. A clause in the mutiny bill, first inserted in 1718, enabling courts martial to punish mutiny and desertion with death, which had hitherto been only cognizable as capital offences by the civil magistrate, was carried by a very small majority in both houses 2. An act was passed in 1735, directing that no troops should come within two miles of any place, except the capital or a garrisoned town, during an election 3 ; and on some occasions, both the commons and the courts of justice showed that they had not for

' Parl. Hist viii. 904.

2 Id. vii. 536.

38 G. II. c. 30. Parl. Hist. viii. 883.

gotten the maxims of their ancestors as to the supremacy of the civil power '. A more important measure was projected by men of independent principles, at once to secure the kingdom against attack, invaded as it had been by rebels in 1745, and thrown into the most ignominious panic on the rumours of a French armament in 1756, to take away the pretext for a large standing force, and perhaps to furnish a guarantee against any evil purposes to which, in future times, it might be subservient, by the establishment of a national militia, under the sole authority indeed of the crown, but commanded by gentlemen of sufficient estates, and not liable, except in war, to be marched out of its proper county. This favourite plan with some reluctance on the part of the government, was adopted in 1757 2. But though, during the long periods of hostilities which have unfortunately ensued, this embodied force has doubtless placed the kingdom in a more respectable state of security, it has not much contributed to diminish the number of our regular forces; and from some defects in its constitution, arising out of too great

The military having been called in to quell an alleged riot at a Westminster election in 1741, it was resolved, Dec. 22d, "that.the presence of a regular body of armed soldiers at an election of members to serve in parliament is a high infringement of the liberties of the subject, a manifest violation of the freedom of elections, and an open defiance of the laws and constitution of this kingdom." The persons concerned in this having been ordered to attend the house, received on their knees a very severe reprimand from the speaker. Parl. Hist. ix. 326. Upon some occasion, the circumstances of which I do not recollect, chief justice Willes uttered some laudable sentiments as to the subordination of military power.

2 Lord Hardwicke threw out the militia bill in 1756, thinking some of its clauses rather too republican, and, in fact, being adverse to the scheme. Parl. Hist. xv. 704. H. Walpole's Memoirs, ii. 45. Coxe's Memoirs of Lord Walpole, 450.

attention to our ancient local divisions, and of too indiscriminate a dispensation with personal service, which has filled the ranks with the refuse of the community, the militia has grown unpopular and burthensome, ra ther considered of late by the government as a means of recruiting the army than as worthy of preservation in itself, and accordingly thrown aside in time of peace; so that the person who acquired great popularity as the author of this institution lived to see it worn out and gone to decay, and the principles, above all, upon which he had brought it forward, just enough remembered to be turned into ridicule. Yet the success of that magnificent organization which, in our own time, has been established in France, is sufficient to evince the possibility of a national militia; and we know with what spirit such a force was kept up for some years in this country, under the name of volunteers and yeomanry, on its only real basis, that of property, and in such local distribution as convenience pointed out.

Nothing could be more idle, at any time since the revolution, than to suppose that the regular army would pull the speaker out of his chair, or in any manner be employed to confirm a despotic power in the crown. Such power; I think, could never have been the waking dream of either king or minister. But as the slightest inroads upon private rights and liberties are to be guarded against in any nation that deserves to be called free, we should always keep in mind not only that the military power is subordinate to the civil, but as this subordination must cease where the former is frequently employed, that it should never be called upon in aid of the peace without sufficient cause. Nothing would more break down this notion of the law's supremacy than the perpetual in

terference of those who are really governed by another law; for the doctrine of some judges, that the soldier, being still a citizen, acts only in preservation of the public peace, as another citizen is bound to do, must be felt as a sophism, even by those who cannot find an answer to it. And, even in slight circumstances, it is not conformable to the principles of our government to make that vain display of military authority which disgusts us so much in some continental kingdoms '. But, not to dwell on this, it is more to our immediate purpose, that the executive power has acquired such a coadjutor in the regular army that it can, in no probable emergency, have much to apprehend from popular sedition. The increased facilities of transport, and several improvements in military art and science, which will occur to the reader, have, in later times, greatly enhanced this advantage.

II. It must be apparent to every one, that since the restoration, and especially since the revolution, an immense power has been thrown into the scale of both houses of parliament, though practically in more frequent exercise by the lower, in consequence of their annual session during several months, and of their almost unlimited rights of investigation, discussion, and advice. But if the crown should by any means become secure of an ascendancy in this assembly, it is evident that although the prerogative, technically speaking, might be diminished, the power might be the same, or even pos

I

Nothing can be more un-English than an innovation of no long standing, which I never observe without disgust, the presence of sentinels at the doors of the British Museum, and even at exhibitions of pictures. Though this proceeds only from the silliest vanity, it is pity that, among the numberless modes in which that quality can display itself, it should not have chosen one less unbecoming.

sibly more efficacious; and that this result must be proportioned to the degree and security of such an ascendancy. A parliament absolutely, and in all conceivable circumstances, under the control of the sovereign, whether through intimidation or corrupt subservience, could not, without absurdity, be deemed a co-ordinate power, or, indeed, in any sense, a restraint upon his will. This is, however, an extreme supposition, which no man, unless both grossly factious and ignorant, will ever pretend to have been realised. But as it would equally contradict notorious truth to assert that every vote has been disinterested and independent, the degree of influence which ought to be permitted, or which has at any time existed, becomes one of the most important subjects in our constitutional policy.

I have mentioned, in the last chapter, both the provisions inserted in the act of settlement, with the design of excluding altogether the possessors of public office from the house of commons, and the modifications of them by several acts of the queen. These were deemed by the country party so inadequate to restrain the dependents of power from overspreading the benches of the commons, that perpetual attempts were made to carry the exclusive principle to a far greater length. In the two next reigns, if we can trust to the uncontradicted language of debate, or even to the descriptions of individuals in the lists of each parliament, we must conclude that a very undue proportion of dependents on the favour of government were made its censors and counsellors. There was still, however, so much left of an independent spirit, that bills for restricting the number of placemen, or excluding pensioners, met always with countenance ; they were sometimes rejected by very slight majorities;