its amount; in so far as it should increase the imports beyond its amount, it would increase the exports. It might diminish the exports of corn and cattle, but it would add to that of other articles of Irish produce.

The absentee landlords, therefore, instead of increasing the exports of Ireland, only diminish its imports. Were they to return, the exports would be at least the same, while they would add, in one way and another, three millions to the imports, if their rents amount to this sum. Were additional foreign produce of this value imported into Ireland, every one must be convinced that, in its working up and distribution, it would employ a prodigious quantity of additional la bour.

Of course the doctrine, that the merchants, on receiving the money from the agent, "go into the Irish market, and buy exactly the same amount of commodities as the landlord would have bought had he been at home, the only difference being, that the landlord would eat and wear them abroad, and not at home," is preposterous. The question is, Does absenteeism diminish the demand for labour? And, therefore, to establish that doctrine, the merchants should buy, not only the same amount of commodities, but the very same commodities that the landlord would have bought had he been at home. They should buy and export the Irish produce, import foreign produce in exchange for it, sell the latter, and purchase as many suits of clothes, pairs of shoes, dozens of wine, pounds of candles, tea, sugar, &c. &c. as the landlord consumes-they should do all this before receiving the money of the agent for the bill sold to this agent they should export the last named commodities, and not Irish produce, or there is manifestly a "difference," which is fatal to the doctrine of the Philosopher. The merchants do nothing of the kind; they merely buy in the Irish market such commodities as they would buy if the landlord should dwell at home, or should not exist. They sell to the agent a bill; and if they did not do this, they would sell to the landlord, or other people, foreign produce of the same value. The difference is thisif the landlord dwell abroad, he merely, in the Irish market, exchanges one

kind of money for another, which puts no labour in motion; if he dwell at home, he exchanges his money for foreign produce, which puts a vast quantity of labour in motion.

The point is so important, that we will, at the hazard of being tedious, bestow on it some farther illustration.

If British landlords, possessing twenty millions of income, were to leave this country, and dwell permanently in France, how would this operate? According to Mr M'Culloch, it would add a clear twenty millions to our exports. If he be right, it must inevitably be true, that this would make a clear addition of twenty millions to the imports of France. France would receive this sum as a free gift, without returning any equivalent-she would receive it chiefly in raw produce-she would receive it only in such things as she would needand she would receive an increase of consumption commensurate with it at the same moment. Now, is it not perfectly clear, that this addition of twenty millions to the imports of France

that this addition of twenty millions to her annual profits-would enable her to employ an enormous additional quantity of labour? And if it be, is it not equally clear, that the gain of France would be the loss of England? The Economists are aware of the dilemma in which they have placed themselves. They manfully assert, that as the one country would not lose, the other would not gain; they might just as truly assert, that to take ten thousand pounds from the income of one man, and add it to that of another, would not make the one poorer, or the the other richer.

To support these doctrines, the Economists maintain, that although the removal of the landlords would throw an immense mass of capital and labour -an immense number of tradesmen, mechanics, artizans, and labourers out of employment for the moment, these would be permanently employed by other trades, which would be proportionably increased by the absenteeism of the landlords. We cannot go along with these people until we have something better from them than the flimsy assertions and assumptions to which they cautiously confine themselves. Let us bottom this matter. If the landlords go abroad the tenants raise the same produce, sell it to the

same people, and pay the rents in money to agents. The agents buy bills upon France with the money, and send these to the landlords. Now, what are the commodities sent to France which these bills represent? They consist almost wholly of raw produce.

If, in consequence of the absenteeism of the landlords, France buy a great additional quantity of East India silk of us, shall we then import an additional quantity of this silk? By no means. She will merely buy that silk which our manufacturers would otherwise buy. She will add nothing to our imports of silk. If she buy a great quantity of cotton of us, the case will be the same: she will buy what our manufacturers would otherwise buy, but she will not increase our imports of cotton. If she buy of us much wool and iron, the case will still be the same: we shall not produce more wool and iron-we shall only sell these to her instead of our own manufacturers. The same quantity of these articles might be brought into the country by the produce of the estates as before; but the demand for the twenty millions' worth of manufactured articles would be transferred from this country to France. The landlords would employ the French traders, mechanics, &c. instead of the English ones; and the raw articles would have to be sent to France, to be there manufactured, instead of this country. The mighty mass of capital and labour-the mighty host of traders, mechanics, artizans, and labourers-which the expenditure of the twenty millions now employs between the importer or English producer and the consumer, would be deprived of employment, while not a single trade would receive any additional capacity to employ them, save the carrying trade to France, of which France would engross a large portion. So far as regards employment being given by the landlords in other trades, nearly the whole of this capital and labour would remain idle for ever.

To render this still plainer, we will assume that a nobleman in this country expends annually ten thousand pounds in silk goods alone; and that those who supply him with, and make up these goods, serve him only. He buys the goods of his mercer, and this employs the mercer, his capital, shop

men, porter, &c. The mercer buys the goods of the manufacturer, and this employs the capital of the manufacturer and throwster, with the weavers, dyers, &c. The nobleman's family employ dressmakers to make up the goods. By employing these people, he enables them to consume many silks. Now, if he remove to France, and there consume the same quantity of silks, what is the consequence, assuming that in both places the raw article is bought of the English importer? He deprives the mercer, his capital and shopmen, the manufacturer and throwster, with their capital and workmen, and the dressmakers, wholly of employment, and of the means of consuming silks. His rent is raised as before; but instead of being expended in employing these people and their capital, it is taken in reality to the importer for the purchase of that raw silk to send to France which had previously yielded such employments. The trade of the importer remains the same, but the employment of the others is wholly lost, so far as regards the nobleman, if we except the trifling share that may be obtained by carrying the raw silk across the water.

This is looking at the matter in the most favourable point of view, and in a much more favourable one than we ought. So much capital and labour being rendered idle, would have the most mighty effect in depressing profits and wages. Consumption, general imports, and exports to all parts save France, would be greatly diminished. France, from receiving an additional twenty millions' worth of raw produce to manufacture, retail, and work up, would increase her trade greatly beyond the same amount.

We will assume that there are in this country three great and distinct classes of producers. The first is composed of the agriculturists, which includes the landholders. The landlord is as much a producer of corn as his tenant; the two are in reality copartners; the one finds the greater part of the capital, i. e. the land and buildings; the other finds the remainder of the capital, i. e. the stock. The second class consists of the importers or producers of raw produce not agricultural, and the third of the manufacturers. Under the term manufacturers, we here include all who work up and retail the raw produce of all descriptions.

Now, were our agriculturists to buy all their manufactures of France, this would throw out of employment all the manufacturing capital and labour of this country which are now employed in supplying them. If they could not send their own produce to France in payment, they would exchange it for the produce of the second class; this class would not import or produce more from this-it would merely send that produce to France which it now supplies to the manufacturers. This capital and labour would be thrown permanently out of employment; for, from the effect upon profits and wages, our carrying trade would be quite as much diminished with other parts, as it would be increased with France. Again, if the second and third classes were to buy the whole of their agricultural produce of France, this would throw the whole of our agricultural capital and labour out of employment. It would not increase the trade of these classes, though France should take manufactures in exchange; for they would merely send the goods to France which they now sell to our own agriculturists. They would, in truth, sell considerably less, because they would have to support gratuitously the idle population. Nothing we think in mathematical demonstration could be clearer than this -if we import French manufactures and corns when our own manufacturers and agriculturists can abundantly supply us with both, we must employ French capital and labour, render idle an equal amount at least of British capital and labour, and greatly diminish the profits of the capital and labour of the whole country. If British landholders go to expend twenty millions annually in France, this will only differ from our agriculturists as a body buying annually of France twenty millions' worth of French manufactured goods, instead of buying to the same amount of our own manufacturers, by its being infinitely more injurious to this country. If the opinions of the sage Economist be true, it must inevitably be true likewise,

1. That rents employ no labour after they are paid to the landlord. The landlord who expends fifty or sixty thousand per annum, gives no employment to labour by such expenditure.

2. That the rent of a landlord is in reality expended before it is put into

his hands, and that, although he may receive it in solid sovereigns, he cannot expend it again so as to employ labour. 3. That a nation can have no exports, unless its landlords, or others whom it supplies with income, dwell abroad.

4. That the imports of a nation employ no labour.

5. That the cultivators of land would have no surplus produce to sell, if they had no rents to pay.

6. That a nation cannot have any surplus agricultural produce, if its landlords be not absentees.

7. That were the absentee landlords to return home, each one-Heaven moderate his appetite !—would devour all the corn, hogs, and oxen, that his tenants could dispose of.

8. That if you take your business from your English tailor, and give it to a French one, it neither injures the one, nor benefits the other. By buying all your goods of the Englishman, you do not employ him; by buying the whole of the Frenchman, you would not employ him. Capital and labour cannot be deprived of employment, and they can never be superabundant.

9. That all trades are of equal value to a nation; it makes no difference to a nation whether it has merely a population just sufficient to cultivate its soil, or twice the number in addition engaged in manufactures and commerce. A nation can lose manufacture after manufacture, and this will do it no injury; in proportion as its manufactures may decrease, its commerce and agriculture will increase. If it lose the whole of its manufactures, and nearly the whole of its commerce, it will be able to employ its capital and population just the same in agriculture, although its land shall be previously fully occupied. If the whole of our manufacturers were thrown out of employment, they could immediately be employed in our agriculture, and the nation would not lose by it. A nation is as rich, populous, and powerful, when it has only its agriculture, as it is when it has in addition an immense portion of commerce and manufactures.

10. If all the people of independent fortune who now dwell in London, were to remove to Liverpool, and were to be restricted from procuring a single manufactured article from London,

this would neither injure London, nor benefit Liverpool.

11. If land in this country, which pays twenty millions of annual rent, should belong to the King of France instead of its present proprietors; and if his Gallic Majesty should constantly receive the rent in raw produce, and never send a shilling of it back to be expended on the land, the case would be precisely the same to the nation at large, as it is at present, when the land belongs to inhabitants of this country, who expend the rent in British merchandize and manufactures.

12. If fifty millions were annually taken from the profits of this country, and added to those of France as a free gift, it would neither injure the one country, nor benefit the other; it would neither make the one poorer, nor the other richer.

We could go farther, but we will pause at the round dozen. Gentle reader, what an amazing science is Political Economy !

The wretched dogmas that in reality lead to these conclusions, are not put forth as matters of opinion as things that may possibly be erroneous. Oh, no! they are promulgated as though their truth were matter of decisive demonstration; all who dissent from them are stigmatized as ignorant, prejudiced bigots, and covered with ridicule. The Economists have stuck themselves upon their bubble, and, in consequence, they imagine that they have soared far above the world, and the infirmities of human nature, and they seem to think that they have invested themselves with the attributes of Heaven. The foul names and grins of such egotists, will not, we conceive, disturb any man's peace, whatever effect they have on his risibility.

It is not solely on account of Mr M'Culloch that we have bestowed so much attention on this doctrine. The fact is and we most earnestly beg our readers to keep it in mind that upon this doctrine stands what is called our new and liberal system of Free

Trade. This system distinctly asserts as its basis, that to buy manufactures and corn of France, and other states which have adopted the prohibitory system against us, will benefit, and not injure, our own manufactures and agriculturists, although these may be able to supply us abundantly. This is exactly the doctrine of the Philosopher. It is exactly the same as asserting, that if our agriculturists buy nearly the whole of their manufactures of France with raw produce, it will benefit and not injure our own manufacturers; that if our manufacturers buy nearly the whole of their corn of France, it will benefit, and not injure our agriculturists; that if our landholders go to dwell constantly in France, their expenditure of their incomes in that country will be precisely the same thing to England as their expenditure of them at home would be. We repeat, that in reality there is not the least difference between the doctrine of Mr M'Culloch, and the principles on which this new system avowedly rests. If the doctrine be true, the system stands upon a rock; if the doctrine be false, the system is built upon sand, it will fall, and the fall will be terrible. We hope we have said sufficient to convince our readers that the doctrine is perfectly untenable. We are ourselves as thoroughly convinced that it is wholly false, and that the system which has been raised upon it is one of error and destruction, as we are that light is not darkness-that flame is not ice-that vapour is not adamant. Time will pro

duce that conviction in the nation which we cannot. Words may be disregarded, but ruin and misery will obtain attention and credence.*

We must now say something on a difference touching absentee expenditure, the existence of which Mr M'Culloch practically denies altoge ther. If the Irish absentee landlord dwell in France, he injures Ireland to benefit France; and the benefits which he confers on the latter do not ope

rate to benefit the former. If he dwell in England, what Ireland loses in respect of his expenditure is gained by England. The benefits of his expenditure are still kept in the empire. Ireland has a free trade to England, and his expenditure in the latter increases this trade. If there were a perfectly free circulation of labour throughout Britain and Ireland, if Ireland were as far advanced in manufactures and commerce as Britain, and if it could supply its full proportion of the various articles sold in the English market-then the residence of the Irish landlord in London, with regard to expenditure, would only operate to Ireland, as the residence of the Yorkshire landlord, in London, operates to Yorkshire. The great mass of our landlords are, to a very great extent, in respect of expenditure, absentees from their estates. They expend the greater part of their incomes in London, or other large places.

But whatever Ireland may lose from the landlord's expending his income in England, it forms but a very contemptible part of the whole loss which flows from his absenteesim. Excessive rents and subdivision form, so far as the landlord is concerned, the great curse of Ireland, and these do not necessarily flow from his expending his rents in London. The whole of our English landlords might dwell constantly on their estates, and still, if they should exact the utmost farthing of rent possible from their tenants, our peasantry would be as poor and miserable as the Irish peasantry, and our land would be as much subdivided as that of Ireland. Exorbitant rents, if they be general, must produce subdivision; and both, whether landlords be residents or absentees, must plunge the cultivators into want and misery.

If the Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, or Westmoreland landlord dwell almost constantly, and spend the whole of his income in London, his tenants are still in respectable and comfortable circumstances. They pay moderate rents -such rents as leave them fair profits upon their capital. The landlord seizes not the lion's share of the produce of the land-he gives them their due portion. In the distressed parts of Ireland everything is taken from the tenants but the most bare subsistence. The English farmer can save money he can reserve his farm VOL. XIX.

for one son, and put the others into respectable trades. The Irish farmer cannot save-he cannot put his sons into trades; when he dies his property must be divided, and, so far as regards his children, his land must be divided likewise. The English farmers and their labourers, in reality, retain and expend upon the estate a large portion of that rent, which in Ireland is extorted from the Irish ones, and sent out of the country.

While it is manifest that exorbitant rents, and their offspring, subdivision, are, so far as concerns the landlords, the great evils of Ireland, it is, in our judgment, equally manifest that these evils flow from absenteeism. If a nobleman or gentleman of large fortune who prides himself upon his rank and ancestry-who is fond of show and splendour-who has never known the want of money-who has his fortune in money already madewho has been taught to look upon the parsimonious ideas of traders with scorn-and who has been constantly habituated to generosity and profusion-if such an individual personally direct the management of his estate, it is not possible, in the nature of things, that he should be a bad landlord. Pride, pomp-every feeling of his nature, will compel him to let reasonably cheap farms, and to let his farms, and even his cottages, to none but men of good character and conduct. His larger tenants will be enabled to save, and to occupy more land; he will keep himself constantly enabled to let his land in farms of any size to good tenants. On the other hand, if a low-bred, mercenary man of small property, have the sole management of an estate as a per centage-agent, or middleman; if he take this management for the sake of pecuniary profit; and if his profit be regulated by the amount of rent which he can extort from the cultivators, it is not possible, in the nature of things, that he can be a good landlord. Every thing will conspire to compel him to sponge from the occupiers the utmost farthing of rent, without regard to anything else. While the owner only lets the land to enjoy a fortune-to obtain the interest of capital, this man lets it to make a fortune-to accumulate a capital. He will dissipate the capital of the larger occupiers, compel them, if they provide for their chil

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