BATTLE OF NAVARINO. 211 The events which followed need not be dwelt upon-the Morea again bent to the Mohammedan yoke; the fortresses of Nauplia and Napoli di Malvasia alone, of all its strongholds, remained in the hands of the Greeks (and these, without the co-operation of a fleet, may be considered impregnable); the piratical Mainotes had been driven and confined to the fastnesses of their native peninsula; and the more peaceful inhabitants of the plains, released from the dread of the wandering bands of "Palicari," once more returned to the cultivation of their vineyards, or resumed their long-interrupted commercial intercourse with the Turks. The Egyptian army, having fulfilled its task in the Morea, was about to be transported to some other part of the theatre of war, when the parties to the triple alliance interfered to arrest it. The battle of Navarino followed, and, in September 1828, the victorious Ibrahim was compelled to return to Egyptstript of all his conquests, but certainly not of his well-earned laurels. 212 THE EGYPTIAN ARMY. The war in Syria broke out soon after; and the siege of Akka and battle of Konieh added to the reputation of the Arab troops and their commander. It is here necessary to remark, that a considerable change had been effected in the Egyptian army since it first took the field against the Wahabees, when it was composed principally of the black slaves captured in the wars of Senaar and Kordofan. Those natives of a tropical region had, in the course of a very few years, been swept off by diseases brought on by change of climate, food, &c., and Mohammed Ali then determined on filling up the vacancies in his ranks exclusively with the native fellahs. Of these, the army which conquered the Morea was principally composed, and the regular army of Egypt continues, in a great measure, to be recruited to this day from the same class. It would be a matter of extreme difficulty for any foreigner to ascertain the exact numerical strength of the Egyptian army, as well from its being so dispersed over the THE EGYPTIAN ARMY. 213 various provinces that are now comprised within the government of Mohammed Ali, as from the want of returns that can at all be depended upon. But, if all the regiments of which it is composed were kept to their full establishment, it would amount to about ninety thousand men, organized as shown in the following table: do. 3 Companies of Veterans (in the Fortresses) 300 The complement of men to each regiment of cavalry is five hundred and thirty, formed into six companies, or three squadrons; and the strength of the regiments of infantry is three thousand two hundred men, 214 STAFF OF THE REGIMENTS. divided into four battalions of eight companies each. As but few, if any, of the regiments are complete, (indeed, some of them are mere skeletons) the strength of the regular Egyptian army, even including the staff and military schools, cannot, however, be calculated at more than eighty thousand men. Even this number is an enormous force to raise out of the population of Egypt." The staff of each regiment consists of a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, four chefs de bataillon, four adjutant-majors, four assistant adjutant-majors, one surgeon, four assistants, four accountants, and an iman (priest); each company-officered by a captain, lieutenant, and sub-lieutenant-is composed of a serjeant-major, four serjeants, eight corporals, two drummers, and eighty rank and file. This force is supposed to be raised and kept complete by conscripts, levied exclusively in Egypt. The troops raised in Syria, together with irregular Bedouin and other tribes, kept in pay by Mohammed Ali, would, perhaps, swell his ranks to nearly double that amount. The soldier is furnished yearly with two complete suits of clothing, and his daily ration consists of half a pound of meat, a pound and half of bread, with a small quantity of rice, beans, oil, vegetables, and wood. The war in which Mohammed Ali continues to be constantly engaged in the Yeman, the threatening attitude of the Porte, and the military occupation of Syria and Candia, impose on him the necessity of maintaining an army so totally disproportioned to the resources of the country, in men as well as in money; whilst, to make good the constant deficiencies caused in its ranks, both by the |